1803.] 
he ought to have accounted for his ‘fur- 
prize and to havé produced his evidence. 
II. The Enquirer has’ ventured ‘to 
doubt the truth of this affertion that the 
exiffence of an idea depends on its being 
perceived. Ue conficers an idea to be 
the evidence of perception, the trace made 
on the interior organ. Like any other hu- 
‘man record it may continue to exift ina 
latent, but produceable form, after the 
fenfation with which it correfponds, or 
the tranfastion of which it ts the record, 
has gone by. Every one knows that a 
feniation may take place without its being 
perceived. At’ the end of a train ‘of 
thought one recolleéts that ‘the clock 
ftruck, that a coal fell from the fire, that 
a twinge of the tooth-ache’ occurred, al- 
though unheeded at the time. The clothes 
at the bed’s foot) flip off during fleep, a 
coldnefs of the legs comes on; this fug- 
gefts by affociation the idea of walking 
into the water, and one dreams of bath- 
ing. In all thefe cafes the fenfation took 
place unperceived ; the correfponding idea 
was produced within; and by means of 
the idea the fenfation was recollected. All 
the very habitual fenfations, fuch as the 
winking of the eye lids and the pulfation 
of the arteries, notorioufly take place un- 
perceived. Why may not the like be true 
of ideas? Who ever perceived the ideas 
which ftimulate the motion of breathing ? 
Yet this is a voluntary motion. Who 
ufually perceives the ideas, which ftimu- 
late the legs to walk? Yet if a channel 
croffes the foot-path, a ftride is fubitituted 
to a ftep ; this proves that a whole fyllo- 
gifm of ideas had taken place. And 
how daily fuch reafonings take place me- 
chanically, as it is called; that is, with- 
out our perceiving the ideas of which 
they confit? This has long been known 
to every body but metaphyficians, for 
perceived ideas are called thoughts for 
diftin&tion’s fake. The man, who is at- 
tending to his ideas, is faid to think; as 
the man, who is attending to his fenfa- 
tions, is faid to feel. Memory confifts in 
comparing new with old ideas; thefe, 
therefore, continue to exift from the date 
of their origin; if thofe ideas which re- 
prefent the paft were called into being 
when we compare them with the prefent, 
we miftake time for fpace. ; 
Til. Mr. Lofft fays, that to talk of 
latent and unperceived ideas is to confound 
ideas with the figns of ideas. Words are 
the figns of ideas. The things here in 
queftion are internal phzenomena of the 
human fyfiem: not the notes and marks 
and fymbols of written fophiftry. An 
Is Capel Loff’s Defence of Berkeley fatisfaltory ? 
oa 
‘idea, (fays Mr. Lofft) which through life 
is never recollefted, 1s as non-exifent to 
the individual.’ No. The procefs of 
breathing being voluntary implies the ex- 
citement of ideas, which throughout life 
are never recollected. Thefe fpontaneous 
or automatic motions, fays Mr. Lofft, are 
referable not to Jatent unperceived ideas, 
but to habit. And what is habit? The 
paflage of perceived into unperceived trains 
of idea. The continuance of thofe volun- 
tary actions without the attention of the 
mind, which were originally brought to 
bear by means of its attention. y 
IV. Is the univerfe a train of ideas ? 
That Berkeley precipitates his con- 
clufion in maintaining the ' affirmative, 
Mr. Lofft admits: but he fays: We may 
by analogy infer that objeéts have an ex- 
iftence analogous to that of the mind 
which perceives them. A curious inftance 
this of analogical reafoning! Becaute 
this mind can move this arm to {nuff this 
candle; therefore thefe fnuffers, which 
muft have an exiftence analogous to 
the mind which perceives them, can 
voluntarily turn the feiffar on its fcrew- 
hinge, and devour with appetite the fur- 
plus length of wick. Oue may pafs. on 
to the next argument. 
V. But this is a mére note of com- 
mentary, which affects none of the theo- 
retical reafoning. 
VI. The Enquirer has not objected to 
the truifm that there is mind in the-uni- 
verfe. He odjecis, however, to Berke- 
ley’s proof of the perpetuity of the uni- 
verfe; although he believes it perpetual. 
He objects allio to the ftrangely difcon- 
nected inference, that, becavfe it is eternal, 
it muft have one eternal perceiver 3 ima- 
gining this method of proving the ex- 
iitence of Deity to be fo unfatistactory as 
to excite doubt. loreplying to thefe ob- 
jections, Mr. Lofft chiefly attacks the il- 
luttrations of the Enquirer: and only cor- 
roborates the politions of Berkeley, by 
declaring the objetions unfounded : and 
by aflerting that his own mind furnifhes 
him withcomplete evidence of the exiftence 
ofotherand of thefupreme mind. Is not this 
hingeing idealifm on perfonal revelation? 
VIZ. The feventh propofition of Berke- 
ley is thus amended by Mr. Lofft. 
t. §* The fenfible qualities, color, tafte, 
fmell, cannot inhere in matter; they are 
perceptions of mind.” 
This afferton isa claim of grant, a beg- 
ging of the queftion in difpute: it fuifices 
to oppofe the counter-affertion. 
All the perceptions, as all the volitions 
of mind, inhere in matter; every fenfible 
Tt phenomenon 
