1893] 
erder to their being communicated to his 
Mayjefty ; and -he conceived this would be 
more effectually done ,py himfelf than thro? 
any medium whatever. He faid, that it.was 
a matter of infinite difappointment to him, 
that the Treaty of Amiens, inftead of being 
followed by conciliation and friendthip, the 
natural efteéts of peace, had been productive 
only of continual and increafing, jealoufy and 
miftruft ; and that this miftruft was now 
avowed in fuch a manner as muft: bring the 
point to an iflue. 
He now enumerated the feveral provoca- 
tions which he pretended to have received 
from England. He placed in the firft line 
our not evacuating Malta and Alexandria, as 
‘we were bound to do by treaty. In this he 
faid that no confideration,on earth fhould 
make him acquiefce; and of. the two, he had 
rather fee us in poffteffion of the Fauxbourg 
St. Antoine than Malta. ‘He then adverted 
to the abufe thrown out againft him in the 
English public prints; but this he faid he 
did not fo much regard as that which ap- 
peared in the French papers publifhed in 
London, This he confidered as much more 
mifchievous, fince it was meant to excite this 
country againft him and his Government: 
He complained of the protection given. to 
Georges and others of his defcription, who, 
inftead of being fent to Canada, as had been 
repeatedly promifed, were permitted to re- 
main in England, handfomely penfioned, and 
conftantly committing all forts of crimes on 
the coafts of France, as well as in-the inte- 
rior. In confirmation of this he told me, 
that two men had within thefe few days been 
apprehended in Normandy, and were now on 
their way to Paris, who were hired aflafiins, 
and employed by the Bifhop of Arras, by the 
Baron de Rolle, by Georges, and by Dutheil, 
as would be fully proved in a court of juftice, 
and made known to the world. 
He acknowledged, that the irritation he 
felt againft England increafed daily, becaufe 
every wind (I make ufe as much as I can of 
his own ideas and expreffions) which blew 
from England, brought nothing but enmity 
and hatred againft him. 
He now went back to Ezypt, andtold me, 
that if he had fele the imalleft inclination 
to take pofieflion of it by force, he might 
have done ita moath ago, by fending twen- 
ty-five thoufand men to Aboukir, who would 
have pofiefied themfelves of the whole coun- 
try in defiance of the four thoutand Britith 
in Alexandria. That inftead of that garrifon 
being a means of protecting Egypt, it was 
only furnifhing him with a pretence for in- 
vading it. This be fhould not do, whatever 
might be his defire to have it as a colony, because 
be did not think it worth the rifk of a war, in 
which he might, perhaps, be conjidered as the ag- 
greffor, and by which he fbould lofe more than be 
could gain, fince fooner or later Egypt would be- 
long to Vramce, either by the falung to. preces of 
Correfpondence between Great Britain and France. 463 
the Turkifo empire, or by fome arrangement with 
the Porte. 
As a proof of his defire to maintain peace, 
he wifhed to know what he had to gain by 
going to war with’ England. A defcent was 
the only means of offence he had, and that 
he was determined to attempt, by putting 
himfelf at the head of the expedition. But 
how could it be fuppofed, that after having 
gained the height on which he ftood, he 
would rifk his life and reputation in fucha 
hazardous attempt, unlefs forced to it by ne- 
ceflity, when the chances were, that he and 
the greateft part of the expedition would go 
to the bottom of the fea? He talked much 
on this fubject, but never affected to diminifls 
the danger. He acknowledged that there 
were one hundred chances to one againit him; - 
but ftill he was determined to attempt it, if 
war fhould be the confequence of the prefent 
difcuffion ; and that fuch was the difpofition 
of the troops, that army after army would 
be found for the enterprife, 
He then expatiated much on the natural 
force of the two countries, France with an 
army of four hundred and eighty thoufand, 
men, for to this amount it is, he faid, to be 
immediately completed, all ready for the moft 
defperate enterprifes 5; and England with a 
fleet that made her miftrefs of the feas, and 
which he did not think he fhould be able to 
equal in lefs than ten years: two fuch coun- 
tries, by a proper underftanding, might go- 
vern the world, but by their ftrifes might 
Overturn it. He faid, that if he had not felt 
the enmicy. of the Britifh Government on 
every occafion fince the Treaty of Amiensy 
there would have been nothing that he would 
- hot have dene to prove his defire to. conci- 
liate 3 participation in indemnities as well as 
in influence on the continent; treaties of 
commerce,.in fhort, any thing that could 
have given fatisfa€tion, and have teftified his 
friendfhip, Nothing, however, had been 
able to conquer the hatred of the Britith Go- 
vernment, and therefore it was now come to 
the point, whether we fhould have peace or 
war. To preferve peace, the Treaty of 
Amiens muft be fulfilled; the abufe in the 
public prints, if not totally fuppreffed, at 
leaft kept within bounds, and confined to the 
Engiith papers; and the proteétion fo openly 
given to his bit ereft enemies (alluding to 
Georges’ and perfons of that defcription), 
muft be withdrawn. If war, it was neceflary 
only to fay fo, and to refufe to fulfil the 
Treaty. He now made the tour of Europe, 
to prove to me, that, in its prefent ftate, 
there was no Power with which we could 
coalefce for the purpofe of making war 
-againft France 5 confequently it was our in- 
tereft to gain time, and if we had any point 
to gain, renew the war when circumftances 
were more favourable. He faid, it was not 
doing him juftice to fuppofe, that he conceiv- 
-ed himfelf above the opinion of his country 
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