“O74 
reftored, and can be refored oxzly, by the 
initantaneous applicatioa of the moft ac- 
tive and powerful ftimulants. 
It weuld reconevle many of the oppo- 
fitions and incongruities which appear in 
the works of thofe who have written 
upon the difeafes of the human frame, at 
different periods of its kiftory, to confi- 
der, that man, the fubje&t upon which 
they write, has, during the intervening 
p:riods, undergone confiderable changes 
in his phy fical as well as moral conftitu- 
tion. 
State of Public Affairs in September, 1803. 
oa. 1j 
Sydenham was eminently judicious and 
fuccefstul in his time. Bur, the phyfi- 
cian who, in this comoaratively enner- 
vated and puny age, was,,in the exercife 
of his profeffion, to imitate, without mo- 
dification or referve, the bold and ener- 
getic ftyle of practice adopted by that 
great maiter of his art, wou'd not beun- 
likely, by the empirical rafhnefs of his. 
conduét, to deftroy, in almoft every in- 
ftance, in which he ventured to prefcribe. 
Scuthamplon-row, J. Rep. 
September 26, 1803. 
STATE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 
In September, 1803. 
FRANCE, 
HE expectations of the Englifh peo- 
JL ple have long been turned towards 
the French coaft, alc we have been 
boaftingly told, fall quickly pour forth 
en this country hundreds of thoufands of 
thofe troops which have hitherto met with 
no effeStual refiftance. The threat of 
Frerch invafion is not new; it has been 
wife in France to threaten, and it has been 
wife in England to prepare, but ftill has 
the ocean feparated the angry combatants. 
’ There have been times when France 
was as much fuperior in troops as at pre- 
fent, and was alfo fuperior in fhips, but 
even then, with the vaft advaniage of a 
covering fleet, Frenchmen did not truft 
themielves on Englifh ground. It has 
been (aid that France never had fo large a 
difpofeable force as at .prefent, but it is 
more true that England never had folarge 
a receiving force. 
of France is deubtlefs confiderable, but is 
much limited by the impo fing attitude fhe 
muit neceffzrily keep on the continent, 
Bonaparte mult overawe Ge ermany, Italy, 
and Spain, he muft have rE to 
draw money from the Dutch and Hano- 
verians, he mult have a military academy 
to periectt the Swifs in hherty, he mutt 
have a difpoleable force along his exten- 
five coat to vepel the oc “altouial attacks 
ef the Englith; he mutt guard bis means 
of invaiion to prevent them from bemg 
taken away beneath his own batteries 5 he 
muit have a force difperfed threveh the 
interior o: Fr-nce to pr revent revolutionary 
movements; he mud be well prepared in 
and about Paris, ani he mult have a com- 
pany of Gencrals to perferm their evolu- 
The difpofeable force. 
tions, and go through their different 
pnafes, about his own perfon, the centre 
of fear and apprehenfion. When all thefe 
important pofts are filled to his fatisfac- 
ticn, where is he to find a difpofeable force 
fufficiently powerful to conquer England,. 
defended as fhe would be by half a mil- 
lion of troops, including the volunteers, 
and not lefs than an hundred thoufand 
failors, fea-fencibles, and men acquainted 
with naval affairs. When we eftimate 
the danger to which Bonaparte would be 
expofed at home, were he to fend away 
any confiderable proportion of his troops, 
and alfo the dangers which the part fent 
away mult encounter, we are inclined to 
think that the enterprize will not be en- 
gaged in at a time when unanimity.and 
military fpirit are the characteriftics of 
Englifhmen. 
Tt has been maintained that he has . 
threatened to invade this country, and 
that he muft keep -his promife or render | 
himfelf contémptible. Such a confidera- 
tion, however, can have no weight with a 
good General, who muft neceffarily att ac- 
cording to circu Faneea, and whofe duty 
it often is to hold language and make de- 
monitrations net intended to be ated on: 
Colus an virtus quis in hofte requirat. 
France has affumed an attitude threatning 
to England; fhe has takem pofitions pre- 
per for invading it, and fhe holds corref- 
ponding language; but the real defigns 
of France are by no means manifeft. No 
country in the vicinity of French troops 
can be confidered as fecure from a fudden 
irruption, nor dces the conduét of France, 
fince the tevelution, render fuch unpro- 
““w voked 
