1803; ] 
things exift without the mind, in an un- 
thinking fubftance..- I anfwer, an idea 
can be like nothing but an idea; a colour 
r figure can be like nothing but ano- 
ian colour or figure. If we look but 
ever fo little into our thoughts, we fhall 
find it impoffible for us to conceive a 
likenefs, excépt only between our ideas. 
Again, I afk, whether thofe fuppofed ori- 
ginals, or external things, of which our 
ideas are the pictures or reprefntations, 
be themfelves perceivable or no? If they 
are, then they are ideas, and we have gain- 
ed our point; but, if you fay they are 
not, I appeal to any one, whether it be 
fenfe, to aflert a colour is like fomething 
wiich is invifible ; hard or foft, like fome- 
thing which is intangible, and fo of the 
reff. 
VIII. An idea canbe like nothing but an sep. 
This is not fo certain. Asa telefcope i is a 
copy or externalization of the procefs of vi- 
fion ; fo written language may be a copy or 
externalization of the procefs of thinking. 
Ideas may be fo many elemental forms, types, 
or charaéters, anfwering to letters, or fhort- 
hand marks, by means of which the mind 
notes down its experience, and which it 
paftes up, as‘it were, in the cells, and on the 
membranes, of the brain, whence, unlefs 
fattened by frequent revifion, they feem to 
detach themfelves again. In this-cafe, ideas$ 
like words, would always-reprefent.at firft 
fenfible objeéts, and would, in like manner, 
undergo efpecially two modifications :—(1) 
by analogy, the ideas derived from one fenfe 
would be eniployed to define the ideas derived 
from another ; anfwering to the ufe of meta- 
phor in language: (2) by abftraétion, the 
iJeas originally particular and phyfical would 
become general and metaphyfical; as the 
word man, which was once the proper name 
of a hero worlhipped by the ancient Germans, 
is become the name of the whole human-fpe- 
cies.. The progrefs of knowledge confifts in 
generalization ; in abftraéting from a fa, a 
phenomenon, or leffon of experience, that 
which it has of individual or particular, and 
exptefling in the moft comprehenfive or gene- 
ral form the truifm which it implies, fo as 
to include all parallel facts. 
If they are perccivable, then they areideas. 
The main argument of this paragraph re~ 
pofes on the affumption, that nothing is per- 
ceivable but ideas ; whereas fenfations are alfo 
perceivable: the mind has accefs toboth ends 
of the organs of perception, and can comiparé 
tlie affeCtions of the external and inter- 
nal extremities. By that comparifon it in- 
fers moft of its knowledge. Weknow by 
experience, that fenfations can excite ideas 5 
by experience, that the mind can excite ideas: 
we know by experience, that ideas cannot 
excite fenfations; dy experience, that the 
mind cannot excite fenfations. We confe- 
Montury Mag, No. gs. 
Enquirer, No. XXIV.  /4O4 
quently infer, that what excites fenfations 
(i. e. the external world, the frame of things, 
the univerfe matter) is eflentially different 
both from the mindand from ideas. Q. E. D. 
IX. Some there are who make a dif- 
tinction betwixt primary and fecomdary 
qualities: by the, former, they mean ex- 
tenfion, figure, motion, ref, folidiry, or 
impenetrability and number: by the lat- 
ter, they denote all other fenfible quali- 
ties, as colours, founds, taftes, and fo 
forth. ‘The ideas we have of thefe they 
acknowledge not to be the refemblances 
of any thine exiting without the mind or 
unperceived ; but they will have our ideas 
of the primary qualities to be patterns or 
images of things, which exift without the 
mind, i in-an unthinking fubftance, which 
they call matter. By matter, therefore, 
we are to underftand an inert, fenfeleis 
fubftance, in which extenfion, figure, and 
motion, do attually fubfift.: But, it ts 
evident, from what we have already 
fhewn, that extenfion, figure, and motion, 
are only ideas exifting in the mind, and 
that an idea can be like nothing but ano- 
ther idea, and that confequently neither 
they nor their archetypes can exift in an 
unperceiving fubfance. Hence it. is 
plain, that the very notion of what is 
called matter or corporeal fub/lance m- 
volves a contradiétion in it. 
IX. An inert fenfelefs fubfiance, in which ex- 
tenfion, fizure, and motion. 
Here matter is defined a fenfe lefs, extended, 
moving fubGance: in this cafe, the calorique 
of Hippocrates and Okely, whe they confi- 
der as eflentially percipient, and which is 
certainly perceived by fenfe, would be im- 
material, although corporeal: fuch fpirit 
would differ from matter, as a gaz from a li- 
quid. Refiftivenefs, or the capability of be- 
coming an object of fenfation, is more com- 
monly confidered as the effential attribute of 
matter, 
Weare then told,that the very notionof mat- 
ter involves a Uokicieaie Moninit; becaufe ex- 
tenfion, figure, and motion, do actually fubfittin 
ir; but extenfion, figure, and motion, are only 
ideas, and can confequently notexifinan un- 
percéiving fubftance, fuch as,by the definition, 
matter ismade to be. ‘This is a repetition of 
the fophifm already employed in the feventh 
paragraph. Thofe abftraét, general, or me- 
taphytical, ideas, expreffed by the terms, ex- 
tenlion, figure, and motion, fubfitt only in 
the mind; but this truifm does not preclude 
the exiftence elfewhere of a fpecific extent, 
of a definite thape, of a given movement. 
The irreality} whidh may be predicated of 
thofe hypothetical exiftencies, -fignified by 
general terms, cannot be predicated of thofe 
fenfible exiftences, fignified by)» particular 
terms; even when the {pecific exiilences bee 
long to the fame clafs with the gengric, and 
3. R are 
