
. 
1796] 
perity, while it preferved all Europe from the 
calamities which it has fince endured; a medi- 
ation which this kingdom was fo well fitted to 
carry on with vigour and dignity, by its power, 
its chara€ter, and the nature of its government, 
hapvily removed from the contending extremes 
of licentioufnefs and tyranny. 
‘¢ From this neutral and impartial fyftem of 
policy, his Majefty’s Minifters were induced to 
depart, by certain meafures of the French Go- 
vernment. of which they complained as injurious 
and hoftile to this country; with what juftice 
thefe complaints are made, we are now called 
upon to determine, fince it cannot be pretended 
that the meafures of France were fuch as to 
preclude the poffibility of adjuftment by nego- 
tiation; and it is impoffible to deny, that the 
power which fhut up the channel of negociation, 
rouft be the real aggreffor in the war. To reject 
Negociation, is to determine on hoffilities, and, 
whatever may have been the nature of the points 
in queftion, we cannot but pronounce the refufal 
ef fuch an authorized negociation with that 
country as might have amicably terminated the 
difpute, to be the true and immediate caufe of 
the rupture which followed. Nor can we for- 
bear to remark, that the pretences under which 
his Majety’s Minifters then haughtily refufed 
fuch authorized communications, have been fuf- 
ficiently expofed by their own aontlnrs: in their 
fubmitting to a fimilar intercourfe with the fame 
Government. 
‘< This mifguided policy, which thus rendered 
the war inevitable, appears to have actuated the 
Minifters to a determination to continue it at all 
hazards. At the fame time, we cannot but ob- 
ferve, that the ob{tinacy with which they have 
adhered to their defperate fy{tem, is not more 
remarkable, than their verfatility in the pretext 
upon which they have juftified it. 
<¢ At one period the ftrength, at another the 
weaknefs of the enemy, hac ‘e been ufed as mo- 
tives for continuing the war; the fucceffes, as 
wellasthe defeats, of the Allies, have contributed 
only to prolong the conteft; and hope and de- 
fpair have equally ferved to involve us {till deeper 
in thé horrors of war, and to entail upon us an 
endlefs train of calamities. 
<¢ After the original profefled object had been 
- obtained, by the expulfion of the French armies 
from the territories of Holland and the Auftrian 
Netherlands, we find his Majefty’s Minifters, 
influenced either by arrogance, inflated by ambiti- 
6n, or vain hopes of conquefts, which, if realized, 
could never compeniate to the nation for the 
blood and treafure by which they mutt be ob- 
tained, rejecting, unheard, the overtures of the 
- Executive Council of France, at a period when 
the circumftances were fo eminently favourable 
for his Majefty and his Allies, that there is every 
eafon to fuppofe that a negociation, commenced 
at fuch a junéture, muft have terminated in an 
honourable and advantageous Peace. To the 
profpects arifing from fuch an.opportunity, they 
preferred a blind and obftinate perfeverance i ina 
war, which could fearce have any remaining ob- 
ject but the unjuftifiable purpofe of impofing 
Mr. Fox’s celebrated Motion. 
331 
upon France a Government difapproved of by the 
inhabitants of that country. And fuch was the 
infatuation of thefe Minifters, that, far from being 
able to frame a wife and comprehenfive fyftem of 
policy, they even negle€ted the few advantages 
that belonged to their own unfortunate {fchemé. 
«< The general exiftence of a defign to inter- 
pofe in the internal Government of France, was 
too manifeft not to roufe into attive’ hoftility 
the natural zeal of the people; but their parti: 
cular projects were too equivocal to attraét the 
confidence, or procure the co-operation of thofe 
Frenchmen who were difaffeéted to the then 
Government of the country. The nature of thefe 
plans was too clear, not to provoke formidable 
enemies, but their extent was too ambiguous to 
conciliate ufeful friends. 
“We beg leave farther to reprefent to your 
majefty, that at fubfequent periods your mini- 
fters have fuftered the moft favourable opportu- 
nities to efcape of obtaining an honourable and 
advantageous pacification. ‘They did not avail 
themfelves, as it was their duty to have done, of 
the unbroken {trength of the great confederacy 
which has been formed againft France, for the 
purpofe of giving eifect to overtures for nego- 
ciation. They faw the feceffion of feveral 
powerful ftates from that confederacy ; they fuf- 
fered it to diffolve without an effort for the at- 
tainment of a general pacification ; they loaded 
their country with the odium of having engaged 
in a combination charged with the moft quef- 
tionable views, without availing themfelves: of 
that combination for procuring favourable con- 
ditions of peace. 
“¢ That, from this fatal neglect, the progrefs of 
hoftilities has only ferved to eftablifh the evils 
which might certainly have been avoided by 
negociation, but which are now confirmed by 
the events of the war. We have felt that the 
unjuftifiable and impra¢ticable attempts to efta- 
bliih royalty in France by force, has only proved 
fatal to its unfortunate fupporters. We have 
{een with regret the fubjugation Holland, and the 
agerandifements of the French Republic, and 
we have to lament the alteration in the ftate of 
Europe, not only from the fuccefs of the French, 
but from the formidable requifitions of fome of 
the allied powers on the fide of Poland; requifi- 
tions alarming from their magnitude, but ftill 
more fo from the manner in which they have 
been made, fo fatally has this war operated to 
deftroy in every part of Europe that balance of 
power, for the fupport of which it was under- 
taken, and to extend thofe evils which it was its 
profeffed object to avert. 
“ Moft cordially, therefore, did we affure his 
majefty that his faithful commons heard with 
the fincereft fatisfaction his majefty’s moft gra- 
cious meffage of the 8th of December, wherein 
his majefty acquaints them, that the crifis which 
was depending at the commiencement of the 
prefent feffion, has led to fuch an order of things 
as would induce his majefty to meet any difpo- 
fition to negociation on the part of the enemy, 
with an earneft defire to give it the fulleft and 
{peedieft effect, and to conclude a general treaty. 
, Uuz2 o: 
