392 Ts Capel Los Defence of Berkeley fatisfaliory ? 
will account for all fenfations, is itfelf a 
claim of srant—is begging a very dif- 
putable queftion. 
Mr. Lofft then attacks the word /ub- 
firatum, which may conveniently be dif- 
mified from the contreverly : and the word 
fubfiance, which is not fo eafily avoided, 
but to which the harfher and novel term 
extancy, trom the adjective extant, can 
be fubitituted. ae etren Mr. Lofft does 
not object to the do&trine that either all is 
Spirit, or all ts matter, or fomething. is fpt- 
rit and fometbing matter : yet it is proper 
to obferve, that this ciftribution is only 
exhauftive, that is, only comprizes. all the 
poflible theories of the univerfe, in cafe 
fpirit be fo defined, that: whatever is not 
fpirit may be called matter; or, im cafe 
matter be fo defined, that whatever is not 
matter may be called fpirit. Thus if 
matter be defined that which can excile 
fenjation, and fpivit be defined that which 
cannot excite fenfation, the diftribution is 
exhauftive; becaule all extancies (for of 
privatives, fuch as fpace, there is no 
queftion) either can or cannot excite fen- 
fation. But if matter be defined an inert 
Jenjelefs extended figured fubffance, (this is 
the definition Mr. Lofft adopts) and {pirit 
be defined an adiive ‘icant unextended 
Sirmlefs fubjiance : then the diftyibution is 
not exhavftive, and there may be other 
things inftead of thefe, or befide thefe, 
comprizing properties ef both. ‘Thus 
under the name body (fu ppofe) one fet of 
reafoners might defend the exclufive exilt- 
ence of an extended and occafiona Ny fen- 
fitive matcrial of all things—terminating 
in the panthei{m of Spinoza: and another 
fet of reafoners might under the name 
mind (fuppefe) det fend the exclufive exilt- 
ence of a fenfitive and occafionally extended 
material of all things—terminating in the 
paatheifm of Berkeley. And this is in 
faét the trick of thole {chools of philofo- 
phy, which teach either unmixt hypo- 
the fis. 
It the material of the univerfe be fepa- 
rated, by definition, into two fubftances, 
{pirit and matter: thefe words, through 
however many fyliogifms they may pais, 
wili always appear to demonftrate the 
doétrine of two fubfiances. If 
rial of the univerfe be wholly comprized, 
by definiticn, in the term mind, or fpirit ; 
this word, if correctly ufed in tyliogizing, 
will Gill remain the name of that material, 
and appear. to demonftrate the doétrine of 
one immaterial or fpiritual fubftance. In 
like manner if the material of the univerfe 
be wholly comprized, by definition, in the 
term body or maitei; this word, after 
I 
the mate- - 
[May t 
being added and fubtracted through ever 
fo miany equations of fyllogifms, will re- 
main the name of that material, and ap- 
pear to conduét to the doftritie of one - 
material or corporeal fubftance. 
Let us now pafs on to the Berkeleyan— 
propofitions, which are the proper objects 
of Mr. Lofft’s defence: it will be conve- 
nient to number the different bundles of 
annotations in the fame manner as a 
original paragraphs. 
I. Our knowledge, fays Mr. Lofft, iS 
limited to our fenfations, per ae and 
refle@iouns. 
Our knowledge, fays the Enquirer, 1s 
limited to the affections of the two ex- 
tremities of the organs of fenfe; that is, 
to our fenfations and our ideas. |, 
Here there is no real difference. The- 
affections of the external extremity of the 
organ of fenfe, whether phenomena of 
body or mind, are by both parties called 
fenfations. The affeCtions within are cal-. 
led reficétions by Mr. Lofft, and ideas by 
the Enquirer. This is, in the latter,’ 
mere deference to ulage ; for the propereft 
name wouid be that employed by certain 
{cholaftic philofophers now too little fiu- 
died, correfpondencies:; thefe internal af- 
feftiena correfponding with previous ex- 
ternal affetions of the organs of fenfe. 
Perception may be conveniently employed. 
for defignating both the fenfations and the’ 
correfpondent ideas. 
in ail this what does the Enquirer af- 
fume? Merely that the body has an out- 
fide and an inide. But Mr. Lofft is fuch 
aniggard of his conceffions, that he ac- 
tually complains one fhould /uppofe we 
millakein dreams what is g@ing on within 
us, for what is going on without us. 
Mr. Lofft attacks the pofition that ideas 
do not differ.in kind. ‘This is a mere di~ 
grethon in the Enquirer occafioned by the 
digreffion in Berkeley, and affeéts in no- 
thing the queition in difpute. The En- 
quirer fays, that ideas differ in vividuels | 
and in complexity; and that terms or_ 
words only can differ in kind, the cate- 
gorical diftributions not relating to any 
properties of ideas. The word /feafation 
may defcribe a procefs, which takes place 
at the outfide of the body; and the word 
idealization may defcride a procefs, which 
t:kes place at the infide of the body: but 
fenfation and idealization are both abftra& 
terms, like imagination and refleétion, 
which belong to the fame metaphyficak 
clafs of words. Mr. Lofft may exclaim, 
zt is furprizing this fhould be advanced 5 
it is evident there is a great difference be 
tween the kinds or claffes of ideas ; "he 
_ he 
