18038. ] 
French, fully aware that they could not 
give battles in regular order, fought to 
reduce the war to important affairs of 
polts, which has {ucceeded. ; 
When the war was carried into rugged 
or mountainous countries, the ufe of the pha- 
lanx or clofe column was fond impoffible. 
To aét in fuch fituations with vigour, they 
formed éclaireurs,* fharp-fhooters, light- 
infantry, and chafeurs. More than once 
their fharp-fhooters have decided actions of 
importance. When checked and repulfed, 
they fall back on the column, which re- 
ceives them, and in its turn attacks the 
enemy or fuitains his fhock. 
The French artillery preferves nothing 
but the name of what it formerly was. 
Their officers are ignorant, unexpert, and 
inferior to all others. Their battalions 
have no field-pieces attached to them. 
The excellence of their flying artillery 
amply compenfates this : It 1s compofed 
of the flower of the French foldiers, who 
expofe themfelves without meafure. The 
belt generals of the Republic have attri- 
buted their fuccefs to its boldnefs and ra- 
pidity of movement, as it fupplies the 
place of that quantity of artillery, which 
generaily burdens armies. 
It is a conftant maxim, to have a body 
- of referve in all the French armies, com- 
pofed of their beft troops, and commanded 
by an able general. If the two lines are 
beaten (for at prefent, on certain occa- 
fions, they form fomething that refembles 
two lines), the referve covers their retreat. 
The precipitancy with which the French 
retire, without obferving order, would be 
fatal in its confequences, if the referve 
did not cover; on more than one occa- 
fion (at Marengo), the referve fnatched 
the victory out of the hands of the enemy. 
It alfo fupports thofe who purfue the ene- 
my, and enables the light troops to fecure 
a greater number of prifoners, 
Many examples of fuccefs have origi- 
nated from obfervations made by the fol- 
diery. This is very confpicuous in the 
French, and their generals often make ufe 
of them. 
Topography is carried to a great degree 
among both officers and foldiers in the 
Republican army. Whatever polit a de- 
tachment occupies, it is inftaptly recon- 
noitred attentively by them, inftead of 
* Thefe are a fort of fcouts, and formerly 
called barteurs d’ cfrade, to lead the army, 
make fires, guard the flanks in paffing defiles, 
and prevent ambufcades.——-SeeDupré’s Neolo- 
gical Dittionary of the French Language, 
MonTHLY Mag.No. 99, © 
Notice on the French Army. 
217 
lying larzily on the earth; by. which 
means they form their feveral plans of at- 
tack or defence. If they are attacked, 
they have the incalculable advantages of 
knowing the ground, and of being inftruc- 
ed before hand in all that can be done. 
If any grand operation be in agitation, 
every body is prepared ; the orders are 
gencral, and in their fubftance point out 
the object which the general has in 
view ; every officer, every foldier is as 
much interefted in its fuccefs as if the 
plan werehis own, The generals in chief 
confide the execution of their operations 
to their fubordinate officers. Battles 
are but a re-union of feveral engagements, 
that take place by divifion or brigade. 
They make it a point to keep their troops 
in conftant movement and enterprize, 
with the hope of meeting with fome fa- 
vourable occurrence; they care little about 
the fufferings and lofs of individuals. 
When they are threatened, or when they 
with to engage, they concentrate all their 
forces enthe principal point: they pufh this 
method even to temerity, in laying them-~ 
felves bare in every other part. 
The French are too powerful to admit 
of their being defpifed. In 1799, when 
they were beaten at all points, they began 
to be ridiculed ; they have fincé become 
dreadful; their victories are painful to the 
fight. If we could feparate the fuccefles 
which they have acquired by means of 
armiftices, capitulations, and treaties, 
(which are never any thing more than 
perfidious truces), the fucceffes obtained 
by their troops will be reduced to almoft 
nothing. Their battles have often been 
difadvantageous to them; witnefs that of 
Marengo: their negeciations always fa- 
vourable; witnefs the armiftice that fol- 
lowed it. Their adverfaries ought to re~ 
member, that the French are more dan- 
gerous when they treat, than when they 
fight. Their fuperiority of refources, 
and efpecially their prodigious facrifices 
of men, ought to infure them the victory ;~ 
they have neverthelefs almoft always loft 
it, whenever they had to deal with the 
Archduke Charles and Suwarrew. Co- 
bourg and Clairfait, although inferior in 
numbers, have often rendered the balance 
even. - Bonaparte faw his. ftar turn pale 
before the Archduke Charles. His good 
fortune, through an armiftice, delivered 
him from the danger into which his rafh- 
nefs had drawn him. Superiority of num- 
bers, revolutionary aétivity, canning, and 
confummate hypocrify, have rendered the 
French triumphant ; whilft the allies have 
Ff been 
