266 
the GNOSTIC POWERS of the foul, we 
fhall find that they are accurately five in 
number, viz. xtelleé?, cogitation (tivo) 
opinion, phantafy, and fenfe. : 
INTELLECT is that power by which 
we underfiand fimple felf-evident truths, 
called axioms, and are able to pafs into 
concract with intellectual forms feparated 
from all conneélion with matter. 
COGiTATION is that power by which 
we reafon icientifically, 
Orinron is that which knows the 
univerfal in fenfible particulars, as, that 
every man is a biped ; and the conclu- 
fion of cogitation, as that every rational 
foul is immortal ; but it only Knows the. 
emt or ¢hat a thipg ts, but is perfe@ly 
ignorant of the dior, or wey it 1s. : 
‘The PHantTasy is that power which 
apprehends things clothed with figure, 
and may be called a figured intelligence, 
(poe diel sae vonzic). Aas 
Laftly, SENsE is that power which is 
-dfftributed about the organs of fenfation, 
which is mingled with paflion in its 
jucgment of things, and alone appre- 
hends that by which it ts externally agi-. 
tated. - 
Now ‘it is evident, fince tlie energies 
of thefe. powers are perfectly diftinct 
from each other, that the powers them- 
felves, which are the fources of thefe 
energies, mutt aifo be diftinct. ne 
' Again, it is evident that defire, which 
tends to one thing, auger, which afpires 
after another thing, and that deliberative 
tendency to things in our pocver, which the 
Greeks cali procrefis (merwssecic) are fo 
many diftinét vital powers of the foul. 
But above both the gnoftic and viral 
powers is the ove, or the fummit or ver- 
tex of the foul, by means of which we 
are enabled to fay, I perceive—I opine 
—I reafon—I defire—I  deliberate— 
which fummit follows all thefe energies, 
and energizes together with them 3 for 
we fhould not be able to know all thefe, 
and to apprehend in what they differ 
frem each other, unlefs we contained a 
certain indivifible nature, which fub- 
fifts above the common fenfe, and which, 
prior to opinion, defire, and will, knows 
all that thefe know and defire, according 
to an indivifible mode of apprehenfion. 
In a fimilar manner, therefore, a mul- 
titude of mighty powers fubiifi in the 
intelleét of the Father of the Univerfe, 
difttiné&t from each other, and from their 
comprehending caufe. But they are not 
enly tranfcendéntly more diftinét in the 
Anfwer to the Enquirer. 
of its attributes or powers. 
[Oc, 
divine mind, than in the human foul, on 
account of their unmingled purity, and 
proceeding into different orders; but 
they are fabricative, as well as vital and 
gnottic. 
No objections of any weight, no ar. 
guments but fuch as are fopkiftical, can 
be urged againft this fublime Platonic 
mode of conceiving multitude and unity 
as fubfifting together in the intelleét of 
divinity. Itis this theory which thofe 
who declaim againft the. theology of the 
ancients, fheuld firft exdeavour to under- 
{tand, before they attempt to fubvert. 
At the fame rime, unfortunately, it is a 
theory fu entirely negleéted, that it is not 
to be difcovered, in any writing, fince the 
time of the emperor Juftinian. Indo- 
lence and prieftcraft have hitherto con- 
fpired to defame thofe ineftimable works* 
in which this, and many other equaily 
fublime and important theories can aione 
be found; and the theology of the Greeks 
has been attacked with all the fury of 
ecclefiaftical zeal,and all the imbecil flafhes 
of miftaken wit, by men whofe concep- 
tions on the fubjeét, like thofe of a mai’ 
between fleeping and waking, have been 
TURBID and WILD, PHANTASTIC and 
CONFUSED, PREPOSTEROUS and VAIN} 
The modern Trinity, I ihall leave the 
Right Reverend Clergy to defend. My 
province extends no farther than to 
fhow that neither Plato, nor any of 
his genuine difciples, had any conception 
of a trinity fuch as that which is now ef- 
tablifhed by law! To-prove this, it is 
neceffary, in the firft place, to oabferve, 
that the higheft God is every where cele- 
brated by Plato under the epithets of the 
one and the good ;and is confidered by him 
as a nature fo tran{cendently excellent, 
as to be fuperior to being itfelf. Thus 
towards the conclufion of the firft hypo- 
thefis in the Parmenides, he exprefsly 
afferts that the oxe in no refpect partici- 
pates of effence. And in the fixth book 
of his Republic, he fays that ‘* tbe good 
is {uperior to effence, tranfcending it both 
in dignity and power.’ In the So- 
phifta too, he fhows that deimg partici- 
pates of, and is therefore pofterier to the 
one. In fhort the firft god 1s confidered 
by Plato as exempt from all habitude, 
proximity, or alliance with heing, or any 
Henee, he 
—~ 

* Thofe of the latter Platonifts, viz. ‘Ploti- 
nus, Porphyry, Jamblichus, Proclus, &c. &c. 
&c. 
-juttly 
