1803.| Objervations upon the Effects of Words upon the Mind. 
author refuted, would quietly acquiefce 
in his errors—this iort of implicit obedi- 
ence which is paid to reputation, which 
inclines us to receives: without examina- 
tion, the whole becaufe a part is excellent, 
fhould become the ftrongeit inducement for 
a ievere inveltigation. 
In that part, which J am about to exa- 
mine, of Mr. Burke’s Eflay, he, feems to 
have failed of his ufual acutenels, and'to 
have falfely drawn his conclufions. I fhall 
ftate his principalearguments and affer- 
tions; therefore now beg the reader to 
weigh them with candour. 
Words he divides into three clafies— 
the firft clafs comprehends aggregate 
words—they are fuch as reprefent many 
fimple ideas united by nature to form 
fome one determinate compofition, as man, 
horfe, tree, caftle, &c. ‘The fecond are 
they that ftand for one fimple idea of fuch 
compolitions and no more; as red, blue, 
round, fquare, and the like. Thefe he 
calis imple abftraét words—the third clafs 
are formed by anunion,an arbitrary union, 
of both the others, and of the various re- 
lations between them, in greater or lefs 
degrees of complexity; as virtue, honour, 
perfuafion, magiftrate, and the like—thele 
are the compound abiiraét words. 
Having given the ciaflification, which 
appeared neceflary, I fhall now difculs 
his opinions refpecting words. Of the 
compound abftracis, fuch as virtue, per- 
fuafion, docility, he fays «* I am convinced 
that whatever power they may have on 
the paffions, they do not derive it from 
any reprefentation raifed in the mind of 
the things for which they fand. As com- 
pofitions they are not real effences, and 
hardly caule, I think,any realideas.”” That 
thefe words are not real efiences, I fhall 
readily allow their juftly efleemed author ; 
but muft examine the weight of his argu- 
ments; before I agree thatthey do not 
raife ideas. 
Determinate images in the mind can. 
not be raifed by the compound abftraét. 
words; we cannot be fuppofcd to have 
any clear image prefented to our minds, 
when we hear imply of magnanimity, or 
virtue ; but from hence to draw a conclu- 
fion that no ideas whatever are excited by 
them, would be fophiftry in the extreme : 
the words themfelves ftand for no exad 
images, of courfe cannot excite them— 
Virtue is a word that would receive a cif- 
ferent definition from different. perfons, 
nay the fame perfons wiil oftentimes alter 
their ideas relpecting it; fuch an idea 
however as is annexed to it, vague in- 
deed, and without any afiuai limits, mut 
“be conteived by every one who hears the 
213 
found, provided he has previoufly ac- 
quired its import. To put this matter in 
a ftill clearer point of view, let us exa~- 
mine one of Mr. Burke’s own fentences, 
jut before this affertion—it runs thus: 
‘¢ and they (words) are difpofed:in that 
order in which they are commonly taught, 
and in which the mind gets the ideas 
they are fubftituted for’’—We have here 
nea: lya direét contradiction to his own pefi- 
tion. How is the mind to get thole ideas 
which words are fubftituted for, unlefs 
thole words commonly raife fuch ideas ? 
The faét, however, is, that the mind. does 
get the ideas words are fubitituted for; and 
thefe ideas alone remain. in the memory, 
while the effect of the found is tranfitory 
—Suppole we read a diflertation upon any 
fubject, we feldom recolleé&t the precife 
language in which the ideas are conveyed, 
although the ideas themfelves make a per- 
manent impreffion. I believe Mr. Burke 
was far from being deftitute of ideas when 
he wrote the prefent treatile; and whether 
he was or not, I have received many 
valuable ones from the perafal, 
He then proceeds to obferve that ** 4 
train of thinking of this fort, of examin- 
ing into the meaning, the ideas which 
belong to words, is much too long to be 
purfued in the ordinary ways of conver- 
fation, nor is it at all neceffary that it 
fhould.”” A ftrange affertion indeed 
from a mind like Burke’s! for I did not 
fuppofe it poffible that any thinking perfon 
fhould for a moment doubt, that the’ per- 
ception of the mind, the mind?s eye, can 
form and recgive images quicker than the 
ordinary exertion of the organs of {peech. 
—If it is faid, were images fo abundantly 
railed by the force of imagination, we 
fhould not fo often hear trifling and im- 
pertinent converfation: the reply is ob. 
vious—every mind is not capable of cons 
ceiving lively and appropriate ideas upon 
every fubject 5; but if any fort of ideas 
can be raifed with that celerity I have 
mentioned, the point is gained—Now the 
moit common underftanuings, even a mad- 
man, we know from experience, can ex- 
cite ideas in his mind with a rapidity that 
would be inconvenient to utterance: if 
therefore it is allowed that the mind is ca- 
pable of forming ideas, however aoturd, 
for Ide not fay that every one can call 
his imagination into action, with pro- 
priety, upon a given queition, but if they 
are to be formed with a rapidity equal 
to the ufiial mode of fpeaking; furely we 
cannot deny tothe mind power of recenving 
ideas with equal quickne!s, whea they 
are ready prefented to it by words, 
The concluding obfervation of this fec- 
tion 
