1803.] 
only.’ Whatever the mind be, whether 
immaterial ov material, ideas exift init ; in 
the one fuppofition as in a receptacle or 
fubftratum, in thé‘other as all powers and 
properties are philofophically faid to exift 
in that Being te which they belong. 
It feems to me alfo to be undoubtedly 
true, that ‘our ideas, paffions, and 
thoughts, have no exiftence but zz the 
mind’ and none *‘ qithout’’ the agency 
of the mind: and that thefe comprife all 
that we can feel, perceive, or know. And 
mind, though immaterial, isnot therefore 
desea. It is not fenfation, perception, 
thought: it is the BesnG which feels, 
perceives, and cherifhes. 
The Enquirer fuppofes there may be 
latent ideas which are unperceived. But 
this, IT apprehend, is confounding ideas 
with the figs of ideas, The Enguirer 
imagines, that without the exiltence of 
thefe latent ideas there could be no me- 
mory. But the fatkis, that memory isa 
renewal of the image of patft perceptions, 
by means of their aflociated circumttances : 
of time, place, arrangement, &c. An 
idea which through life is never recollected 
is as non-exiftent to the individual. 
Our /poutancous or automatic motions 
are referable not to latent unperceived 
ideas, but to habit. And if /pace be fup- 
_ pofed real, and motion material, the old 
dilemma againtt the pofibility of motion 
will be fo fox from ridiculous, that I fee 
not how it can be an{wered. 
In the 4th propofition I admit that 
BerxeLey precipitates his conclufion. 
_ Mountains, rivers, all the wifble uni- 
werfe, are phenomena, prefented to our 
minds by fome extervzal caufe. By an 
external caufe, I mean that they are not 
the a&t of our mind zé/elf. And becaule 
the /enfations produced by thele pheno- 
_ mena, ox objeds, exift in the mind, we 
cannot, therefore, affirm that the objeés 
have no external exiftence. But wemay, 
by analogy, infer that the objeéts have an 
exiftence analogous to that of the mind 
which perceives them: and that if the 
mind be immaterial, the eflence of the/e 
objeéts is at leaft probably immaterial 
alfo. In other words, that the CREATOR 
may have conftituted, and probably has 
conftituted, our site fo as that the idea 
of motion, of vifibility, of refiftance, of 
ficure, and of found, fimell, tafte, &c. 
fhall prefent itfelf to us according to cer- 
_ tain laws; that one ordér of thefe ideas 
fhall be permanent and fenfible to all, 
and produce various phenomena and ef- 
- fe&s: that another order fhall be excite- 
able by the snind of the individual ; thal 
Mr. Loffi-on the Sy/tem of Idealifing / 12s 
be confiffent, and evanefcent, and termi- 
nate in the individual without prefenting 
to other minds, unlefs by a like procefs, 
like phenomena and effects. That a third 
order of phenomena fhall conneét itfelf in 
our con{cioufnefs with our antecedent ex- 
iftence. And thus thefe three orders of 
phenomena will anfwer to reality, tma- 
gination, and memory. The reality of 
things cannot depend on material ex- 
iftence. If phenomena are regular, cer 
tain, produ€ctive of all effects according to 
fixt laws, no material bafis can give them 
truer reality: otherwife, on the fuppofi- 
tion of matter, a material grain of fand 
would be more real than the immaterial 
Deity: or, as reality admits not of de- 
grees, the one would alone, be real, and 
the other imaginary. 
It is true you cannot infer a manifet 
and immediate contradiction from the per- 
ception of all objects exiting in the mind, 
to the idea of their having a material ex- 
iftence out of the mind. But from the 
nature of mind, and our experience of its 
operations, we may infer that material 
exiftence is uznecefary. And 1 think 
hardly any difputant ever exited to whom | 
arroganceis lefs imputable thanto BerKke- ~ 
LEY: 
The 5th propofition, that ¢¢ 2 THING 
cannot differ from the SENSATION of it,” 
is conftantly liable to objection; but the 
ludicrous anfwer which is given to it 
will go no farther than to prove, thaz 
there muft be fome arrangement far more 
general than that of ovr individual li- 
mited minds, and far fuperior, which has 
created and maintains the sENSIBLE UNi- 
VERSE, . 
The 6th propofition I conceive to be a 
great and fublime truth, «that a/l the 
choir of heaven, and furniture of the 
earth, all which compofes the mighty 
frame of the world, hath.not any fub- 
Jiftence without a mind: and, confe- 
quently, “* That when not percer wed by 
me or fome other created /pirit, they muft 
Supt in the mind. of the ETERNAL SPis 
RELe 
The ENQUIRER fuppofes: that there is 
no contradi¢tion in imagining mute balls 
conglobated by gravitation, imberent in 
matter, unconnegted with perception s 
and thus that a mighty frame of world 
might exift without a mind. This ap~ 
pears to me to include impoffibilities in- 
finitely multiplicd. I believe, if matter 
exifts, this conglobation never would have 
been fo framed of a fingle inch of it. I 
believe, that, inffead of a mighty frame of 
world exifting “ unperceived and without 
a mind,” 
