1803.] 
the actual excitement of thofe trains of 
ideas, which tend to ftimulate violent volune 
tary motions,-as of the tongue to chide, or 
of the arm to ftrike ; paflions, therefore, do 
not exift without more than ufual attention 
of the mind. But ideas may exift ina latent 
ftate during fleep or abfence of mind, as words 
may exift in a book while it is fhut or in the 
dark, And they do fo exift, or there could 
be no memory. On the Berkeleyan hypo- 
thefis, the paft, and the recolle€tion of the 
paft, having precifely equal reality, ought to 
be indiftinguifhable. Of thoughts the eff is 
percipi; of ideas it is not 5 for, fince volunta- 
ry motions are always ftimulated by ideas, in 
the cafe of voluntary motions become auto- 
matic, they are ftimulated by unperceived 
ideas. Yet this conftitutes a fundamental 
propofition of the f{chool, that ideas, while 
unperceived, do not exift. . 
IV. It is indeed. an opinion ftrangely 
prevailing among men, that houfes, moun- 
tains, rivers, and, in a word, all fenfible 
obje&ts, have an exiftence natural or real, 
diftin& from their being perceived by the ~ 
underftanding. But, with how great an 
affurance and acquiefcence foever this 
principle may be entertained in the world, 
yet whoever fhall find in his heart to call 
it in queftion, may, if I miftake not, per- 
ceive it to involve a manifeft contradiftion. 
For what are the fore-mentioned . objeéts 
but the things we perceive by fenfe, and 
what do we perceive befides our own ideas 
or fenfations ; and is it not plainly repug- 
nant, that any one of thele, or any combi- 
nation of them, fhoald exift unperceived. 
IV. Involve a manifef? contradiction. 
Why fo? Becaufe, anfwers Berkeley, the 
forementioned obje€ts (houfes, mountains, 
rivers) are the things we perceive by fenfe ; 
but the things we perceive by fenfe are our 
ewn ideas or fenfations ; therefore, houfes, 
mountains, rivers, are our own ideas. Is 
this reafoning? Can it ever have been mif- 
taken for fuch ? The minor, to fpeak tech- 
nically, is a moft improbable, nearly a felf- 
contradi€tory, pofition, and, at any rate, isa 
petition of principle, or claim of grant. The 
things we perceive by fenfe are not our own 
ideas; the things we perceive by fenfe are 
not our own fenfations ; nor are our ideas our 
fenfations. . 
Whether this be irony, or arrogance, or 
ferious dogmatifm, is difficult to guefs; it 
forms, however, the fecond fundamental pro- 
pofition, that the univerfe is a train of ideas. 
V. If we thoroughly examine this te- 
net, it will perhaps be found at bottom to 
depend on the doétrine of abjra? ideas. 
For, can there be a nicer ftrain of abftrac- 
tion, than to diftinguifh the exiftence of 
feniible objects from their being perceived, 
fo as to conceive them cxilting unperceiv- 
Enquirer, No. XXIV. 
4359 
ed. Light and colours, heat and cold, 
extenfion and figures, in a word, the things 
we fee and feel, what are they but fo ma- 
ny fenfations, notions, ideas, or impref= 
fions on the fenfe; and is it poffible to 
feparate, even in thought, any of thefe 
from perception?) For my part, I might 
as eafily divide a thing from itfelf. I 
may indeed divide in my thoughts, or 
conceive apart from each other thofe 
things, which, perhaps, I never perceived’ 
by fenfe fo divided. Thus, I imagine the 
trunk of a human body without the 
limbs, or conceive the {mell of a rofe 
without thinking on the rofe itfelf. So 
far I will not deny I can abitra&t, if that 
may properly be called ab/fraGion, which 
extends only to the conceiving feparately 
fuch objects as it is poffible may really ex- 
ift, or be actually perceived afunder. .But 
my conceiving or imagining pawer does 
not extend beyond the poffibility of rea} 
exiftence, or perception. Hence, as it is 
impoffible for me to fee or feel any thing 
without an actual fenfation of that thing, 
fo it is impoffible for me to conceive in 
my thoughts any fenfible thing or obje& 
diftinét. trom the fenfation or perception 
of 46. 
V. Asit is impoffible to fee or feel any thing. 
without an actual fenfation of that thing, joit ws 
impoffible to conceive any thing aifin& from the 
Jenfation of it. 
To feel any thing, and to have an aétual 
fenfation of it, are, no doubt, fynonimous; | 
not fe, to conceive any thing, and to have a 
fenfation of it. Itis, on the contrary, impof- 
fible for a moving animal to conceive any 
thing to de identical with the fenfation occas 
fioned by it: nobody miftakes the moon for 
a part of his eye, a fiddle for his ear, ora leg 
. 
~ & 
of mutton for his mouth 5 becaufe, by re- — 
moving his eye, the moon ceafes to a& upon 
its furface, and fo forth. 
VI. Some truths there are fo near and 
obvious to the mind, that a man need oniy 
open his eyes tofee them. Such I take 
this important one to be, to wit, that all 
the choir of heaven, and furniture of the 
earth, in a word, all thofe bodies which 
compole the mighty frame of the world, 
have not any fubfiltence without a mind ; 
that their being is to be perceived or 
known; that confequently fo long as they 
are not actually perceived by me, or do 
not exift in my mind, or that of any other 
created fpirit, they muft either have no 
exiftence at all, or elfe fubGi&t inthe ming 
of fome eternal fpirit; it being perfectly 
unintelligible, and involving all the abfur- 
dity of abftragtion, to attribute to any fin- 
gle part of them an exiftence independent 
of. 
