958 
-pulation of the kingdom fhall be divided 
Info as many parts as this trithe requires 
of reprefentatives ; and each department 
fall eleét as many reprefentatives of this 
clafs, as it contains of the faid fhares of 
population. 
XXX. The third trithe fhall be at. 
tached to the direct contribution. The 
total fum of contribution fhali be fplit 
into as many parts as there are reprefen- 
tatives of this clafs; and each fhire fhall 
name as many reprefentatives as it pays 
fhares. 
XXXI. The reprefentatives of each 
fhire fhall be named from among the eli- 
gibie citizens of that fhire. 
XXXII. To be eligible to the national 
affembly, a direé&t tax of a mark of filver 
mutt be paid, and fome larfded property 
poffeffed. = 
xxxi. and xxxil. Once more why thefe 
yeftriciions ? Should the expenfive conteft for 
Weitminfter ever become inconvenient toa 
true friend of the people, ought other places 
to be debarred from foliciting his fervices? 
Ought the citizens to be circumfcribed in their 
choice of candidates by any limitation ? 
XXXII. The eleétors fhall name, by 
double {crutiay and relative plurality of 
votes, a number of fubfitutes equal in 
number to a trithe of the reprefentatives, 
whole places they fhall fill up in cafe of 
death or refignation. 
Had thefe fubftitutes undertaken to meet 
for the difcuffion of political interefts, thus 
forming a convention merely deliberative, 
not enactive, this inftitution would have been 
analogous to the Court of Competitors in 
Hume’s Idea of a perfeé&t Commonwealth. 
When changes become neceflary in an efta- 
blithed conftitution, there is no method more 
likely to bring about an agreement of the 
people concerning them, than Sees a 
merely deliberative court of this kind. 
XXXIV. The act of election fhall be 
the fole delegation from the confti:uents. 
The liberty of voting in the reprefentative 
fhall be refrained by no private or condi- 
tional inftructions. ‘The primary and fe- 
condary aflemblies are to addrefs their pe- 
titions, remonftrances, and inftructions, to 
the reprefentative body at large. 
XXXV. The primary and fecondary 
aflemblies, when the elections are finifhed, 
fhall diffolve; and neither continve nor 
refume their functions, until the period of 
the enfuing elections. 
The cotemporary meeting of all the primary 
affemblies legally calls into aétion at once a 
power neceffarily greater than that of the 
government, whofe ftability confequently 
may thereby be endangered. Why fhould 
not different fhires ele&t their reprefentatives 
at different times? Why not monthly or 
A Cintribution to the Theory of Reprefentation, Sc. 
{ Jan. 1, 
weekly admiffions and difmiffions of a few 
delegates ? In all the revolutions of France 
many provifions cf this decree have been 
thought worthy of retainal by all parties. 
At is remarkable, that no regulation is con- 
tained in it for theeduration of the repre- 
fentative body: but if may be inferred from 
the fubfequent claufes relative to the choice 
of magiftrates, that exe half of the parliament 
was to be renewed yearly, and confequently 
the feats to be biennial. 
The following two confiderations may be 
thought to afford a fufficient motive for pre- 
ferring the annual eleétion of one third only. 
Oneimportant danger to which the freedom 
of nations has been expofed in all revolution- 
ary periods, is the extra-legal perpetuation of | 
authority in the hands of theirleaders. The 
thirty tyranes of Athens, the decemvirs of 
Rome, the long parliament ef England, the 
cruel parliament of 1716, have all forcibly 
prolonged their power, after the lofs of their 
popularity, beyond its juft period. For thefe 
ufurpations no other remedy has been found’ 
than infurreGtion. It may however be ob- 
ferved that, if the whele of a reprefentative 
body have at once to vacate their feats, that 
whole body may be interefted to put off its 
diffolution, and to protract illegally its fit- 
tings; and that, if one half be to go out at 
once, one half is liable to that wifh, and 
may find it eafy to gain over a vote or two, 
and thus accomplifh their purpofe. Whereas, 
if one third only (or any lefs number) be to 
go out at once, the chance always muft be 
that the legiflature will compel the pun&ual 
obfervance of the law (two-thirds having by 
the hypothefis no intereft in the breach of it), 
and thus fecure to the people a regular peri- 
odical renovation of their choice. 
A fecond important danger is that to which 
the wifdom of national decifion is expofed in 
periods of popular ferment, when the public 
mind is violently agitated by fome political 
queftion of importance. It happens, namely, 
in confequence cf fpeeches delivered with 
glow and circulated with zeal, or of fome 
pamphlet written in a form unufually ime 
prefive, that the mafs of a people are ata 
given moment operated on by the arguments 
on one fide only: and, that, while the im- 
preflion of thefe reafonings is recent, their 
occafional declarations would be contrary te 
their fettled will, their momentary paftion 
different from theirdeliberate opinion, They 
are ina like fate with the audience of a de- 
bating fchool, during the plaudit which fuc- 
ceeds the harangwe of a favourite fophift; at 
that inftant, they would vote differently from 
what they will do at the clofe of the dif- 
cuflion. Now, if during fuch ebullitions of 
prejudice a complete dilfolution of the legif- 
lature occurred, the ma{s of reprefentatives 
would be fent in conformity to this tranfient 
impreflion, and the meafures of government 
would partake the caft of popular effervel- 
cence; it would declare a rafh war, or enact 
perdecyting 
