434 
and Europe in general, from the ftate of fuf- 
penfe in which they are placed. It is with 
great regret that he perceives nothing in his 
Excellency’s note which can correfpond 
with this ttention, and confequently no- 
thing that can juitify him in delaying to obey 
the orders of his court. It remains, there- 
fore, only to requeft the Minifter for Foreign 
Affairs to give him the ‘means ef obeying 
them, by furntfhing him with the neceilary 
paifports for his return. It is, however, 
neceiiary for him to reétify a miftake which 
has crept into M, de Talleyrand’s note. The 
underfizned did not fay he was. exprefsly 
forbidden to tranfmit any written note on 
the objeét of the difcuffion, but that he was 
not authorijed to do it, and that he would not 
take that refponfibility on himfelf.* 
Paris, 3d: May, 1803. WHITWORTH, 
Third Inclofare, referred ta in No. 66. 
My Lord, Paris, May 3, 1803. 
Having to-morrow morning to make to 
you a communication of the greateft import. 
ance, I have the honour to inform you of it 
without delay, in order that you may not 
expe this evening the pafiports which you 
had demanded. I propofe that you thall 
call to-rhorrow at half-paft four at the Fo- 
reign department. 
CH, MAU. TALLEYRAND. 
No. 67. 
Extra of a Difpatch from Lord Whitworth to 
Lord Hawikefoury, dated Paris, Wednefday 
Evening, May 4, 18093. 
I am this moment come from M. de Tal- 
Ieyrand. The inclofea note will fhew your 
Lordhhip, that the idea which has been 
thrown out, is to give Malta to Ruifia, 
My only inducement for having under- 
taken to refer again to your Lordfhip, is to 
avoid every reproach of precipitation. The 
difference will be but five days, and I have 
declared, that I fee fo many objections to 
the plan, that although I would not refufe 
their folicitations.to fend it, I. could give no 
hope ‘whatever of its being accepted as a 
ground of negotiation. 
Inclofure referred to in No. 67. 
The underfigned has fubmitted to the Firft 
Conful his Britannic Majefty’s Ambaffador’s 
note of the gd inttant, 
After the lait communication addreffed to 
his Excellency, it is more difficult than ever 
to conceive how a great, powerful, and en- 
lightened nation, can be willing to take it 
upon itfelf to declare a war whch would be 
accompanied by fuch heavy calamities, and 
the caufe of which would be fo infignificant,. 
the object in queftion being a miferable 
rock. 
* See No. 63, by which it appears that 
the Britifh Government did not intend to 
forbid that this important communication 
fhould be made in the gfual form. 
Correfpondence between Great Britain and France. | June 1, 
His Excellency muft have been aware that 
the two-fold neceffity of making an agree- 
ment with the guaranteeing powers of the 
Treaty of Amiens and of not violating a 
compact, in the execution of which the ho- 
nour of France, the fecurity for the future, 
and the good faith of the diplomatic inter- 
courfe between the nations of Europe, were 
fo deeply interefted, had impofed a law upon 
the French Government, of difcarding every 
propofition diametrically contrary to the | 
treaty of Amiens. Neverthelefs, the Firft 
Conful, accuftomed fer two months to make 
every {pecies of facrifice for the maintenance 
of peace, would not reject a mezzo-termino 
of a nature to conciliate the interefts an 
dignity of the two countries. 
His. Britannic Majelty appears to have been 
of opinion, that the Neapolitan garrifon 
which was to be placed at Malta would net | 
afford a fufficient force for fecuring the ae- 
tual independence of the ifland. 
This motive, being the only one which 
can explain his Majeity’s refufal to evacuate 
the ifland, the Firft Conful is ready to con- 
fent that the ifland of Malta fhall be placed 
in the hands of one of the three powers wha 
have guaranteed its independence, either 
Auftria, Ruffia, or Pruffia, with a provifo, 
that as foon as France and England fhall 
have come to an agreement upon this article, 
they fhall unite in their requifitions to en~ 
gage the other powers, either contraéting, 
or acceding to the treaty of Amiens, to con- 
fent to it. 
Were it poflible that this propofition fhould 
wot be accepted, it woule be manifeft not 
only that England never intended to comply 
with the terms of the Treaty of Amiens, but 
that fhe has not been a€tuated by good faith 
in any of her demands, and that, in propor- 
‘tion as France conceded one point, the Bri- 
tifh Government advanced another. 
fhould be demonitrated, the Firft Conful 
— a a ae —_ 
If this 
will at leaft have given another proof of his ” 
fincerity, oF his anxiety to devife the means — 
of avoiding war, of his eagernefs to embrace 
them, and of the value which he woula place ~_ 
on their being adopted. 2 
No. 68. 
Downing Street, May7, 1803. 
My Lord, ms 
The propofitions which have been made 
to you on the part of the French Govern- 
ment, and which have induced your Excele — 
lency to delay your departure until the re- 
turn of the meflenger Sylvefter, are in every — 
refpect fo loofe, indefinite, and unfatisfac- 
tory, and fall fo far fhort of the jut pre- 
tenfions of his Majefty, that it 1s impoffible 
that the French Government could have eXx- 
peéted them to have been accepted. During 
¥ 
the whole of the difcufons which have ” 
lately occurred, his Majetty has had a right 
to contider himfelf in the charaéter of the 
injured party. 
ted on his part to induce the French Governe 
meng 
4 
; 
No means have been omit= — 
