466 
and concluded, to demand additional fecuri- 
ties In any new arrangement which it might 
be neceflary to make with a. view of effe&- 
ing the real obje€is of that Treaty: . And 
thefe conSderations, {ufficient as they might 
be in themfelves to juftify the line of con- 
dv which his Maje(ty had determined to 
adopt, have received additional force from 
the views which have been recently and un- 
yefervedcly manifefted by the French Go- 
wernment, refpeGing the Turkifh dominions, 
“and the iflands in the Adriatic (amd which 
bave been in a great degree admitted by the Firft 
Conjid in bis interview with yeur Excellency )— 
wiews which are directly repugnant, not only 
to the {pirit, but to the letter of the Treaty 
of Amiens. 
From the poftfcript in your Excelency’s 
letter it appears, that a projeci was in con- 
templation, by which, according to the de- 
ciaration of M. Talleyrand, the integrity. of 
the Turkifh territory would be fecured, fo 
as to do away every cavfe of doubt or un- 
eafinefs, either with regard to Eg gypt or to 
any other part of the Turkith dominions. — 
His Majefty will confider the communication 
of fuch a proje& as indicating a difpofition, 
on the part of the French Government, to 
afterd him explanation and fatisfaGion refpeét- 
ing fome of the points which have been the 
fubject. of his reprefentations, But after all 
that has paffed, his Majefty cannot confent 
that his troops fhould evacuate the ifland of 
Malta until fubftantial fecurity has been 
provided for thofe objeG@s which, under the 
prefent circumftances, might be materially 
endangered by their removal. 
HAWKESBURY. 
His Excellency Lord. Whitworth. 
No. 40. 
My Lord, Paris, 5th March, 1803. 
I faw M, de Talleyrand yefterday, and ac- 
guitted myfelf of your Lordfhip’s inftruc- 
tions. Irecapitulated the feveral arguments 
therein contained, dwelling particularly on 
the open avowal of the Firft Conful’s views 
in Egypt ; and concluding with the refolution 
of his Majefty not to withdraw his troops 
from Melta, until fome fecurity fhould be 
given, that by fo doing his Majefty fhould 
not expofe the fafety of his own dominions. 
He heard me with great patience, and in 
anfwer endeavoured, as before, to convince 
me that there was no reafon whatever for the 
apprehenfions which we entertained. That 
it was true, the acquifition of Egypt had 
been, and perhaps ftill was, 2 favourite ob- 
jet of the Firft Conful, but that it was not 
f> much fo as to allow him to go to war for 
its attainment. 
I then told him that what had in a parti- 
cular manner excited the attention of your 
Lordfhip, in my laft report, was the aflure 
ance he had given me of fome project being 
in contemplation, whereby the integrity of 
the Turkith Empire would be fo enfured’ in 
Correfpondence between Great Britain and France. 
{ Jane Ty 
all its parts, asto remove every doubt or 
apprehenfion. I begged him, therefore, to 
explain, himfelf on this fubje@, which I 
conceived to be of the utmoft impertance ; 
fince. it was only by fuch means that both 
parties could be fatisfied. He then gave me 
to underfiand, that what he had termed a 
projet was nothing more than what had 
been expreffed in the Firft Conful’s meflage 
to the Legiflative Body, when he fays, that 
there is a French Ambaflador at Conftanti- 
nople, who-is charged to give every afiur- 
ance of the difpofition of France to ftrength- 
en, inftead of to weaken, that Government. 
I exprefies. a doubt whether this, or any 
other parole fecurity, would be confidered as 
fuficient in fuch a tranfa@tion, Flereupon 
he repeated the queftion, What then is the 
fecurity which you require, and which the 
Firft Conful can give? This, I told him, 
muft be the fubjed of the negotiation on 
which we were willing to enter; and I 
trufted that the French Government would 
bring into it the fame temper, and the fame 
real defire to. ccnciliate, which was mani- 
fefted by. his Majefty’s Minifters, 
M. de Talleyrand now informed me, that 
the Firft Conful had, five or fix days ago, 
ordered inftructions to be fent to General An- 
dreolli, by which he was to require an imme- 
diate and categorical anfwer to the plain 
queftion, Whether» his Majefty would, or 
would not, caufe. Malta to be cseacarcld by 
the Britith troops ? That he concluded this 
communication was already made, and that 
he expected to learn the refult of it in a very 
few days ; adding, that all the Firft Conful 
wanted was to know precifely on what he liad 
to depend, 
I could not help lamenting hint precipitate 
meafure, fince it could anfwer no good pur- 
pofe, and would only tend to introduce into 
the difcuffion ill humour and offended dignity, 
in the place of difpaffionate reafoning. [I 
begged him, however, to be prepared, and 
to prepare the Firft Conful to mect with 
more oppofition to his will than he had beea 
accuftomed to on finilar occafions. 
Itold bim, that his Majefty was willing to 
difcufs the point in difpute with fairnefs and 
candour, butcertainly never would be intimi- 
dated into acquiefcence; and I repeatedly urged, 
‘that if he wifhed well to the peace of the 
two countries, he fhould prepare the Firft 
Conful for the confequences which might 
naturally be expected from this ftep, and 
thus prevent the effect of any fudden guft of 
ill-humour. He was unwilling to admit 
that there could be any chance of fatisfying 
the Firft Conful thort of a compliance with 
his wifhes, founded, as he pretended, on 
good faith. 
Our converfation ended here, and J wait - 
the refult of General Andreofii’s communi- 
cation with the utmoft impatience. 
WHITWORTH. 
P. 3. 
