O54 
fhip, there Le be a village-magifracy, 
or, at leaft, ove judicer. 
Vili. The members ecunlee om the 
fires to the National Auembly fhall not 
be confidered as oes deiegates, bur as 
the reprelentatives oF the whole people. 
By eae time it is generally admitted to be 
the duty of reprefentatives, not to decide in 
all cafes as the people themfelves would de- 
cide ; butas it.is beft for the people that they 
Should decide.. 
Gpinion with that of the conftituents; but 
its coincigence with univerfal juftice, is the 
rule of aprobation. Now the fhorter the 
time a delegation lafts, the greater the pro- 
bability of obedience to the conftituency. In 
order then te diminifh the influence of ay 
vulgar, and unfound opinicn, time ian 
eughtto be given for fudden ferments of the 
public mind to fubfide. 
fnould have a chance of affuading bis own 
better judgment on the muititude. A year, 
in the prefent ftate of infiructicn, is evidently 
too little. Triennial, are therefore prefera- 
bic to annual parliaments, 
IX. The delegates 
fhall nct be conlideied 
of individual trithings, 
fhure. 
x. The delegates 
fhali not be confide 
Individual hund 
to the thire-ceurt 
as reprefentatives 
but of the whole 
s to the trithing-towns 
sred as reprefentatives of 
dreds, but of the whole 
g. 
X1. Confequen'ly no individuals of the 
éelegated body we) be recalled at the plea- 
fure of the conftituent body; but fhall aé& 
during the whole. period of office, unlefs 
they incur its forfeiture by foe {pecific 
cr me legally afcertained. 
XII. Each delegated body thall judge 
without appeal concerning the validity 
of the elections of its com¥ponent indivi- 
duals. 
Surely this is a falfe principle, borrowed 
ee Bsitith practice. 
le€tions is the province ef the fenate, that 
Fete can perpetuate its authority beyond its 
jegal period, independently cf the people. 
It can render itteif indiffoi like the 
Long Parliament; cr pafs a feptennial bill, 
like the Cruel Parliament. But, if magif- 
trates chofen by the people (cali them therifis) 
have the duty allotted them of convoking 
the poil-motes at the appointed time, inde- 
pendent'y of a legiflature pretendedly para- 
mount, this is lefs cafy. Befises, the members 
of all popular affemblies have been fond of 
expelling thefe in the minority ; and thus are 
naturally predifpofed partially to decide con- 
Cerning a return, whofe valisity were more 
“conveniently afcertained near the {pot by the 
verdiG of a quarter feffions jury. 
Section I. 
Of the Formation a Eleétion-Meetings. 
Article I. Al oying the right 
Hes 
uble, 
Ts enjo 
A Contribstion to the Tieary of Reprefentation, &c. 
Wot the coincidence of. their 
The reprefentutive- 
Where the police of 
(yates 
of fuffrage fhall be effembled, not by 
parifnes, borat ughs, or towns, ate by hun. 
dreds -—fuch meetings to be cailed prima- 
ry affemblies, or poll-motes. 
Ir, All perfons enjoying the right of 
fuffrage to be called ative citizens, no 
others to partake of the primary aflemblics. 
In the purfait of general principles it is 
not probable that any European lawgiver wiil 
go further than to confer a€tive cit'zenthip 
on ailadult males 3 yet mav it be maintained, 
that if the right of fuffrage were beftowed on 
women, and that right exercifed by PYOXYs it 
would in noth hing intesrupt 'the modefy and 
retircfomenefs which is the ornament of 
their character. Thefe proxies would tefow 
on huibands and fathers ef families a two, 
three, or four-fold influence at elections of 
reprefentatives and of magiftrates, and would 
therefore operate in behalf of thofe feverer 
mora!s to which fingie men are often indiffe- 
rent. [tis true, that for the proxies of wo- 
men independently circumfanced, and re- 
markable for the influence of their years 
and beauty, a chivalrous competition wouid 
arife among the young men; but this might 
be defirable under democratic conftitutions of 
government, which, by furnifhing the men 
with much occupation, have, perhaps, a ten~ 
cency to fegregate the fexes more than is fa- 
vourable to their reciprocal improvement. 
On fimilar grounds the fuffrage of children 
- he qualifications of an active ci~ 
tizen fhall be. 
. To be bora or naturalized in France. 
. To be twenty-five years old. 
. To have dwelt for one year within 
the hundred. 
4. To pay a direc tax, at leaft equal in 
value to the price of three days labour: 
And 5. To be no hired fervant. 
Why thefe rettri:Gians ? Does not the frft 
limitation betray a narrow-minded nationali- 
ty? The ftrangers may be politically aggrieved 
by an alien bill, era droit d@aubaine: ought 
he not thea to be allowed a natural channel 
of redrefs, in the opportunity of attaching by 
his vote the protection of fome reprefenta- 
tive? Is not the fecond too ftrict ? As foon 
as man is able to bear arms, and as his own 
labour fuffices to maintain him, that is, ac- 
cording to the decifion of Athens, at /xteex 
years of age, has he not every claim :o fuf- 
frage which the law-giver ought to contem- 
plate ? The third feems reefonable encugh, | 
and well adapted te guard againit thofe vaga- 
bond fturdy fwearers, who, at an Englith ge- 
neral eleCtion, appear fuccefiively in half a 
dozen towns to perfo mate the abfent ano the 
dead: yet pertons lately removed ought ro 
retain a right of voting fomewhere.  {s not 
the fourth ufelefs ? Cin property derive any 
fecurity from the quality of the worers? Are 
net the igtermediate bady of choafers the effiz 
cient and real electors, the oily. ones whole 
wi 
Px 
