124 
4mind,” not a grain of fand could thus 
exit. And fuppofing matter, gravita- 
tion cannot zzhere init: if it did, it would 
inhere in all matter: it could not act at 
a diftance, at indefinitely great diftances 
from matter: there could be no repulfion ; 
all would be one mafs; no divifion; and 
all would be an atom. _If matter exits, 
gravitation and repulfion are evidently 
ampofed on it by external power: and that 
power muft be mind. 
The odjection that idealifin makes the 
exiftence of the fenfble universe depend on 
the perception of the individua!, and would 
Jead that individual to confider himfelf as 
the fole (pring, comprifing all aCiual and 
poffible exiftence, and alternately abforb- 
ing and reproducing the univerfe, by 
imagining it or not, is altogether un- 
founded. My own mind, and the manner 
of its acquiring its perceptions, furnifhes 
me with complete evidence of the exiftence 
of ether minds, of the SUPREME MIND: 
and the exiftence of the fexfible umverfe 
has therefore an eterzal bafis. 
The 7th propofition ef BERKELEY he 
might perhaps have better thus ftated:— 
The fexfble qualities, colour, tafte, fmeil, 
cannot inhere in matter; they are per- 
ceptions of MIND: matter cannot excite 
them; for it has no wolttion or adive 
power; nothing by which it can be 
adapted to perception, or excitement of 
perception. Uf therefore matter, by its 
prefence, occafion perception, it can be 
only by an arbitrary coincidence derived 
folely from the will of the DEITY. 
MIND, therefore, alone muft be the caufe 
of perception: but as mind can caufe per - 
ception on mind by its own immediate 
energy 3 and perception thus produced has 
anatural, neceflary, perfect analogy with 
‘its caufe; the fuppofition of matter as 
an occafion of perception is unnecefary 
and wzaatural. 
And further, the even poffible exiftence 
of matter, to go no further than we have 
hitherto examined, is at leaft liable to 
great and extreme fufpicion. The /en/- 
ble qualities are wot in matter: folid ex- 
tenfion and figure are all thofe which we 
have whence to infer matter: but afluredly 
mind could form, and a limited mind muft 
form, an idea of refiftance from the limi- 
tation of its own /entient powers. And 
mind having an idea of parts, which all 
the phenomena fuggeft, would alfo have 
the idea of figure and extenfion, as modes 
of perception. What therefore are called 
the primary properties of matter, may all 
of them be, as it appears, properties of 
mind: and; if {pace be nething real, aut 
Mr. Lofft on the Syftem of Idealifin. 
[March 4, 
be properties ef mind. Mind may have 
no relation to /pace, but as an order of 
arrangement in its own perceptions: but 
if matter exifts, pofitively and fubftan-_ 
tially, and not as an ixiellefual aflem=- 
blage of powers and perceptions, {pace 
muft have a fubftantial exiftence alfo. 
Now in addition to what has been alréacy 
faid as argument of the xom-exifence of 
fpace, \et this be confidered. 
If {pace be occupied by 4ody, what be- 
comes of the {pace /o occupied? It can- 
not give way: for the parts of {pace are 
not transferable: it already, if it exifts, 
completely filling all dimenfions. Is it 
then azzzhilated and reproduced by the 
mere placing and difplacing of matter? 
This will not be believed. It has no /ez- 
fible qualities, it has no poqers, but 
that of giving a local -habitation and a 
name to matter. It has nothing avalo- 
gousto mind, It has nothing analogous 
to body but mere extenfion. And what is 
this mere extenficn? Suppofe fpace to be 
filled with body it is annihilated every 
where. Suppofe body to be xo where; 
and what parts, figure, or dimenfions, re- 
main to fpace? If it were body, it could 
not co-exift where body is: for/ao bodies 
cannot co- exif? in the fame point. Paf- 
five, immoveable, without will, powers, 
or perception, it is alike excluded from 
the idea of body and of mind. Say that 
it is finite, and you involve a contradic- 
tion: fay that it is infinite, ahd diftin- 
guifh, if you can, the idea from infinite 
nothingnefs. 
The zext propofition afferts this: that 
** an idea can be like nothing but an 
idea:”” and that ‘‘ if external oljeéis are 
perceiveable, they are ideas; if they are 
impercerveable we have no evidence of 
their exifience.’ Y will agree thus far, 
that, fuppofing /olid extenfion to exift, the 
idea of figure in the external object, as. 
conceived, by the mind, and the adual 
figure itfelf, would be analogous. But 
there is every reafon for thinking that 
this idea, like thofe of /enfble qualities, 
has no material archetype correfponding 
with it. Figure and folidity may as well 
be modifications of perception as colour, 
or tafe, or fmell; and the dilemma is 
formed with extraordinary acutenefs. For 
what evidence of external objeéts can we 
have but either the perception of them, or 
the ecefity of them to our perceptions. 
But we peiceive only fenfible qualities: 
and the fuppofed primary qualities by no 
means appear either’to be neceflary to our 
perceptions, or to have any power to pro- 
duce them. The objection of the En- 
2 QUIRER 
