536 
conneétion between two events or im- 
preffions ; that inftiné: is the origin of 
the idea of neceflary conneétion, and not 
the mere impreflions or events which 
were only conneéted by it in our thoughr. 
« Nature,” he continues, ‘¢ has impiant- 
ed in us an inftinét which carries forward 
the thought in a correipondent courfe to 
that which the has eftablifhed among ex- 
ternal objects.” But this is mot enough. 
An inftinét which fhall make me con- 
clude one event to be the caufe of another, 
mutt not only carry my thoughtfrom one 
to the other ; it mutt not only affeciate the 
two ideas, and remind me of their cuf- 
tomary connection ; it muit actually pro- 
duce in my mind the idea of a neceflary 
conneétion between them; for till it does 
this, it cannot make me eoncludé that one 
3s the caufe of the otber. If the inftinét 
do not give me the idea of a neceffary 
conreétion between events, itcannot make 
me infer like effeéts from like caufes ; 
and, therefore, fuch an infin would 
not anfwer the purpofe ; and if we get the 
idea from any other quarter, for infiance, 
from obferving the ¢< courfe eftablifhed 
among external objects,” the inflinct is 
altogether fuperfluous, for in that cafe, 
all we want Is memory. 
Bur it has been proved, that we did 
“not acquire this idea by obferving the 
‘courfe of events; as in all that courfe 
there is nothing like the idea to be ob- 
féerve Therefore, whetlier we have 
an infinet, and, the idea originate in it, 
or whatever may be the origin of this 
idea, it does not appear that it could 
either arife from the conneétion of events 
gn any fingle inflance; or from the cuf- 
tomary connection in a number of in- 
fances 3 or from the habitual affociation 
of ideas, arifing from thet cuftomary con- 
neftion ; or even from any defire we may 
de'fuppofed to have for the renewal of 
the connection. We cannot, therefore, 
attribate it to the impreifions of fenfe, 
either immediately or mediately ; fo that 
it ands im direct oppofition to the prin- 
ciple of Me’ Hume’ <>: 
It remains now to be decided, whether 
ave fhall difcard-an_ idea which feems 
effential to’ human reafon, or give up the 
uaiverfality of this principle ? “Chofe 
who refolve to abide by the principle, let 
what will become of the idea, fhould at 
jaett be as candid as Mr. Hume has been, 
and firft, carefully examine whether there 
be not fome impreffion from which it 
might be derived ; after that, they may, if 
they pleafe, deny its exiftence, as a dog- 
Origin of the Idea of a Caufe. 
(Sur. 
matical fhoemaker m'ght fwear you have 
no feet, becaufe his fhoes will not fit 
them. : 
But it may be faid, according to Mr. 
Hume's fyftem, an !dea is in faét.no idea, 
unlefs it be derived from fome pnpreition; 
nor till he has difeovered that impreffiion, 
does he fpeak of it pofitively as fuch, he 
calls it only a /uppofd.rdea. W oar an 
excefs of refinement is this! “We hear. 
every day of the fuppoted advantages of a 
ruinous war, that is to tay, advantages 
thet exit only in idea; but here is an 
idea which exits only in idea. I wonder 
how fome philofopkers would. have an 
‘dea exit. If we afk-Berkeley im what 
way ideas exift, he tells us plainly (fec, 
139) that they exif? merety by cvay of idea, 
and I confefs [ am of his opinion. — 
I fhall not, however, atccmpt to prove 
the exiftence of rhis idea as to thofe wha 
have not the idea, it would be impoffivle, 
and ro thofe who have, fuperfluovs. Yetit 
may not be amifs to apprize thofe whe 
deny itsexitience, of the diJemma ro whic 
they are reduced. . Fither they mutt ac- 
cnowledge they have the idea, whofe 
exiftence they deny ; or confefs tncy have 
no idea cf what they deny. | 
Tr may be afked, of what ufe is this 
inguiry into the origin of ideas? Shall 
we not continue to aé upon the belief of 
a neceflary connedtion between _ events, 
and will not the effeét-as regularly foilow 
its caufe,, wherherwe know the origin of 
this idea‘orrot? Certainly. And what 
is more, we fhall probabiy continue to 
dfpute abut the exifience of a FIRST 
CAtSE, and argue as learnedly as ever, 
both for and apainft the doétrine of 
wECESSITY, whether we are able to fell 
bow fuch an idea ever came into. our beads 
or ‘not. This is undoubtedly true, and 
yet there ts one reafon why I with we 
wvere able ta account, not only for this, 
but for a thoufand other phemomena im 
the mind; and that is, that we might 
have fome plea for rejeéting, without ex- 
amination, the fyftem of Profeffor Kant; 
for it would be an excellent excufe for 
treatmg the philofophy of other nations 
with contempt, if we could but produce 
a reafonable and confiftent theory of out 
own. - H. RICHTER. 
EN 
To the Editor of the Monibly Magazine. 
SIR, Shieh. 
HE commercial clafs of your readers 
may probably colleét fome informa- 
tion, were you to infert the following ob- 
obferyations 
