410. ° 
played itfelf more or lefs openly, and has 
gained ground on all claffes of . fociety, 
and individuals of all ages. The fchemes 
ef politics, the divers incidents of ‘the re- 
volution,; the {courge of war, and the pro- 
grefs of luxury, combined with the ftill- 
increafing price of provifions, are the real 
and unfortunate fources to which this 
temper-of the public mind may be attri- 
buted. 
Ea 
0 the Editor of the Month ly Magazine. 
SiR, 
MIDTS the fhiseke of contending 
powers for thcfe ten years of {an- 
guinary war, the army of the immortal 
Frederick has been the leat affeétcd ; in 
fact, it is fill what it was. Tne Prufian 
Generals have avoided partial engage- 
ments, by keeping thelr army. united. 
They bave won every battle which 
they gave, and never experiefced a check,* 
but when they fufrered themfelves to be 
attacked. The eléwes of Frederick the 
Great were ealily to be diftinguifhed in 
them. 
The neutrality of Pruffia has been 
imputed to various reafons, but that of 
the French revolutionary principles as 
having crept into its army is the mott 
oltenfble. After much confideration on 
this fubject, we are convinced it is equally 
fale and injurious; but to thew that this 
motive, fuppofing it to be true, would 
be an additional reafon for continuing the 
war againft the French, and, at the fame 
tine, for making their artifices and frauds 
more thorcughly known. 
Xenophon tells us, that it was a maxim 
ef Clearchus, that the foldiers ought to 
fear their General more than the enemy. 
fn effeét, difcipline fupplies the place of 
good-will, Example, and the force of 
Fabit, fucceed in rendering fuldiers infen- 
fible to thefe dangers which terrified them 
at firft. If, through the medium of dif- 
cipline, a foldier can be forced to expofe 
er facrifice his life, furcly his will may be 
made to bend upon other occafions. Who 
can have any doubt but that the French 
army Contains a prodigious number of 
cfiicers and foidiers, who are either roy- 
aisits, or enemies to the party or perfon 
who-coverns them? Ir is difcipline only 
that preven:s the conicripts from return: 
ing to their habitations, witch conftraint 
alone obliged them to abandon, It is the 
* Except in Champagne, and that I pre- 
fume was 4 golden one, a Pont dor. 
Tranfletor. 
On the Pruffian Army. 
{[Junel, * 
common opinion, that Defaix, one of the 
moi able Generals among the French, 
and one of thofe who had rendered the. 
greateft fervices to the revolution, was a 
royalit. He loft his life to gain the 
battle of Marengo; and, perhaps, he 
‘would have freely given it to enfure the 
lofs of the day. 
Surrounded with terrors, ifelated 
from miftruft,~ and engaged in aétive 
fcenesy a perion mutt, of neceffity, co- 
operate with thole he hates; and look 
upon thefe as enemies whom ini inclina- 
tion would prompt him to join, 
Suppofing there are a number of Jaco~ 
bins in the Pruffian army (which is di- 
rectly contrary to our conviction) at what) 
time will they be dangerous? It mutt be 
only when the leifure, rejulting from: 
peace, and the facility of communicating’ 
together, furnifh them with the opporta- 
nity and means of cabal, fedution, and’ 
bribery. If Prufha has the misfortune’ 
to have revolutioniits is her dominions 
and army, they will e dangerous only 
in cafe of the Fitch armies being on her 
frontiers. ‘It is the interea, therefore, of 
Prom ame net to confent that the French 
fhould obtain the empire of land and: 
fea.) She ought to fear left Auttria thould- 
carry her rcientmeni fo far, as to avenge 
herlelf, by (uffering her, without afford 
ing any afiiftance, to experience the dan- 
gers of a war with France? The repub.te 
may get the upper hand of thoie, whom 
as yet they Hay ; not been able to deitroy. 
THE SPANISH ARMY 
Is but the fhadow of what it once was,’ 
It bears trong marks of the weakaels 
and vices of its government. 
In military matters the Spaniards are 
as backward as in the year 1740. They © 
are either difciplined nor inftruéted, 
Place one of their regiments in line with 
another of any nation, and it looks like 
an aflemblage of beggars. Yet thele 
beggars are neverthelels the deicendants 
of thoie who once domineered over Eu- 
rope, and conquered Africa. Had they 
leaders, they might return to what they 
were. No troops are more fober, patient - 
of hardfhips, and fubmifiive to their offi~ 
cers, It is not from the care which the 
latter take of their foldiers, that this ori- 
ginates; for in fact they never trouble 
_themielves aoout them; it is the ferjeant- 
major of cach company that manages every 
thing init. Their pay is very irregular, 
and their maintenance and mien detetta- 
bie; with the exception of the Spanifh and 
Watleen guards. The mifery of the fel- 
diery forces them into {cenes “ot a 
an 
