1800. ] 
For the Monthly Magazine. 
THe ENQUIRER, No. XXII. 
What are effentially the CHARACTER and 
CONDITION of MAN? 
HERE is nothing in which civilized 
I, antiquity appears more laudable, 
and indeed more enviable, than in the phi- 
lofophical liberty it allowed of difcuffing 
fpeculative queftions relative to fome of 
the moft important topics, without athx- 
ing either a public or a private ftigma on 
an individual, on account of the conclu- 
fions he might deduce from his reafonings. 
Deriving the character of a man from the 
the manner in which he fulfilled his duties 
in fociety, and taking for granted, that, 
if he acted well, he poffeffed the motives 
proper to influence him to that courfe of 
action, it regarded with great indiffer- 
ence the metaphyfical or theological fyf- 
tem he had chofen to adopt, and never 
entertained an idea of converting tenets of 
opinion into tefts of qualification for the 
offices of a citizen. Our modern dog- 
matifts, though very far from agreeing 
among themfelves upon many fundamen- 
tal points of doftrine, have yet affociated 
their feveral modes of thinking fo exclu- 
fively to the beft principles of aétion, that 
they have refufed the very name of good- 
nefs to virtues not deduced from their 
theories on the nature and relations of 
man. We have feen even fomere a mat- 
ter of fpeculation, as the origin of evil, 
reprefented as the great hinge of morality; 
and a belief of that fyftem which refers it 
to a fuppofed corruption of human nature, 
made the difcrimination between ge- 
nuine and fpurious morals. ‘That evil or 
imperfeétion exifts throughout the whole 
fentient creation, is fufficiently obvious ; 
but it would feem equally fo, that our bu- 
finefs can only be the correétion of it ; 
and that the means of doing this muft be 
general to all human creatures, as far as 
they make ufe of reafon and experience, 
whatever notions ancient fable or hiftory 
may have given them concernjng its ori- 
gin. On this fubjeét, as on many others, 
the rage for forming hypothefes feems to 
have created difficulties and perplexities 
which do not neceffarily belong to it. If 
we content ourfelves ‘* with reafoning only 
from what we know,’ and confider the 
charaéter and condition of man merely as 
facts in natural hiftory, I conceive that 
our fpeculations concerning them need not 
be either intricate or unfatisfactory ; and 
that we fhall be able to free our minds 
from a mafs of error and prejudice tend- 
ing to bewilder our ideas and miflead our 
condu&. 
Monrxary Mac. No. 64, 
The Enquirer, No. XXII, Baise) 
Man is the terminating link of the ani- 
mal creation. [It is equally evident that 
he participates the nature of this clafs of 
beings, and that he is at the fummit of 
the fcale. His points of conformity with 
the animals beneath him are ftriking and 
numerous. Like them, he pafies through 
the ftages of growth, maturity, and de- 
cline: like them, he perifhes as an indi- 
vidual, but perpetuates himfelf as a fpe- 
cies: like them, he has his pains and plea- 
fures, difeafes and remedies, wants and 
the means of fupplying them. The firft 
law of nature in both, is that of feeking 
happinefs. In both, this happinefs is 
partly perfonal, partly focial. In both, 
occafions arife in which the perfonal and 
focial coincide, and others in which they 
interfere. Now comes the principal mo- 
ral difference. In brute animals, where- 
ever the /zorge, or parental and conjugal 
affection, does not take place, the indi- 
vidual uniformly (a few dubious cafes, 
perhaps, excepted) prefers his own grati- 
fication to that of another, or of any num- 
ber of others: in man, the ftrength of 
‘fympathy, the pleafures of fentiment, the 
habits of fociety, and the reciprocal ties and 
dependencies of various kinds, have fo in- 
volved the interefts of numerous individuals, 
that happinefs cannot be purfued to any 
extent but as a matter of alliance and con- 
junction. Hence cafes perpetually occur 
in which a man is induced to refign his 
immediate and fingle gratifications for the 
fake of that common good in which he is 
a fharer. This is a /aw of bis nature; 
and, confidering it as {uch, it is not of the, 
{malleft confeyuence whether a theorift 
finally refers it to a benevolent or a Yelfifh 
principle. Further, he is enabled by that 
idea of the conneétion of caule and effect, 
and that memory of paft and anticipation 
of future events, which he poiieffes, if 
not folely, at leaft in a degree greatly fu- 
nerior to cther animals, to refift the im- 
pulfe of prefent appetite and paffion, when 
his own greater good, or that of perfons 
dear to him, requires it. Here then ts 
a large provifion made in his nature for 
the attainment of all the perional and fo- 
cial virtues. He will be prudent and 
temperate in the ufe of fenfual enjoyments, 
both that he may not exhauft the fource, 
and that the confequences. of excefs may 
not overbalance the pleafures. He will 
be kind and benevolent, compaffionate and 
charitable, becaufe he 1s fo conitituted as 
to fympathife in the happinefs and milery 
of thofe around him; becaute he isa fo- 
cial, and not a folitary being. He will 
eyen intereft himfelf in the concerns of 
Ee large 
