ci toe ail 
: : 6 ’ 
cuity of reafoning, more than they gain 
in elegance of writing. It may deferve 
the attention of thofe who are fond of 
eloquent argumentation, that one of the 
moft perfeét books of reafoning in the 
world, the Elements of Euclid, has not 
a fingle rhetorical figure from the be- 
ginning to the end. As far as language 
is concerned in argument, a better rule 
cannot be laid down, than that of Cicero: 
“Care fhould be taken to make ufe of 
the moft common words, and fuch as are 
beft adapted to exprefs the meaning*.” 
The neglect of method in ftudy, is an- 
other fruitful caufe of diverfity of opi- 
nion. Even in the conftruétion of gene- 
ral plans of education for public fchools, 
much remains to be done, before a regu- 
lar edifice of inftruétion will be ereéted. 
There is a natural conneétion among the 
feveral parts of fcience, which renders 
it exceedingly defirable that a broad 
foundation being laid in the knowledge 
of the materials and the inftruments of 
{cience, things, and words, the fuper- 
firuéture fhould be raifed with a due re- 
gard to relation, proportion, and har- 
mony. When this great work fhall be 
accomplifhed, by the united exertions of 
well-informed and comprehenfive minds, 
it may be expe€ted, that many fyftems 
of opinions will be overturned, and that 
the uniformity of judgment, which 
ftate{men and prieits have {fo long in vain 
attempted to produce by ceercion, will in 
fome degree arife from the regular in- 
veftigation of truth. For the want of 
fuch a plan of inftruétion, knowledge, 
even upon the fubjecéts mofl interefting 
to man, 1s commonly gathered up in an 
accidental and defultory manner. Par- 
tial views are taken of great queftions in 
theology, morals, and policy ; no fingle 
point is examined throughout, and in re- 
gular train. A few arguments, on one 
fide, are contemplated in full view, and 
in a ftrong light; others of equal im- 
portance are flightly noticed; and, per- 
haps, the whole, or the greater part of 
the evidence, on the fide contrary to that 
which the reader is difpofed to favour, 
is overlooked, or defignedly kept out of 
fight. The inevitable effects mutt be 
Prejudice, error, and diverfity of opi- 
nion. 
If the matter be traced fiill higher, it 
will be found that, where neither paf- 
fion nor prejudice interferes, men ftill 

* Opera danda eft, ut verbis utamur quam 
ufitatifimis, & quam maxime aptis, id eft, rem 
declararitibus, Der Fin. L. iv. c.'20. 
Montruiuy Mac. No, 3X, 
The Enquirer. No. XII. 
jh 
think differently, from the want of cer- 
tain dafa, in which they are agreed, as 
the bafis of their fubfequent reafonings. 
Excepting only in purg geometry, a 
foundation of definitions and axioms has | 
never yer been fo firmly laid as to pro- 
duce, in the application, irrefiftible de- 
monftration. Some philofophers have 
conceived, that there are in every f{cience 
certain firtt principles, the truth of which 
is intuitively perceived, But it is. a 
ftrong pre{umption again the exiftence 
of fuch principles, that no one has ever 
yet been able to difcover a criterion by 
which they are to be diftinguifhed, on 
the one hand, from opinions formed by 
prejudice, and, on the other, from the 
legitimate deduétions of reafon. It will 
perhaps be found, upon ftriét examina- 
tion, that thofe firft principles which are 
called axioms in geometry, appear to the 
mind as certain truths, becaufe they 
neceffarily follow from the admitted fig- 
nifigation of the ‘terms. The whole 1s 
known to be greater than its part, not 
by intuitive reafon, but, becaufe the 
terms whole and part being underftood to 
exprefs certain relative ideas of magni- 
tude, cannot retain their meaning, unleis 
the propofition be received as true. If 
this explanation of the nature of an 
axiom be accurate, the reafon why there 
is fuch a perfeét agreement concerning 
geometrical truths, and fo much diverfity 
of opinions concerning propofitions in 
other fciencés, is, that, in the former 
cafe, the leading terms which are made 
ufe of are univerfally underftood in the 
fame fenfe; but, in the latter, have dif- 
ferent meanings. / 
Diverficy of opinion mutt be ultimately 
afcribed to the different degrces of im- 
perfeétion in human knowledge. Were 
all men perfeétly acquainted with the 
nature, properties, and relations of the 
beings which come under their percep- 
tion or contemplation, they muft fee 
every thing as it is, and muft, therefore, 
form the fame judgment concerning it. 
Did all men know alike, though imper- 
fectly, their opinions muft be the fame. 
But, while one man knows more than 
another, and while men, from their in- 
complete knowledge of things, muft 
neceffarily view the. fame objects under 
different afpeéts, and be liable to mifcon- 
ception and error, it is impoffible that 
diverfity of opinion fhould not arife. 
Concerning mathematical figures and 
quantities, our knowledge is certain. 
Concerning the forms and obvious pro- 
perties of bodies, which come under the 
notice 
