3 
very common, namely, that of concluding the things 
in question to be alike, because they are analogous ; 
to resemble each other in themselves, because there 
is a resemblance in the relation which they bear to 
certain other things.” Whately, Elements of Ithe- 
toric, chap. ii. §. 6. p. 65. Also Appendix B. He 
quotes largely Copleston’s Four Discourses on the 
Doctrines of Necessity and Predestination. ‘ Ana- 
logy does not mean the similarity of two things, but 
the similarity or sameness of two relations,” Xc. 
Most of our modern systematical writers of natu- 
ral history have drawn up differential tables, or syn- 
opses of their different arrangements. Every one, who 
has deserved any praise for his diligence and acumen, 
has added more or less to the number of preceding 
discriminations, has pointed out new differences and 
agreements, which repeated investigations and new- 
ly discovered objects have suggested. These have 
led to various changes of classification; which have 
sometimes been hastily and rashly adopted, and 
sometimes opposed and decried with petulant per- 
tinacity, of common occurrence in all argumenta- 
tion. 
A synoptical table of different systems of classifi- 
cation may be seen in the Introduction to the Cata- 
logue of the Ashmolean Museum. But I have long 
felt a wish to see a table, not of striking differences, 
but of remarkable analogies. If the term chance be 
defined an effect without either an uniform or a de- 
signing cause; then indeed differences, issuing from 
an impulse uncertain and perpetually inconstant, 
B 2 
