1797] 
tiply contrary opinions, are foftered by 
conceit. This quality is called by the 
French, opinidireté, and by fome of our 
old Englith writers, opiniatry, doubtlets 
to exprefs the immoderate fondnefs of 
rhe conceited man for his own opinions. 
fo this fault young people are particu- 
larly liable. The firft acquifitions which 
a young perfon makes in {cience, like the 
firft pieces of money which a child calls 
his own, are valued beyond their real 
worth ; and the reafon in both cafes is, 
that the poffeffor is not capable of com- 
paring his little ftock with the larger 
treafures of others. It is chicfy on this 
account, that : 
« A little learning is a dangerous thing.”? 
While we are at the foot of the hill of 
fcience, our view is fo confined that we 
ean neicher perceive to what heights 
ethers have attained, nor obferve what 
vaft regions remain unexplored by our- 
felves. In the lower ttages of improve- 
iment, men aré apt to reft fatisfied with 
their prefent attainments, and to fic down 
contented with their prefent ftock of 
ideas, and their pretent fet of opinions, 
without fufpeéting that they may be 
falfe and erroneous, or apprehending any 
neceflity for giving them a careful re- 
vifal. It is from the madeft enquirer, 
and not from the conceited fciolift, that 
the world muft look for the correétion 
ef thofe errors which have diverfified 
opinion. 
Nearly allied to conccit is fertinacity, 
another moral fault, which has the fame 
tendency. Some men grafp their opi- 
nions, in whatever way they acquired 
them, with fo firm a hold, that they can. 
hot be wrefted from them by any force 
of argument. 
nions have all the valve and certainty 
of axioms. Never admitting a doubt 
concerning the truth of the dogmata 
they embrace, or making the fuppo- 
fition, fo mortyfying to their pride, 
that poflibly they may be miftaken, they 
read and converfe only to fupport their 
fyftem. “ Why fhould we give our- 
felves the trouble to fearch for atreafure, 
which we already poffefs ? or why liften 
to men who are, either 1gnorantly or dif- 
honcftly, pleasing the caufe of error ?”’ 
Such is the genuine language of dogma- 
tifm. Its fure effeét upon others, is to 
produce difguft inftead of - conviction ; 
upon the dogmatift himfelf, to fhut him 
up for ever within the narrow inclofure 
of his own prejudices: it therefore tends 
Yo perpetuate multiplied and contradic- 
tory errors. 
The Enquirer. No. MITl.. 
With fuch perfons, opti-. 
15 
Dogmatifm, upon the moft faveurable 
fuppofition, proceeds from narrow and 
partial views. But men are often pofi- 
tive atid dogmatical, not becaufe they 
have ftudied the fubjeé in difpute im- 
perfectly, but becaufe they have not 
ftudied it at all. Whey have no doubt 
that the opinions which they have re- 
ceived from their anceftors, or from their 
inftruétors, muft be true: without exa- 
mining the arguments, or evidence on 
which they are founded, they embrace 
them as incontrovertible doétrines, and 
maintain them as ftrenuoufly, as if the 
had feen them eft»blifhed upon the fulleft . 
demonftrations. Such perfons feem to 
confider their opinions as a part of their 
inheritance, and to retain them as tena- 
cioufly as their ¢ftates. This implicit 
afirence to author ty, evidently tends to 
preferve alive thofe falfe opinions which 
have once obtained the fan¢tion of a great 
name, or the patronage of the civil 
power. According to this principle, 
Ariftotle ought full to prefice in our 
fchools, and the fyftem of Defcartes 
fhould never have ‘given way to that of 
Newton. Were this principle univerfal, 
error, in its multifarious forms, muft be- 
come perpetual ; and ic would no longer 
be true, that * ** time, while it confirms 
the dictates of nature, deftroys the fic- 
tions of opinton.”’ | 
But nothing has a more powerful ten- 
dency to produce thofe erroneous judg- 
ments, which occafion diverfity of opi- 
nion, than the predomunancy of paffion 
over reafon. Whale the mind is kepr 
perfeétly cool, and_tree from agitation, it 
can contempiate objects according to 
their réal nature, without exaggeration 
or diftortion: and to view every thing 
as it is in itfelf, and asit ands related to 
other things, is the proper office of the 
underftanding, and the only way to dif. 
cover truth. In mathematical-and philo- 
fophical reafonings, provided the feelings 
of vanity and emulation be excluded, the 
underftanding 1s commonly free from the 
bias of the paffions, and purfues truth in 
the right line of fair inveftigation. But 
on other fubje@s, in which perfonahin- 
tereft is concerned, and concerning 
which, hope, fear, or any other power~ 
ful paffion renders the decifion, on cither 
fide, an object of defire or averfion, we 
are in perpetual danger of forming falfe 
judgments. It is not, indeed, certain, 
that in determining any doubtful quef- 
ae 



~ 
* Opinionum commenta delet dies, Nature 
judicia confirms, Cre .3- 
HON, 

