

1796.) 
Will they not henceforth be deaf to thofe 
advifers, if fuch there are, who would fe- 
ver them from their brethren and conneét 
them with aliens ? 
To the efficacy and permanence of your 
Union, a Government for, the whole is 
indifpénfible. No alliance, however ftriét, 
between the parts, can be an adequate fub- 
ftitute ; they muft inevitably experience 
the infraétions and interruptions which 
all alliances in all times have experienced. 
Senfible of this momentous truth, you have 
improved upon your firft eflay, by the 
adoption of a Conftitution of Government 
better calculated than your former for an 
intimate Union, and for the efficacious 
management of your common concerns. 
The Government, the offspring of our 
own choice, uninfluenced and unawed, 
adopted upon full inveftigation and mature 
deliberation, completely free in iis prin- 
ciples, in the diftribution of its powers, 
uniting fecurity with energy, and contain- 
ing within itfelf a provifion for its own 
amendment, has a juft claim to your con- 
fidence and to your fupport. Refpeét for 
its authority, compliance with its laws, 
acquiefcence in its meafures, are duties 
enjoined by the fundamental maxims of 
true liberty. The bafis of our. political 
fyftem is the right of the people to make 
and to alter their Conftirutions of Govern- 
ment; but the Conftitution which at any 
" time exifts, till changed by an explicit and 
authentic a&t of the whole people, is fa- 
credly obligatory upon all. The very idea 
of the power and the right of the pecple to 
eftablith Government prefuppofes the duty 
of every individual to obey the eftablifhed 
Government. 
All obftraGtions to the execution of the 
laws, all combinations and _ affociations, 
under whatever plaufible character, with, 
the real defign, to direét, controul, coun- 
teract, or awe the regular deliberation and 
- a€teon of the conftituted authorities, are 
deftruétive of this fundamental principle, 
and of fatal tendency. They ferve to or- 
ganize faétion, to give it an artificial and 
extraordinary force—to put in the place of 
_ the delegated will of the nation the will of 
a party, often afmaH but artful and enter- 
prifing minority of the community; and, 
according to the alternate triumphs of dif- 
ferent parties, to make the public admini- 
- flration the mirror of the ill-concerted and 
incongruous projects of a faétion, rather 
than the organ of confiitent and whclefome 
plans digefted by common councils, and 
modified by mutual interefis. 
MonriaLy Mac. No. X. 
ee 
Addrefs of Prefident Wafbington. 
However conftitutions or affociations of 
the above defcription may now and then 
anfwer popular ends, they are likely, in the 
courfe of time and things, to become potent 
engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and 
unprincipled men will be enabled to fub- 
vert the power of the people, and to ufurp 
for themfelves the reins of Government; 
deftroying afterwards the’ very engines 
which have lifted them to unjuft dominion. 
Towards the prefervation of your Go- 
vernment, and the permanency of your . 
prefent happy ftate, it is requifite, not only 
that you fleadily difcountenance irregular 
oppofitions to its acknowledged autherity, 
but alfo that you refift with care the fpirit 
of innovation upon its principles, however 
{pecious the pretexts.—One method of af 
fault may be to effeét in the form of the 
Conftitution alterations which will impair 
the energy of the fyftem, and thus to un- 
dermine what cannot be direétly, over- 
«| 
thrown. In allthe changes to which you 
mav be invited, rernember that time and ° 
habit are at leaft as neceffary to fix the true 
character of Governments as of other hu- 
man inftitutions — that experience is the 
fureft ftandard by which to teft the real 
tendency of the exifting Conftitution of a 
country—that facility in changes upon the 
credit of mere hypothefis and opinion, ex- 
pofes to perpetual change, from the end- 
lefs variety of hypothefes and opinion; ard 
remember, efpecially, that for the efficient 
management of your common interefts, in 
a country fo extenfive as our’s, a Govern-= 
ment of as much vigour as is confiftent 
with the perfect fecurity of liberty is in- 
difpenfible, Liberty itfelf wiil find ia fuch 
a Government, with powers properly dif- 
tributed and adjufted, the fureft guardian. 
It is, indeed, little elfe than a name, where 
the Government is too feeble to withftand 
the enterprifes of faétion, to confine each 
member of the fociety within the limits 
prefcribed by the laws, and to maintain all 
in the tranquil and fecure enjoyment of 
the rights of perfon and property. 
I have already intimated to you the dan- 
ger of partiés in the State,. with particular 
reference to the founding of them on geo- 
graphical difcriminations. Let me now 
take a more comprehenfive view, and wara 
you in the moft folemn manner againft the 
baneful effeéts of the fpirit of party ges 
nerally. 
This fpirit, unfortunately, is infepa- 
rable from our nature, having its root in 
- the ftrongeft paffions of the human mind.— 
It exifts under different thapes in all go- 
5M vernments, 
8 19 


