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is a discriminating, a selecting, a judging, a prefer- 
ring, an avoiding, a desiring, a fearing, a hoping, an 
abhorring principle. These properties of mind are 
not indeed objects of sight, as mouths and feet and 
hands are, but they are not less certain. We might 
as wisely doubt whether we have mouths and hands, 
as doubt whether we have discriminating, judging, 
fearing, and hoping faculties. These latter indeed 
are objects of consciousness, not of the senses; but 
without consciousness we could have no knowledge 
of the existence even of the senses. 
As organs have a manifest relation to purposes, 
to ends to which they are especially adapted, so by 
analogy we may presume that mind, which is to 
guide the organs to such end, is allotted to each 
individual for such guidance; to be a guard against 
peril, to record experiences, to employ past expe- 
rience as a warning to abstain from action, or as a 
stimulus to promote it, and for other and yet greater 
purposes which I do not here specify, because they 
belong to a distinct science. 
Without mind, we should obviously have nothing 
on which, and nothing with which, to argue. It is 
the repository of our sensations, of our reflections, — 
of our emotions and our passions; of our judgments 
on the mutual relations of external objects; of the 
relations of all to us, and of us to all; of the relations 
of man to man in society, and of man to the Author 
of his being. 
To confound the active principle with the organ- 
ized machine would, in arguing on a work of human 
