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meaning, when employed either in phi- 
lofophical reafonings, or common life.” 
The queftion here feems to be, whe- 
ther we {hall relinguifh the principle, or 
difcard this ftabborn idea that will not 
fabmit to it? Some men, I have no 
‘doubt, would willingly-give up every 
idea in their heads, rather than incom- 
mode their favourite fyftem; but Mr. 
Hume would not do this rafhly. “‘ There 
still remains,” fays he, ‘* one method of | 
avoiding this conclufion.” Well then, 
let us fee how this unfortunate idea will 
efcape. 
It is not, he owns, reafonable to con- 
clude, merely ‘“ becaufe one event, in one 
inftance, precedes another, that, therefore, 
the one is the caufe, the other the effect ;”” 
secaufe, “ we can never obferve the te 
between them.” For inftance, when [ 
frike this table, the blow is followed by 
2 found, and all that I perceive are the 
motion and the found; but I do not fee 
what it is that conneéts thefe~ events, 
nor, if this were the firft time I had 
ebferved them, fhould I have any idea 
of a neceffary conneétion between them ? 
But “ when many uniform inftances 
appear, and the fame objeét is always 
ie 
followed by the fame event, we then’ 
begin to entertain the notion of caule 
znd conneétion.” That is to fay, after 
abferving two events conftantly fucceed- 
ing one the other, we conclude that they 
muft always occur for the future in the 
ame order, and that, whenever the firft 
takes place, the other muft of neceflity 
follow it. Mr. Hume fays, it is not 
«by any procefs of reafonmg’’ that we 
draw this conclufion. How then? By 
<‘ cuftom or habit; for,’ he argues, 
«© whenever the repetition of any parti- 
cular aét or operation, produces a pro- 
‘ penfity to renew the fame aét or opera- 
tion, without being impelled by any 
reafoning or procefs of the underftand- 
ing; we always fay, that this propenfity 
is the effeét of cuftom.”” ‘ When we 
fay, therefore, that one object is con- 
neéted with another, we mean only, that 
they have acquired a connection in our 
thought.’~ . 
Accordingly, one of his definitions of a 
caufe is, ** an object followed by an- 
other, and whofe appearance always ¢on- 
yeys the thought to thar other.” Let 
us try this by an inftance :—Suppofe a 
_philofopher, who, with an excellent fto- 
mach, had all his life been ufed to 
live well, fo that at a certain hour, when 
he began to feel himfelf hungry, he was 
On Hume’s Account of Necefary Connetivn. 
[Sup. 
regularly ferved with a good dinner; 
then imagine that a fet of - lean half- 
famifhed philofophers, of fome other 
feét, merely for the fake of an experi- 
ment, fhould eat up his dinner for him. 
Well, at the ufual time his appetite re- 
turns. That event, which had always 
been fucceeded by another fo very agree- 
able, immediately conveys his thought to 
that other; becaufe, forfooth, the appe- 
tice and the dinner have acquired a con- 
nection in his thought, and he feels a 
ftrong propenfity to renew a pecultar act 
or operation. Here are all the fymptoms. 
of caufation; but no dinner! How the 
philofopher would be furprifed. In a 
little time, however, he would fee that 
Hume was miftaken. He would find 
that the cuftomary conneétion of two 
events might caufe an affociation of his 
ideas, fo that, when one of the events 
occurred it would convey his thought to the 
other; but this would no more make him 
expeét that other, than he would expect 
a dinner becaufe his appetite put him in 
mind of it. He would learn not to confider 
one event as the effet of another, merely 
becaufe the ideas were affociated in his 
mind; he would look not only for a cuf- 
tomnary, but a neceffary conneétion be- 
tween them: but it is clear that cuftom 
or habit can only aflociate our ideas, and 
give us the notion of a cuftomtary connec- 
tion. The queftion 1s, how do we get 
the idea of a neceflary connection? Says 
Mr. Hume, “ When the fame object is 
always followed by the fame event, we 
then begin to entéxtain the notion of 
caufe and connection.” This is a face 
which no one difputes; the only queftion 
is, qwby do-we then begin to entertain 
fuch a notion? Upon the bare experi- 
ence, that # ceftain event has hitherto 
been fucceded by another, why do we 
with fuch affurance conclude, that it muft 
always be fucceeded by it? Mr. Hume 
tells us, it is becaufe “ We then feel a 
new fentiment or impreflion, to wit, a 
cuftomary conneétion in the thought or 
imagination, between one objeét and its 
ufual attendant; and this fentiment,” he 
informs us, “is the original of that idea 
which we feek for.” If the idea in queftion, 
which is thar neceflary. conneétion, be 
copied from the idea of cuftomary connec- 
tion, the idea of black may be copied from 
that of white. Let the cuftomary con- 
neétion pave ile as long, and the habit 
of obferving it have grown as obftinate as 
you pleafe, it can never change its nature ; 
it is Rill but a cu&emary conneétion, ey 
ow 
t 
