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7 
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aE eee ee ae. 
AGS Correfpondence between Great Britain and France. 
Majefty’s difpofition for the prefervation of 
peace 
I beg leave to return your Lordthip my 
thanks for having apprifed me of this circum- 
fiance*by a fpecial meffenger ; I found, how- 
ever, on going to M. de Talleyrand, at two 
o'clock, that he was already informed of it. 
He was juft fetting out to communicate it to 
the Firft Conful, and appeared under confi- 
derable agitation. He returned with me to 
his cabinet, and though he told me he was 
preffed for time, he fuffered me to relate the 
circumftance without interruption. I endea- 
voured to make him fenfible that this mea- 
fure was merely precautionary, and not 
in the leaft degree intended as a me- 
mace. I concluded my obfervations by re- 
peating that it was merely a meafure of 
felf-fecurity, founded- on the armaments 
which were carrying on inthe ports of France 
and Holland, remarking at the fame time, 
that had not even thefe armaments been as 
notorious as they were, the very circumftance 
of the Firft Conful’s determination to aug- 
ment fo corfiderably his army In time of 
peace, would have been a full and fufficient 
motive for fuch’a meafure ef precaution. 
M. de Talleyrand now informed me that 
he was already acquainted with the bufinefs ; 
that a meffenger had that morning arrived, 
who had brought him a copy of the mefiage, 
which he communicated to me. I could draw 
from him no reply whatever to my obferva- 
tions. He confined himielf ftriétly to the 
aflurance which he has fo repeatedly made, 
that there was no foundation whatever for 
the alarm which was felt by his Majefty’s 
Minifters ; that the Firft Conful was pacific ; 
that he had no thonghts whatever of attack- 
ing his Majefty’s dominions, unlefs forced to 
do fo by a commencement of hoftilities on 
our part; that he thould always confider 
the refufal to evacuate Malta as fuch a .com- 
mencement of bofiilities : and that as we had hi- 
therto hetitated to do fo, he was juftified in 
adopting the meafures which might eventu- 
aliy be neceflary. He difclaimed every idea 
of the armaments fitting out in the Dutch 
ports having any other deftination than to 
the colonies ; and concluded, that for his 
part he could not comprehend the motives 
which had neceflitated a refort to fuch a mea- 
fure on the part of his Majefty’s Govern- 
ment. 
He then defired leave to go to the Firft 
Conful, promifing that he would let me 
know the refult when we met at dinner at 
the Pruffian Minifter’s. He did not come 
there till near feven o’clock, and when we 
rofe from dinner he took me afide and in- 
formed me, that although the Firft Cenful 
had been highly irritated at the unjuft fufpi- 
cion which his Majefty’s Government enter- 
tained, yet he would not allow himfelf to be 
fo far maftered by his feelings, as to lofe 
fight of the calamities which the prefent 
difcufion might entail upon humanity. He 
dwelt much on this topic, and explained the 
meafures to which he fhould be obliged to 
refort ; he faid, that if England withed to 
difcufs fairly, Re wifhed the fame; that if 
England’ prepared for war he would do the 
fare’ and that if England fhould finally de- 
termine on hoftilities, he trufted to the fup- 
port of the French nation in the caufe of 
honour and of juftice. It was in vain that I 
repeated that England did not wifh for war; 
that peace was as neceffary to us as it could 
be to France; that all we defired, and all 
that we were contending for, was fecurity ; 
that every thing proved to us, that that fe- 
curity was threatened by the Firft Conful’s 
views on Egypt; and that confequently our 
refufal to evacuate Malta, was become as 
much a neceflary meafure of precaution, as 
the-defence of any part of his Majefty’s do- 
minions. To this kind of reafoning M.de 
Talleyrand oppofed the moderation of the 
Firft Conful, his great felf-denial, and his 
determination to facrifice even the moft fa- 
Vourite points to his fincere defire to avoid a 
rupture. 
M. de Talleyrand now told me, that, in 
order to facilitate my communication of the 
Firft Conful’s fentiments, he would commu- 
nicare to me a paper which he had that morn- 
ing drawn up with him ; that it was not to 
be confidered as any thing abfolutely official ; 
that it was a memorandum to affift me, but 
fuch as I might, if I chofe, tranfmit to your 
Lordfhip. WHITWORTH. 
Right Hon. Lord Hawketbury. 
Verbal Note referred to in No. 42. 
I. If his Britannic Majefty, in his Mef- 
fage, means to fpeak of the expedition of 
Helvoetfluys, all the world knows that’ it 
was deftined for America, and that it was 
on the point of failing for its deftination, but 
in confequence of his Majefty’s Meflage, the 
embarkation and putting to fea are about to 
be countermanded. 
Il. If we do not receive fatisfactory ex- 
planation refpeCting thefe armaments in Eng- 
land, and if they aétually take place, it is 
natural that the Firft Co:ful fhould march . 
20,000 men into Holland, fince Holland is 
neneaneds in the Meffage. 
III. Thefe troops being once in the coun~ 
try ét 7s natural that an encampment fhould 
be formed on tlie frontiers of Hanover; and, 
moreover, that additional bodies fhould join 
thofe troops which were already embarked 
for America, in order to form new embarka- 
tions, and to maintain an offenfive and defen- 
five pofition. 
IV. It is natural that the Firtt Conful 
fhould order feveral camps to be formed at 
Caiais, and on different points of the coafts, 
V. It is likewife in the nature of things, 
that the Firft Conful, who was on the point 
of evacuating Switzerland, fhould be under 
the neceflity of continuing a French army in 
that country. 
2 Vi, It. 
