376 
trine and the objection to it.—All our 
more feeble impreffions or ideas are the 
copics of our more lively and immediate 
imprefions. The idea of caufe is derived 
from no fingle inftance of the operation of 
bodies, but from a fucceflion of them, 
which produces 2 new impreffion of ac- 
cuffomed connection. And this impreffion 
is the parent of the idea of eeefary con- 
neGion—thus far Mr. Hume. But, fays 
Mr. Richter, acccuftomed conneétion and 
neceflary connection are eflentially dif- 
ferent ; hence we have an idea which is 
not a copy of a previous impreflion. Now 
though I am fatisfied with this reafoning, I 
am by no means contented with the general 
inference which Mr. RICHTER torms; 
for he fist identifies Hume’s theory with 
the whole body of our national metaphy- 
ficks, and thence determines that as our 
own nation contains no ‘* reafonable and 
confiftent theory’ of the origin of ideas, 
we fhould have recourfe to the fyftem of 
the famous German profeflor Kant. 
When I confider the general chara¢ter of 
Kant’s Philofophy, and that is exprefsly 
eftablifhed on the notion of innate ideas *, 
} am anxious to fhew that we are not 
driven to the necefaty of reviving the 
buried controverfies of the laft century, 
-and that we need not raife the {pirit of 
antient metaphyfics which the powerful 
wand of Locke has been thought to have 
for ever laid. ; 
Grofsiy and indiftin@tly examined, the 
philofophy of Hume nearly refembles that 
tatight in the {chool of Hartley, and the 
modern French philofopners. But the 
charaéter of his writings does not autho- 
rife their being the reprefentative of the 
modern fehoel. Xn felicity of definition, 
mm familiar illuftration, and in per{picuity 
of narrative, we muft in candceur allow 
the preference to our continental neigh- 
bours ; but their works are more fpecious 
than profound, they rather fate plaufibly 
than prove fkilfuily; and though they 
fatisty the willing fiudent, they are not 
rich in that variety and depth of proef 
which the feeptic requires. Hartley, on 
the contrary, with few exterior extractions, 
is at once profound and folid: he fur- 
nifhes an armoury oftenfive and defenfive, 
and the minute detail of proof which he 
dilplays, makes a permdnent impreffion. 
Of Hume, I fear, that in fpite of his 
pait renown, a ferere analyfis will dif- 
cover, that though, from the influence of 
much tafte, he could.diffufe over a broad 
_—————— 

Dr. Beddoes’ very excellent eflay on 
tures of Denonfrative Evi cence. 
The Origin of the ldea of Caufe. 
furface a general air of elegance; and 
from the acutenefs of his mind, deteé 
errors, inconfiftencies, and abfurdities in 
the popular opinions, as in his exquifite 
dialogues, the fceptic, &c. yet that from. 
the want of clofe and correét thought, or 
not having the habit of attending minutely 
to the meaning of words (which means 
the fame) he was not able to write with 
that precifion and correétnefs which can 
fatisfy the learned critic or the fubtle dif. 
utant. . 
Whilf then I allow that Mr. Richter 
has in ftriétnefs refuted Hume, I muf 
oppole the /pirit of his argument. For 
the affertion by Hume, that all our ideas 
are copies ef our impreffions, is in fub- 
tance the fame as the generally received 
notion that al! our ideas are derived from 
the fenfes. Let us difmifs for the prefent 
Hume’s diftinétion between impreffions 
and ideas, and adopt one that promiles a 
clear elucidation. ‘*Senfations,perceptions, 
-and ideas, are the changes produced in 
the interior organ by the impreffions on 
the exterior organ. Thele changes 
confidered in themfelves are ealled fen- 
fetions; when the interior organs per- 
ceives them, they are termed precep- 
tions, and they are called ideas when the 
interior organ refers thefe changes to the 
objects producing them}.’” I have an 
idea of neceflary conneétion at this mo- 
ment, that I am enquiring into the ob- 
je&t that produced it. But when firft ex- 
cited, it was only a perception, that is, (as 
in propriety all ideas are) an involuntary 
change in my internal organ, produced 
by the tran{miffion of a fenfation by the 
external to the internal organ, and there 
modified by all the affociated previous 
fenfations which that organ had received. 
It is reafonable that the perception of. 
caufe fhould not be generated by the firft 
inflance of coexiftence or fucceffion of 
event; but bya repetition of fuch inftances. 
But Mr. Hume has unhappily accounted 
for it. ‘¢ There is nothing in a number 
of inftances different from every fingle 
inftance which is fuppofed tobe exaétly 
fimilar, except only that after a repe- 
tition, the mind by habit expedts,” 
&c. Now in truth, every inftance is 
really different, in the fame manner as 
if two perfons are taken to a view which 
one of them has feen formerly, or in land- 
{cape, his fenfation fimply in itfelf, though 
complex in its caufes, will be very dif- 
ferent from that of him to whom the ob- 
ject was altogether novel. If it is afked, 
when, and in what manner, this percep- 

Tt Syfeme de la Nature. 
tion | 
vee 

[*May 

