Vou. IV.) 
how it fkould raife in the mind a totally 
new idea, feems perfectly inconceivable. 
The gap is ftill unclofed, and the {pace 
berween the bas deen and the mu/t be, is as 
wide as ever, But it may be infifted, 
that the habit of conftantly obferving a 
connection, aéts fo upon the mind, as to 
make us afterwards pofitively expect it, 
and believe it abfolutely neceffary. If 
this affertion were fufficient, nothing 
could be more ealy or more common , 
but the caufe here afligned is notorioufly 
inadequate to the effect. What is there 
in the circumftance, of my having hitherto 
always feen two events connected, that 
feem. at all calculated to raife in me a 
belief, that they could not poflibly have 
occurred feparately, and that they muft 
always for the future be fo joined: 
That, upon experiencing a- cuftomary 
conneétion, or rather a conftant order of 
fuccetlion, we do conceive the idca of,a 
neceflary connection, is allowed; bet 
what proof have we that this experience 
is the caufe of the idea? If we exa- 
mine the nature of the experience, we 
find nothing in it that bears the leat 
reference to fuch an idea; fo rhat the 
argument ftands thus: habir certainly 
produces the idea of necefliry, becaufe it 
is fucceeded by that idea in the mind. 
In fact, it is an affertion unfupported by 
argument. What is the ufual effect of 
habit > Mr. Hume tells us, it is “ a pro- 
penfity to renew a particular aét or ope- 
ration,” in other words, it is a defire of 
obtaining fomething to which we are ac- 
cuftomed. But csn my defire of a thing 
perfuade me that I mu% neceffarily oo- 
tain it, and that the whole order of na- 
ture would be deftroyed if I fhould not ? 
Doubtlefs it will be infifted, that the 
ftrong defire or propenfity, derived from 
habit, to renew the connection between 
two events, does abfolutely raife in us a 
belief, thar there is a neceffary connec- 
tion between them, and that this defire 
of renewing it, compels us to think that 
it will be renewed. Yet this aifertion is 
Kill more detticute of proof than the laft. 
How has it been proved that we have any 
defire that the effeét fhould follow the 
caufe>?> Afk the thief at the gallows 
-.whether he defires that the rope fhould 
- ftrangle him. . It may be faid, perhaps, 
that defire is the conftant effeét of habit, 
and may therefore be f{uppofed; but never, 
furely, did the greateft dunce contract a 
liking to the birch, though in the habit 
of being flogged daily. The repetition 
even of what was once agreeable, . fres 
Montuix Maa. XXYVI. 
Origin of the Idea of a Caufe. 535 
quently becomes tirefome, and what is fo 
eagerly purfued as vaiiety? But that the 
mind takes no pleafure in the conftant 
union of the effect with irs cavfe (merely 
as fuch) feems evident from the greedinefs 
with which men fwallow the monftrous 
ftories of enchantment, ghofts, miracles, 
-&c. where all that fo much delights us 
is, the diforderly produétion of fome ef- 
feét by an unufual caufe. Yet I will 
even fuppofe it proved, that we have 
fome occult defire or propenfity to renew 
the conneétion between,events 3 ftill the 
chief point is to be confidered. It has 
not yet been fhown, that the mere defire 
of a thing #s in any way caiculated to 
produce a belief of its neceffity, nor does 
it appear that fuch a defire could even 
form the idea of necefflity in the mind; 
at leafl, I can fee no reafon to conclude 
that it does, and Mr. Hume does not 
fupply me with any; on the contrary, he 
contounds the two thiags together, and 
then accounts for them as if they were 
one and the fame. In order to prove 
that the habit of obferving a conneétion 
gives us the idea of its neceifity, he tells 
us, that it creates a propexfity to renew irs 
as if the propenfity to, or, defire of a thing 
were not to be diftinguilhed from the con- 
ception of its neceflity. Thefe are cer- 
tainly two very different ideas, nor dol 
fee that one in the leaft refers to the 
other. Whether we are told, therefore, 
that habit produces the idca of neceffity, 
or, that habit only raifes a propenfity, 
and that this propenfity caufes the idea; 
what is all this but affertion and conjec- 
ture, unfupported by reafon? 
Indeed, Mr. Hume himfelf, as if in- _ 
ternally confcious that he had not traced 
the idea to its fource, drops the term Aadést 
and has recourfe to that of znffimd. 
Speaking of this operation of the 
mind, by which we infer like effe&ts from 
like caufes;’ he tells us, ‘it is more 
conformable to the ordinary wifdom of 
nature to fecure fo neceffary an a& of 
the mind by fome inftin& or mechanical 
tendency, which may be infallible in its 
operations, may difcover itfelf at the fir 
appearance of life and thought, and may 
be independent of all the laboured deduce 
tions of the underftanding.” 
T underftand by inftinét, a power de- 
pending upon the peculiar ftructure 
of the mind, and which determines it to 
fome particular act. If it be by inftinét, 
therefore, that we infer one event from 
another, that is, if the peculiar ftruéture 
of the mind make us conceive a neceffary 
4 A connection 
