1803.] 
come near or engage with; fo rhat we 
may fay with truth, that the Engl:th 
failors are not only fuperior in the bold- 
tie!s of their marcéuvres, but {till more 
fo from that fpecies of daring which is, 
in the higheft degree, the combined effect 
of fcience, experience, and courage. The 
wails of England are her navy, and her 
feam:n are worthy of protecting fo impor- 
tant a charge. ‘ 
Not having ftifficient knowledge to 
enable us to form an opinion, in which we 
could ourfelves piace any reliance, we 
fall {peak with caution onthe poffibility, 
or the degree of facility which the French 
may have of invading England: we will 
not difcufs this point. Circumftances are 
diferent from what they were in the days 
of the two Williams, and of Lonis VIIT, 
Bur, at the fame time, the force and 
Boldnefs of the French are now infinitely 
greater, and their refources more exten- 
five. If we reflect on the almoft parallel 
extent of coalt, from Ufhant to Welt 
Fricflind,* on the fhortnefs of the paflage 
in fome places, on the facility which the 
poffeffion of the Netherlands, and, we may 
add, of Holland and Spain, affords the 
French, on the accidents of a fea that 1s 
naturally ftormy, and on the temerity of 
the French, that, which perhaps is im 
poflible in itfelf, does not, however, ap- 
pear improbable. 
Let us fuppofe, that with the help of 
favourable winds, or with the chapter of 
accidents on their fide, the French fhould 
fucceed in difeinbarking 12 or 15000 
men in England, the maritime fuperiority 
of the Engliffi would cut off all retreat for 
thofe troops. Succefs, death, or capti- 
Vity, would then be the only aiternatives. 
This body of men will choofe a pofition 
on the coafts, where they may have means 
to fubfitt, and forrn a kind of téte de pont, 
to enable them to wait, till the fame wind 
that would drive the Englith veffels from 
a channel which is continually in agita- 
tion, fhould bring them reinforcements ; 
the difficulties of this paflage are dimi- 
nifhed, when there is‘ a certain fixed 
point, where a fafe landing may be effeét- 
ed, and where no account is made of 
what is taken, but of that only which ar- 
* We may add, to the moft northern point 
of Sweden and Denmark ; the former being 
naturally and notorioufly in the; intereft 
of France, and the latter, no lefs attached, 
perhaps from the animofity the imbibed againit 
ms aicer the Copenhagen bufinefs. 
Britifh Army, A135 
rives.* What would the capture of 50 
or 60,000 men fignify to the French? 
The Government would readily: facrifice 
that number for the reduétion of England ; 
and, in cafe of their not being deftroyed, 
would calculate upon finding them again 
in England. If the landing fhould take 
place m Treland, what ought we not to 
apprehend from the difpofition and temper 
of the people.+ 
_ To oppofe the invaders, an army com- 
pofed of regulars, militia, and volunteer 
yeomanry, would aflemble, They mutt 
make up their mind to lofe a great aum- 
ber of men, as they ought to attack the 
enemy without intermiffion, and to imi- 
tae their conduct, by which, in the be- 
ginning of the war, they eluded the Auf- 
trian ta&tics.’ This muit be done not fo 
much for the purpofe of beating the enemy 
the firft, fecond, or even the tenth time, 
as for deftroying a certain number of 
them each time, and reducing them before 
reinforcements could arrive, or frefh de- 
{cents be made. It is of the greateft im- 
portance to prevent a landing: but if it 
be once effected, it then becomes neceflary 
to endeavour to deftroy one corps after 
another.{ The Englith, in reducing their 
battles as much as poffible to partial ens 
gagements, after tke manner of the French, 
would go a great way towards diminith- 
* Every Englifhman ought to recolleét, 
that the fame wind which brings over, im 
one night, a body of troops from Boulogne, 
Calais, Dunkirk, Nieuport, Oftend, éc. pre= — 
vents the Britifh fleet from interrupting their 
pafluge ; and every foldier knows how effec 
tual a coup-de-main, well followed up, might 
be made within a fhort diftance from the feat 
of empire. ; 
+ Ireland is looked uponas a neceflary firft 
ftep to the fubjugation of England. Itisa 
point d’appui which the French fteadily look 
to. I 
} This is certainly the wifeft plan, unlefs 
tlie troops of the country could be fo diftri- 
buted, as to be ready, at a moment’s warn- 
ing, to meet an invading enemy in the mott 
vulnerable quarters. Some people have itna- 
gined, that the fafeft way would be to fuffer 
the enemy to advance into the country, the 
cattle, &c. having been previoufly drawn in- 
land, and the means of fubfiftence deftroyed. 
We are humbly of opinion, that the invading 
columns fhould be tet at once and at all 
points. Had this mode been purfued by Ge- 
neral Menou in Egypt, the Britith troops 
never would have had an opportunity of gain- 
ing the hard fought bactle of the a1 of 
March, 
bess 3H2 ing 
