490 
of a fpirit. To be convinced of which, 
the reader need only reflect, and try to 
feparate in his own thoughts the being of 
a fenfible thing from its being perceived. 
VI. All thofe bodies which compofe the mighty 
frame of the worid have not any fubfifience witb- 
out a mind; THAT their being is to be perceived 
er known. 
Unintelligible, of courfe irrefragable. If, 
inftead of the word that, the word whereby 
awere inferted, the fentence would  be- 
come Englifh; and the intended pofition 
of the author would probably be expref- 
fed. In this cafe Berkeley has aflumed as 
a felf-evident propofition the queftion in 
difpute. It involves no contradi¢tion to 
fuppofe, that whole folar fyftems, whofe 
light has not yet reached the peopled earths, 
are ftill uninhabited. It involves no contra- 
diction to fuppofe, that out of a chaotic mafs 
of matter, finite in quantity, and eternal in 
duration, fuch mute balls fhould have con- 
globated, by a gravitation inherent in the 
matter, and unconnected with perception. In 
this cafe, a mighty frame of world would 
have fubfifttence without a mind, whereby its 
being is to be perceived. To call the con- 
. verfe hypothefis fo near and obvious, that a 
man need only open his eyes to fee it, is grofs 
arrogance of affertion. Yet on this gratis 
faying is hung the mighty inference — Con/e- 
guently fo long as they are not actually perceiud 
by me, or do not exift in my mind, or that of 
any other created [pirit, they muf? either have no 
exifience at all, or elfe fubfift in the mind of fome 
eternal fir:t. 
This is the third fundamental propofition : 
——the univerfe, being a train of ideas, cannot 
exift while unperceived 3 butit always exifts, 
therefore it has an eternal perceiver, God. If 
the firft pofition de affumed, the fecond can- 
not be conceded coafiftently. What proof 
has the Berkeleyan to offer of the immorta- 
lity ofthe univerfe ? I open my eyes, it ex- 
ifts; I fhut them, itis annihilated; for I per- 
ceive it not. This, in his fyftem, is found 
Jogic: he has nothing to oppofe to the doc- 
trine of an intermitting univerfe: he may 
confequentially, with refpect to external 
beings, be a nullibift, maistain the folitarity 
of his own exiftence, and the alternate ema- 
nation and abforption, or creation and annihi- 
lation, by the a€& of his own will, of all that 
is: he may confiftently terminate in auto- 
theifm. 
V1I. From what has been faid, it fol- 
Jows, there is not any other fubftance than 
f{pirit, or that which perceives. But, for 
the fuller proof of this point, let it be 
confidered, the fenfible qualities are co- 
Jour, figure, motion, fmell, tafte, and fuch 
like, that is, the ideas perceived by fenfe. 
Now, for an idea to exift in an unpercciv- 
ing thing, is a manifeft contradiction ; for 
to have an idea is al] one as to percvive ; 
Enquirer, No. XXIV. 
that therefore wherein \colour, figure, and 
the like qualities exift, muft perceive them} 
hence, it is clear, there can be no un- 
thinking fubftance or Jubjiratum of thofe 
ideas. 
VII. Ut follows, there is not any other fub= 
flance than fpirit. 
How truly furprifing an inference! It is 
dificult to guefs from which of the foregoing 
paragraphs Berkeley expeéted his reader to 
come at fach a conclufion: if from the fixth, 
it is only undeniable, inafmuch as it is unin- 
telligible. 
This, however, is the forth and laft funda- 
mental propofition, thatall being is fpirit, or 
percipient fubftance ; fince I am fo, the uni- 
verfe fo, and God fo, befide which nothing is. 
Berkeley’s fuller proof is almoft ludicrous. 
The colour, figure, fmell, and tafte of this 
apple are ideas perceived by fenfe. For an 
idea to exift in an unperceiving thing is’ a 
contradiction, This apple, therefore, where- 
in colour, figure, and the like qualities exift, 
can be no unthinking fubftance. 
The fallacy of this argument confifts in 
employing indifcriminately particular and ge- 
neral terms. Colour, fmell, tafte, are gene- 
ralterms. ‘There are blue, yellow, red, indi- 
vidual fenfations, whofe common phenome- 
non is called colour; but this impreffion, 
though it can be imaged in idea, is not itfelf 
capable of being perceived apart by fenfe. It 
is obtained by abfraétion, by withdrawing, 
leaving out, or ftripping off that part of the 
concrete idea of fenfation, which conftitutes 
bluenefs, yellownefs, rednefs. This abftrac- 
tion made, this omiffion of individuality in 
the idea once accomplifhed, it is no longer 
the reprefentative of any fenfation, which 
ever was or can be excited, fenfation being 
converfant only with individuals. Such ab- 
{tract ideas, thererore, are not perceived by 
fenfe; neither, indeed, can they exift (unlefs 
latently, as in a drowned perfon before revi- 
val) in unperceiving beings. ‘They refemble 
the exes and the wyes of the algebraift, which 
are indefinite reprefentatives of individual 
numoers employed to think and reafon with. 
For the major or firft affertion of Berke- 
ley’s fyllogifm to be true, particular terms 
are wanted. The ruddinefs of this apple is 
perceived by fenfe. For the minor or fecond . 
affertion to be true, general terms are wanted. 
The idea of colour can only be formed ina 
perceiving {pirit, But when the propofitions 
are thus reduced to precifion, and re-ftated, 
they are not parallel, commenfurable, or 
conneéted. The fecond, which is general, 
does not include the firft, which is particu- 
lar ; and the inference has no relation to the 
premifes. 
VIII. But fay you, though the ideas 
themfelves do not exift without the mind, 
yet there may be things like them, where- 
of they are copies or refemblances, which 
things 
