9:6 4 Contribution to the Theory of Reprefentation, &c. (Jan. 1, 
V. No bankrupt, or infclyent debtor, 
‘nay be or become a member of the primary 
fecondary or nationai affemblics, or of the 
municipal or adminiftrative bodies. 
VI. The like privation fhall extend to 
children inheriting and retaining the pre- 
perty of an infolvent father, without pay- 
ing their proportion of his debts;— 
excepting, however, married children, 
portioned before the infolvency of the fa- 
ther. ; 
v. and vi. Thefe reftri€tions cannot but 
infli& infamy on many innocent perfons: they 
‘have, therefore, all the demerit of teft-laws 
The Englifh law of ele€tion infliéts infamy 
on thofe who fell commodities to the public, 
and on thofe who accept public employments: 
it expels contractors from parliament, it for- 
bids revenue-officers to vote. Thus it takes 
for granted, that the executive power has an 
intereft hoftile to that of the nation; yet it 
punithes as a libeller the man who {peaks or 
writes againft the public enemy: the former 
35 the abfurdity. 
To punifh thofe who offer money for votes 
at popular eleétions, is another puritanical 
encroachment on popular rights; intended, 
like the laws about gambling, to prevent the 
higher clafies from diffipating their fortunes 
in moments of paffion, and thus finking oc- 
eafionally back into the mafs of the people. 
Why fhould the voter be riftrifted from 
choefing which equivalent he will have for 
bis vote, the empty triumph of a demagogue, 
er the increafe of his conveniences ? 
VII. Thofe excluded by the fifth and 
fixth articles may refume the rights of ci- 
tizenfhip, on complying with the aforefaid 
regulaticns; that is, by paying in full 
their creditors, or the proportionate fhare 
of their father’s debts. , 
VIII. In each municipality fhall be 
kept a iit of the active eitizens—diftin- 
suifhing thofe eligible to offices. No ci- 
tizen to be enrolled in this lift, who thall 
mot have all the above mentioned qualifi- 
cations, who fhall not have prefented the 
record of bis civic infcription; and who, 
‘after the age of twenty-five, fhall not have 
publicly taken, in prefence of the fore- 
‘man cf the hundred-court, the oath to 
maintain with a'l his might the conftitu- 
ticn of the country (to be faithful to the 
nation, the law, ard the king), and to 
fulfil the civil and political funétions to 
him intrufted withoutfear, fee, or favour. 
Why is not the cheice of the people, or of 
the confituted authorities, in all cafes made 
a fufficient qualification for eligibility to of- 
fices ? And why is 2 civil teft to be impofed ? 
Cannot a republican be a gacd magiitrate un- 
‘ger a king, and a royalift under a republic? 
IX. No citizen frail exert in mere than 
‘one piace his right of, voting. Ne one 
may in any aflembly act by proxy. 
Difconne&ted enaGions thefe, which thouid 
have been feparated. Why may nothing be 
done by proxy? Is net all reprefeatative go- 
vernment founded on the very principle of 
acting by proxy? A man does not indeed 
often, in the firt inftance, appoint his-attor-_ 
ney by proxy, but what further reftriGion 
would be ai ail reafonable ? 
X. No clafs being henceforward prier- 
leged in France the a4ive citizens of what- 
ever quality or condition fhall come with- 
out any diftin&tion to the primary af- 
fembhies. 
A claufe to forbid—-what #—the common 
forms of difference. Is this the arrogance of _ 
new liberty ? Nothing can be mere imprudent 
in the Jaw-giver, than to irritate the remem- 
brance of the degraded claffes by the unnecef- 
fary mention of diftin@ions which éxift not, 
and the ambition of the defpifed clafies by the 
unneceffary mention of a privilege withheld. 
XI. There fhall be at leaft one primary 
aflemoly in every hundred. 
XII. When the number of citizens in 
a hucdied fhail not exceed goo; there fhall 
be but one primary affembly. When it 
exceeds goo, there fhall be but two, of at 
leaft 450 citizens each. 
XII. Each primary affembly thall tend 
as much as poffible to the number of 600; 
yet fo that if there be many afflemblies in 
one hundred, the leaft numerous fhall con- 
hit at leaft of 450. Thus, were the veters 
are more than goo, but fewer than 1050, 
there fhall be no complete affembly of 600, 
tecaule the fecond cou'd then not confit of 
450m, 
Where the voters are more than 1050, 
the firi-formed afflembly fhall confit of 
6co, and the fecond of 450 or more. 
If the number amounis ts 1400, there 
fall be but two, the fir of 600, and the 
other of 800; but if to 1500, there fhall 
be three, one of 600, and two of 450; and 
fo forth, according to the number of active 
citizens in each trithing. 
XIV. In towns of 4000 or fewer fouls, 
there fhall be but one primary affembly. 
There fhall: be two in thofe containing 
from 4000 to 8000, three in thofe from 
8000 to 12,000, and fo forth. Thefe af- 
femblies fhall be formed by wards or fee- 
tions, viz. by contiguous diftributions. 
XV. Each primary affembly, as foon as 
fermed, fhall ele&t a foreman and fecretary 
by fimple f{erutiny and abfolute plurality 
of votes ;—till which eleétion the elder ci- 
tizen fhall prefide, and the three next oldeft 
fail colleét the votes in prefence of the 
affembly. 
XVI. Next fhall be nominated three 
{crutineers, who fhall receive the return 
of the fubfequent polla, This poll pee 
alle 
