278) 
= 
phenomon, color, tafte, fimell, is an affec- 
tion of matter. * 
2. ** Matter cannot excite the fenfible 
Qualities ; for it has no volition or active 
power.” ° , 
Counter-affertion. Color, tafte, fmell, 
are never excited by volition; they cannot 
therefore originate with the willing prin- 
ciple, or active power. 
3. © 1f matter by its prefence occafion 
perception, it can be only by an arbitrary 
coincidence derived from the will of the 
Deity: mind, therefore, alene muft be 
the caufe of perception, for mind can 
caufe perception on mind by its own im- 
mediate agency.” 
Counter-aflertion.. As matter by its 
prefence occafions perception, this muft 
be an effential property of it, derived from 
the will of Deity; mind, which never 
caufes perception on mind, probably 
therefore ufes matter as its vehicle, in- 
firument, or mean, even when it feems 
to caufe perception in our own bodies. 
“© Perception thus preduced has a na- 
tural neceflary perfect analogy with its 
caufe ; the fuppofition of”? mind ‘‘as.a 
medium of perception is unneceflary and 
unnatural,” 
- But it is not in this way that the 
flighteft pregrefs can be made in the ar- 
gument. Mir. Lefit’s digreffion concern. 
ing {pace is remarkably well executed ; 
ut difplays all the atti:udinarianifm of fo 
phiitry ; all the legerdemain of an ac- 
complifhed juggler in logic ; it is worthy 
of the moft ingenions author of the Enig- 
ma upon Nothing, who might repeat fuch 
play on meanings with any word which is 
a pofitive expreffion for a negative quan-_ 
tity. . 
WVIIT. In his commentary on this pa- 
yagraph Mr. Lofft adopts the very form 
of mil-reafoning deteéted in the En- 
quirer’s note to the feventh propofition. 
Figure, color, tafte, fmell, are general 
terms, and reprefent ideas formed by ab- 
ttra€tion, formed by leaving out that part 
ef the original or concrete idea of fenfa- 
tion, in which roundnefs, bluenefs, bit- 
ternels, arematicnefs confifts. This omif- 
fon of individuality in the idea once ac- 
complified, it is no longer the reprefenta-> 
tive of any fenfation, which ever was or 
can be excited ; fenfation being converlant 
only with individuals. But as this omif- 
fon of individuality m the idea is what 
we cail a proceis of mind, a pheno- 
menon, which takes place at the in- 
ternal feat of perception, (it may be com- 
pared to outhne-engravirg, for ihe fenfa- 
tion omits the folid of mature, and the 
Js Capel Lofft’s Defence of Berkeley fatisfaftery?  [ May }, 
idea the colouring of fenfation); fo all 
thefe abf@raét ideas may be faid to exift in 
the mind only, to be incapable of exiting 
in any unperceiving thing, and the like, 
In thort, whatever is not the name of an 
individual fenfible objeci may be faid.to 
exift only in the mind. This ts a pro- 
perty which figure, color, tafte, have in 
common with {pace, and time, and death; 
and with all the adjectival fubfantives, 
fuch as happinefs, whitene{s, tmmertality, 
reality, with all the weffes and itzes in the 
language. On this truifm Berkeley builds 
the argument which he repeats over and 
over again in fo,many different difguifes ; 
that becaufe figure, color, &c. exift in 
mind only; therefore things having, fi- 
gure, color, &c. (or, as he phrafes it, 
that wherein color, figure, and the like 
qualities exi?) fubfift in mind only: as 
if an abfraG was not an omiffive but a 
colleftive term, and included. all the acci- 
dental inftead of merely the effential par- 
ticulars of each of the clafs tor which it 
ftands. This fophifm is noticed again by 
the Enquirer in the commentary on the 
ninth prepofition: It may thus be paro~ 
died. Charity exifis only in the mind, 
Therefore the deea of the good Samaritan 
is a non entity. But Mr. Lofft is fo 
much more occupicd with his own ideas, 
than with the words and phrafes and 
books hefore him, that he a€tually tells us 
que percetve only fenfible qualities. No 
qualitics, ftri€ily fpeaking, can be fevfible, 
no abftraét ideas can be fuhmitted to fen- 
fation, no general property can become 
an obje& of feeling:—but fuch bulls m 
language cannot always be avoided in 
common dialeét, although, when philofo- 
phizing, they are inadmiffible in radical 
propofitions. 
IX. The Enquirer is happy to find 
Mr. Lofft at length approaching him, and 
objeéting to fuch definitions of matter, or 
fpirit, as tend to comprehend both under 
a common name. Definitions, however, 
ought not to be made a@ priori, as by the 
Ariftotelians, but a pofferiori, as by 
the Baconians. Matter has figure, fays 
Ariftotle; very true: on its being fi- 
gured depends its action on the fenfes. 
This, therefore, is the firk flep toward 
definition which experience affords. If 
Plato cheofes befides to fay, Matter is 
fenfelefs ; he has to prove that the living 
brain, which is figured and not fenfelefs, 
is not itfelf the organ of perception. If 
Newton choofes to add, Matter is inert ; 
he has to prove that the rays of heat or 
light, or gravitation, owe their move- 
nent to a projectile, and not to an inher 
é . Feat 
