’ . 
the fele&tions which they have introduced 
“into their language, prove their tafte in 
general, and induces a prefumption, that 
they will make ftill further progrefs in 
this fcience. In the year 1800, the fame 
Anthimus Gazi engraved, at Vienna, a 
large chart of Greece and of Tur- 
-key in Europe, in twelve fmall fheets, 
drawn up by himj which exhibits ail 
the geography of Meletius, with other 
more circumftantial details. In the fame 
year, the fame Gazi engraved a tolera- 
bly handfome Map of the World, in 
four large fheets, drawn up by one 
Georce GoLéski, apparently from 
fome German chart, and adorned in all the 
ufual ways of projecting the globe, with 
fome details on the different planetary 
fyfiems. It contains the portrait of Alex- 
ander Mauroufi, Prince of Walachia, 
‘with a {mall chart of that province. 
The following judicious obfervations, 
ewhich throw some light on the obfcure phi- 
lojophy of Kant, are taken from a late 
French literary journal, (la Decade Philo- 
fophique).—It appears that a Manual of 
this Philofophy has been publifhed at 
Paris, with great reputation, by Citizen 
Cu. ViLLIERs: but it is afferted, that 
the account given of it hitherto in the 
journals is but little fatisfaétory. This 
philofophy has oecafioned much difcuffion 
at Paris: but according to the writers in 
the above journal, the fundamental part of 
the fyftem has been entirely negiected, 
and publication has been only occupied 
about the forms. In Germany,it feems,this 
philofophy has already acquired all the ho- 
nours of antiquity; the difputes which 
it has given rife to among the learned of 
that country relate only to its interpreta- 
tion ; the principal dogmata have been 
received without difficulty, and at pre- 
fent ferve only for a point to fet, out 
from in the ramifications of argu- 
ment. “The Germans, it is here faid, re- 
proach the French for condemning Kant 
without hearing him; and it is added, 
that the Englith have been generally ex- 
cluded from this difcuffion, on account of 
of their partiality for Locke. In this 
ftate of things, {ay the above writers, no- 
thing is required but a little common 
fenfe to appreciate this fyftem according 
to its juft value. Admitting, therefore, 
the ncology of the terms volition, religio- 
Sty, fociety, bellelettrifte, &c. and the tur- 
prifing confufion which pervades the pages 
of Kant, which they attribute to the tafte 
ef the German writers, who generally 
give to their works the form of a grimcire 
Literary and Philofophical Intelligence.’ 
[ Oaober I, 
(conjuring-book), from which the cele~ 
brated Lavater himfelf was not exempt ; 
they propoie to examine only the refult 
of the fyitem in itlelf. Kant di- 
vides human intelligence into fenfibi- 
lity and underftanding; fenfibility com- 
prehends the faculties of apprehending 
and of receiving impreffions, from whence 
aries knowledge; the underftanding com~ 
prehends the faculty of willing, and that 
of /pontaneity, from whence arifes action. 
He fays, that man judges of things ac- 
cording as they appear to him, and that 
he is unable to know them as they are in 
themifelves. So far we are agreed as to 
the terms. DEsCarTes has demonttrated, 
that colours and founds are only different 
modifications of our feeing and hearing 5 
andConpiLuLac himéelf has faid—*‘ Nous 
ne woyons point les corps en eux-memes’— 
We do not {ee bodies in themfelves. But 
Kant pufhes his f{cepticifm fo far as to 
fay, that fpace and time exift only in 
man ; and when Condillac makes this de- 
finition—‘* It is from touching that we de- 
rive the reprefentation of {pace, when our 
hand paffes over a furface,” Kant ftops and 
exclaims—¢ You fuppofe already a fur- 
face, a hand which moves;" this is a 
petitio principii, and begging of the quef+ 
tion. What definition then does he give 
himfelf? A fimilar one, although in dif- 
ferent terms. Space, according to him, is 
the condition of the poffibility of diftin- 
guifhing two bodies feparately ; and Con- 
dillac, fuppofing the exiftence of fpaces 
fays,that this act gives us a relative know- 
ledge of it, which is undeniable. . Hence 
the fubtlety of Kant is reduced to fay, that 
{pace having no exiftence, yet touching 
can give us the idea of it, which is abfurd. 
This firft error leads ftill fucther, as may 
well be judged; and this indeed is the 
proudeft triumph of the fyftem of Condil- 
lac, that man judges according to his fen- 
fations, and that our ideas are fenfation 
itfelf. In faét, Kant has an interior per- 
ception of himfelf, and he fays—*‘* to 
exift..” Confining himfelf to this firf 
impreffion, he only fees in the whole of 
nature a vaft tableau, veprefenting ficttiti- 
ous objects, as they are not himfelf; he 
is likewile obliged to fay; in order tobe 
confiftent, that God is ua zmore eternal than 
be is yellow, and lie even denies his ex 
iftence iz toto, becaufe it is not identically 
him. Toavoid the reproach of egotifm 
and materialifm, he allows the extltence 
of a God from the conviction of the heart 
alone ; but this too much refembles the 
celeftial machinery of fome German dra- 
% _.. dramas 
