409 Mr. Lofft on the Syftem of Idcalifi 
And if matter requires fpace for a fup- 
port or fubfiratum, and yet fpace be mo- 
thing real, the confequence is evident and 
inevitable.’ If fpace be a real exifting 
fabflance, let its advocatés fhew wherein 
it differs from a mere zdea of the order and 
selation of confiftent fen{fations. 
If it be afked, have thefe zdeal powers 
and effects no Jocality, no fubftaniial 
effence in which they inhere; the anfwer 
is this, MIND, confcious power, aktive 
exifience, fupplies every thing which is 
intelligible, and not contradictory in the 
idea of place and fubfiance. If it be ob- 
jeGted, but mind detached from fome fub- 
fiance, as its fupport, is inconceiveable, 
and indeed wareal, the reply may juftly 
be, what /upport of mixvd, other than its 
own eflence, and the WILL of the su- 
PREME MIND, can be conceived? Do we 
imagine that the infinite, omnifcient, om- 
nipotent, and immutable Diiry hath 
matter or {pace for the fupport of HIS 
EXISTENCE, oris any thing evidently and 
certainly real but minp! 
I now proceed to the feveral PROPOsr- 
TIONS of BERKELEY. The jix/? propo- 
fition, that ** the objeds of human know- 
ledge are ideas,” is faid to aflume the 
matter in dilpute; for that they may be 
things:—that is, zmpercipient fubftances. 
But of thefe, if they do exift, we have by 
no means azy knowledge: our knowledge 
is limited to our fén/fations, perceptions, 
and refleciions. | 
But does not the ENQUIRER affume 
what is to be proved in the flrange hypo- 
thefis of ideas and fenfations :—fuppofing 
fenfation to be. motion, communicated to 
one end of a bundle of tubulated fibres, 
at the extremity which is excited by ex- 
ternal fubftances, and zdea motion at 
the other end, at the extremity which is 
conneéted with the feat of the mind, Sen- 
{ation cannot be motion communicated to 
any arrangement of fibres in any order or 
direétion ; nor 7dea motion communicated 
in any order: thefe, at mof, could only 
be the izffruments or occafions of fenfation, 
and idea. “ But it will not farely be con- 
ceived, either that the Deiry is imper- 
cipient, and without ideas, or that HE 
receives them by this or by azy mechan- 
ifm. And of bumaz minds, unlefs we have 
no better way of accounting for fenfation 
and ideas, to account for them in fuch a 
way feems to he far from philofophical. — 
Indeed, a fenfatioz being more vigo- 
vous than an idea, itis impoffible, on me- 
chanical principles, that it fhould be ex- 
cited at that extremity of the organs 
which is fartheft from the feat of percep- 
[March 1, 
tion; for if likeany thing mechanical, it 
feems not like a weight but an impulfe. 
But in truth, mechanifm and perception 
are two ideas, which appear to have the 
utmoft centrariety to each other ; the one 
fimple, the other complex ; the one found- 
ed in proportions and combinations of one 
kind, the other in powers and qualities of 
a kind wholly different. Multiply, ar- 
range, and combine the relations of quan 
tity, motion, and compelling force, with- 
out end, and you will never difcover in 
them the remoteft analogy to fenfation or 
perception. Between the idea of a ma- 
chine and of mind there will ever be an 
infinite diftance.. Nor does it feem much 
lefs incongruous. to fuppofe a machine 
conveys thought or fenfation, than to fups 
pote that it thinks or feels. . 
The Enquirer fuppofes, that “in 
dreams we miltake ideas for fenfations. 
Is not this acknowledging, that fenfations 
are only an order of ideas. A fenfationz, 
indeed, I take to be an immediate per- 
ception ; an zdea, a recollected perceptions 
a thought, the a@ of recolieéting and com- 
paring ideas. Hence it is that ideas ex- 
cite and imprint fenfations: but weaker 
than the -primary and immediate fenfa- 
tion. Oa hy 
It is furprifing that the ENQUIRER 
fhould afk, what 1s the difference between’ . 
the kinds of ideas? It is evident there is 
great difference between the kinds or 
clafles of ideas of /exfation, imagination, 
and refiedtion. But what is moft impor- 
tant to this enquiry is, not the difference 
in itfelf, but the proof that mzzd and not 
matter is the adequate and fole origin of 
ideas of every kind. The ENQuirER 
laughs at the ideas of the ANTIENTS ; 
the archetypal forms of things, by which 
all are fabricated and modelled. Yet it is 
certain, carry materialifm as far as we 
will, that wherever there is defgz, an iz= 
telleZual form, in fome mind, precedes 
the execution of every work: or in other 
words, there is an antecedent idea of that 
which 1s to be made. vay 
Until it was ftated, I thould have been 
unable to imagine that any one could 
doubt the truth of this affertion, that 
‘“* the exiftence of an idea depends on its 
being perceived.” I cannot otherwife de- 
fine an idea than the zmage, or reprefen- 
tation, of a recoliecied perception or aflem- 
blage of perceptions. Where no fuch 
perception has exiftence, there is conle- 
quently no fuch idea. , ee 
I as little imagined that any one could 
doubt of the truth of this affertion, that 
“6 ideas exift in the mind, and in the mind 
: ee . Demee )) os 
