1799-] 
tion is excited, I anfwer, that the celerity 
of all intellectual affociations juttifies our 
fuppofing that it takes place. very early 
in life, long before the term itfelf could 
bemade intelligible. A child, for inftance, 
kicks a ball, it rolls, he lays his hand 
upon it, and it ftops. An obfcure per- 
ception of caufe or neceflary conneétion 
rifes in his mind, and, like the gradual 
perception of objects at day break, his 
organs aré flowly quickened, till he fees 
clearly and diftinétly all around him. 
One of the great axioms of modern philo- 
fophy is, that general terms are not ex- 
preflive of any particular idea, but that 
they are calculated to call up or excite in- 
differently many diftin&t ideas. In. the 
abftra& we can have no idea of caufe, but 
from our earlieft infancy we have had 
frequent experience of what is fignified by 
that term. The child is very foon made 
fenfible that he muft ftoop to pick up his 
toy, and that if he does not grafp his 
hand it will fall; this perception is fuf- 
ficiently explained by the law of affoci- 
ation, which eftablifhes the connection in 
idea between the end to be attained and 
the means to be employed. This great 
truth Mr. Hume has endeavoured to ttate, 
but with an inaccuracy which alone gave 
his opponent-a decided fuperiority. “« We 
* then feel a new fentiment or imprefflion, 
** to wit, a cuflomary connection in the 
** thought; and then obferves, that 
this fuggelts the idea of meceffary connec- 
tion. Now, though it was a cuftomary 
connection in faét which produced. tke 
connection in thought, yet, in the mind of 
the child, the cu#/fom or habit of the con- 
nection formed no part of the perception 
or rather fenfation. The ideathat it did, 
fuppofes much fuperfluous and uncauted 
reflection. The conneétion was at firft per- 
haps faint and unconticious, and as it grew, 
received additional and fupplemental cir- 
cumftances, fuch as the idea of the caufe 
of its own exiftence. From the great 
law of affociation, by which the ap- 
pearance of one object excites in the mind 
the idea of others connected with it, and 
alfo revives fenfations (excited by thofe 
objeéts) which are not by any one fup- 
poled to be copies of any thing external, 
have arifen all ideas of reflection; and it 
has ultimately given birth, in a being 
purely paffive and mechanical, to that 
feries of motions the vigour, rapidity, 
and fortunate conneétions of which, pro- 
duce the fublime energies of the POET 
and the PHILOSOPHER. 
But however, Hume’s diftinétion be- 
ween impreffions and ideas mutt be thrown 
MonruLry Mac. No. xLv. 
The Origin of the Idea of Caufes 
377 
afide ; becaufe it feems to imply a diftinc- 
tion in nature; whilft the definitions of 
the French philofopher eftablith diftinctions 
which are purely relative, and founded on 
different views of the fame fubje&t ; and 
do not clafh in the leaft with BERKELEY : 
and if this objection were not fatal, the 
arrangement would be found imperfect, 
applying only to thofe ideas of fenfation 
which may be faintly excited in the ab. 
fence of the original external obje&t. But 
the impreffion of neceffary connection hay- 
ing arifen from an external objed, flimu- 
lated with a mind impregnated with certain 
previous impreffions, it ever remains an 
impreflion, loting by reflection none of its 
original force and livelinefs, and there- 
fore never becoming, in Mr. Hume’s 
fenfe, an idea. ; 
But Mr. Hume, though fometimes ac- 
quainted with the law of affociation, de- 
nies that the external objeéts excite the 
idea of caufe. It would exceed the limits 
of a paper to review his 7th fection. Thole 
who examine it, will find, that he has ~ 
grofsly confounded the perception of a 
connection iz fact, between certain events, 
as the fenfe of pain after blows: witha 
knowledge of that energy in nature by 
which the coneétion is preferved, fuch as 
the occult principles of animal irritation 
and fenfation, operating, through the 
fuppoled agency of the nerves: a know- 
ledge which is beyond the limits of hu- 
man intellect. \ 
Left Mr. RicHTeER fhould reply that 
there is {till a diftinétion between an uni- 
tormly experienced connection and a necef- 
fary connection; I would remark, that 
the neceffity zz future is fuggefted in- 
ceffantly to the child, by the trequent oc- 
cafion for renewed efforts in his little occu- 
pations, and in the obftacles attending his 
exertions. And, that when once necef- 
fity in individual cafes is apparent, it 
fuppofes no greater exertion of what is 
popularly called adéfive power, than all 
theories allow; to extend in thought fuch 
neceflity to paft events : and finally bya 
train of fimple and demonftrative reafon- 
ing, to arrive at one of the moft.valuable 
truths in philofophy, the fubje&ion of 
the intellectual as well as the material 
world to the irrefiftible laws of neceffity. 
It may feem that I have not reafoned, 
but rather afferted, in thefe remarks ; but 
argument muft in all cafes terminate in 
the affertion of faéts, which thofe who 
hear them, will varioufly receive as they 
agree with their own obfervation. He 
reafons beft, who appeals to the facts moft 
sa and on that ground 
3 
i 
Ihave — 
