1802.] 
with the neighbouring nations, which he 
did in the courfe of two years after his 
elevation to the confulate, than he extend- 
ed his {way by an appeai to the people 
from the period of ten years, two of which 
had run, to the whole of his life. The 
caufes of this diverfity, it is fairly to be ~ 
prefumed, were inherent rather in the cha- 
ratter of the Roman and the French 
people, than in that of their refpective 
Emperors. When they agreed in fo ma- 
ny points, it is reafonable to prefume, 
that a difference of conduét is not to be 
afcribed to the government, but to the 
people governed. As juft penetration 
and folid fenfe was one and the fame 
in both, they both conducted themfelves 
on the fame plan, where it was pra¢ti- 
cable: when their plans were different, 
there was a difference in the temper and 
circumftances of their fubjects. 
The Romans, though the yulgar in all 
nations are prone to change and novelty*, 
compared with the Greeks and Afiatics, 
were rather a folid and fteady people. 
There neither is, nor perhaps ever was, a 
people on the face of the earth at all ci- 
vilized, fo fiery, fickle, and ineonftant, as 
the French. Bonaparte, knowing this, 
availed himfelf of the full tide, to fix, as 
far as human prudence and forefight could 
fix, his fortune. In proportion as any in- 
dividual or nation is endowed with lively 
paffions, they are, in that proportion, lia- 
ble to fanaticifm. Bonaparte was, for a 
time, with the French an object of fa- 
naticifm. It was on fanaticifm that 
his power was originally founded. But 
fanaticifm, even religious fanaticifm, no 
doubt the ftrongeft, is a feeble and fugaci- 
ous bafis of power, unlefs it be fupported 
and nourifhed by oppofition, on the one 
hand, or the arts of prieftcraft on the 
other, It is well-obferved by Machiavel, 
in his Prince, which we may {wear Bona- 
parte has read again and again, that all 
the prophets, who were fupported by an 
armed foice, fucceeded in their undertak- 
ings; bur that all thofe, who had not fuch 
a force to truft to, were defeated and de- 
ftroyed. ‘* Neither Mofes (fays Machi- 
ave]) nor Cyrus, nor Thelfeus, nor Romu- 
lus, could ever have cauled their in{titu- 
tions to be fo long obferved, if they had not 
been armed. 
<¢ In our times,”’ the Florentine Secretary 
_{as he was called) proceeds, ‘* Giacomo di 
Savanarola, a Dominican Friar, who pre- 
tended to converfe with God, and declared 
a A a re 
* Mobiliam tuba Quiritinm Horace, 
Ode I. 
Parallel between Auguftus Cafar and Bonaparte. 
Q25 
againft the See of Rome, was deftroyed, 
when the people began to fall off trom 
him, becaufe he had neither power to 
keep thofe fteady in their perfuafion, nor 
to defend himfelf when they deferted 
him.” 
The elevation of Bonaparte to the fu- 
preme and uncontrouled power, which 
may be cenfidered as the completion of 
the revolutionary circle, from defpotifma 
to defpotifm again, has proved more than 
any event in our times two great princi- 
ples in politics, whichfome hefitate as yet 
to call a{cience. Firft, it fhews how all 
anarchy muft terminate at laft in military 
and defpotic powers Secondly, it fhews 
how much reafon ail free and popular go- 
vernments have to be jealous of tranf{cend- 
ant genius, and even virtues. When we 
read at {chool Cornelius Nepos or Plu- 
tarch, we not only ftand in amazement 
at the oftracifm of the Athenian Republic, 
but conceive the demagogues to have 
been either madmen, or montters of ini- 
quity. But, when we reflect how eafy 
it is fora people, evena very great na- 
tion, to unite in an enthufiaftic admiration 
and devotion to one man, we begin to 
think of the banifhment of even Ariftides 
with fome degree of patience. 
It is difficult to unite any people, but ut- 
terly impofflibie to unite the French, in any 
fyftem founded on a common or general 
opinion of right or intereft. There re- 
ain, therefore, for France only two other 
kinds of government—of which one is 
founded on a refpect for hereditary autho- 
rity; and the other in a furrender, ac firft 
voluntary, and afterward compulfory, to 
fome renowned chief and conquercr. The 
French nation have deftroyed the former 
of thefe, and preferred the Jatter. 
Whether this new order of affairs is to 
form the commencement of a new dynafty 
and grand empire, or to be followed by 
yet farther convulfion, is a fecret that lies 
profoundly buried in the intricacies of fu- 
ture events. ‘As the French nation can- 
not be governed but by the vigour and 
promptitude of monarchy, the fooner they 
lay afide all curious {peculations concern- 
ing political conftitutionsthebetter. They 
mutt truft for {ome tolerable fhare of com- 
fort and conlequence to religion and the 
progrefs of arts, {ciences, and civilization, 
which mould and form even arbitrary 
courts, and promote the reign of humanity 
and reafon. Why kick in vain againft the 
pricks? Why not acknowledge the fo- 
vereignty of the Corfican dynafty now, as 
well as afterwards? If the monarchy is 
not hereditary, it muft be, what is worfe, 
F fe elective. 
