488 
ty of thefe organs. The progrefs of that mo- 
tion frem without inwards, by means of 
which a fenfation produces. the correfponding 
idea, is ufually called perception; and a per- 
ception fs often employed as a common name 
for the motions of either extremity of the or- 
gan. When the mind is attending to mo- 
tiens of the external extremity, it is faid to 
feel ; when to motions of the internal ex- 
tremity, it is faid tothink. To feeble or ha- 
Bitual motions, it commonly dogs not attend 
at all: ‘with refpe& to them it fleeps. 
Senfations differ in kind: the eye meafures 
the intenfity and velocity of light; the ear 
meafures-the thape and {wiftnefs of the vibra- 
tions of air; the nofe and palate meafure the 
chemical mixtures in volatile and liquid ap- 
plications ; but ideas tranflate into one homo- 
geneous charaCter the experience of the diffe- 
sent fenfes, all the diverfe fenfations being 
wecorded probably by movements of the parti- 
les of the brain. As we record in words the 
phenomena of fight, in words the phenomena 
ef found, in words the phenomena of-tafte ; 
fo the mind records, in one fort of imagery, 
3m a uniform chara@ery, the phenomena of 
all fenfation. ‘The organ of idealifation is 
alike ftimulable by each fpecific clafs of fen- 
dations, whereas the organ of fenfe is. only 
grritable to its appropriate ftimulus. Hence 
3t happens, that, although fenfations are no- 
wife linked together, a vivid a€tion on the 
eye producing none on the ear, and reverfe- 
¥y 3 yet ideas are always linked together, a 
vivid excitement of any idea bringing out the 
€ontiguous, or cotemporarily imprefied, ideas, 
from whatever fenfe derived. 
It. But, befide all that endlefs variety 
of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is 
hikewife fomething which knows or per- 
ceives them, and exercifes divers opera- 
tions, as willing, imagining, remember- 
ing, about them. ‘This perceiving aétive 
being is what I call mad, fpirit, fiul, or 
myfelf. By which words, I do not denote 
any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely 
diftinét from them, wherein they exift, or, 
which ts the fame thing, whereby they are 
perceived ; for the exiftence of an idea 
confits in being perceived. 
Vt. Wherein they exift. 
Ideas may be compared to. a Jandfcape, and 
the mind to the fan: as’ ideas ere perceived 
to exif only during the attention of the 
siind to thole ide2s: fo the mountains, the 
trees, the lake, are perceived to exift only 
éuring the prefence of the fun: whether 
carknets annihilates thefe obje@s, is the quef- 
gion in difcuilion, and muft no where be 
‘taken for granted. The Jandfcape cannot 
be faid'to exif, in the fun, unlefs fun be ufed 
for funfhine 5; nor can ideas be faid to exift in 
roe mind, wnlefs mind be ufed for the {phere of 
its cwn attention, for that extent of fpace 
in the brain, which ic can at one time Mimu- 
Yate into actica. 
Enquirer, No. XXIVs 
[Janets 
For the exifience of an idea conffis in its being 
perceived. ; 
How beldia ftride! how violent an infes 
rence! how difconneéted with the premifes ! 
An idea is the evidence of perception, the 
trace made on the interior organ, and, like 
any other -human record, it may continue to 
exift in a latent but produceable form, after 
the fenfation, or tranfa€tion, of which it is 
the record, is gone by. When the mind re- 
members, it re-produces ideas, which, for an 
interval, had been latent; by fome fuch pro- 
ceis perhaps as the electrician caufes flaccid 
down to briftle up on approaching a rubbed 
glafs. To fay that the down, until eleéri- 
fied, was not there, or that the ideas, until 
attended to, were not in the brain, is again. 
begging the queftion in difpute, and folfting 
that into a corollary, which follows not from 
the propofition. Bs 
III. That neither our thoughts, nor 
paffions, nor ideas formed by the imagt- 
nation, exilt without the mind, is what 
every body willallow. And it feems no 
lefs evident, that the various fenfations or 
ideas imprinted on the fenfe, however 
blended or combined together (that is, 
whatever objects they compofe) cannot 
exift otherwife than in a mind perceiving 
them. I think an intuitive knowledge 
may be obtained of this, by any one that 
fhail attend to what is meant by the term 
exiff, when applied to fenfible things. 
The table I write on, I fay, exifts, that 
is, I fee and feel it ; and, if I were out of 
my fiudy, I fhould fay it exifted, meaning 
thereby, that, if I was in my ftudy, Imight 
perceive it, or that fome other fpirit a¢tu- 
ally does perceive it. There was an 
odour, that is, it was fmelled ; there was 
a found, that is to fay, it was heard; a 
colour or figure, and it was perceived by 
fight or touch. 
underftand by thefe and the like expref- 
fions. For, as to what is faid of the ab- 
folute exiftence of unthinking things, 
without any relation to their being per- 
ceived, that feems perfe&tly unintelligible, 
Their efe is percipi, nor is it pofiible they — 
fhould have any exiftence out of the minds 
er thinking things which perceive them. ~ 
UL. Neither our thoughis, nor paffions, nor 
ideas, exif? without the mind. 
The prepofition without is here fomewhat — 
equivocally ufed both for the French faas and 
bors: and the word thought is very dextroufly 
brought forwards. The nrft fep was to con- 
found fenfations with ideas, the next is to — 
. . . . 
confound thoughts with ideas, in order to 
predicate concerning fenfations what is only 
true of thoughts, under the middle name of - 
ideas.. By thought is meant the a€tion of 
mind on ideas; thoughis, therefore, do not 
exift without the mind, By pafiion is meant 
mn hes the: 
This is all that I can” 
