1803.] 
nnd by Sir J. Saumarez, and other daring 
and {ikilfull leaders, on various French 
ports lately, is there any reafon to place 
much confidence on deftroying our enemy 
in this manner. It is undoubedly right 
to keep up an alert, if poffible, on the 
svhole line of their coaft; but, moft un- 
fortunately, ourbombardments have been a 
greater annoyance, and ftruck greater ter- 
rer into poor fifhermen andthe peaceful in- 
habitants of maritime towns, than into the 
French Government :--the peaceful in- 
habitants of towns that deteft the ‘pre- 
fent Government of France as much as 
we do! With regard to your Cor- 
refpondent’s third pofition, that, if the 
enemy dare to come out cf his ports, he 
muit.face our naval forces, it is, indeed, 
itrongly fupported by probabilities, but 
is far from amounting to a certainty, 
It is poflible that the enemy in a climate 
fo variable may elude our fleets, and, not- 
withitanding all our vigilance, accomplifh 
a landing on fome point or points of a 
caaft fo extended—The poffibiJity of this 
event the wifdom of the Britifh Govern. 
ment and Nation has wifely admitted, 
and provided an infuperabJe barrier for de- 
fence in a valt combination of force by 
fea and land, of which the intermediate 
and conneéting link is the fea-fencibles. 
That this barrier will preve infuperable, 
may be pronounced with the highelt de- 
gree of affurance, provided that our force 
by land as wellas by fea be wifely directed. 
Strength or force does not confit merely 
in numbers or quantity, but in the com- 
municated impulfion, and the line in 
which it is direéted-conformably with 
the maxim in phyfics, that the momentum 
of bodies confilts in the quantum of matter 
multiplied into the velocity. If different 
impulfes were communicated to different 
portions of the mafs, and the whole were 
not toco-operate uniformily and fteadily for 
the attainment of one diftinét end or ob- 
ject, the impetus or velocity would be im- 
peded and diminiflied by different and even 
oppobte: movements. In proportion to 
the very numbers of fuch a chaotic mafs 
would be the general refult of confufion, 
diltraftion, and difafter. 
Concerning the direction or application 
of our immenfe force at land there are two 
capital queftions on which military men 
and others appear to be divided. The one 
relates to the promptitude or the delay to 
be obferved on our part, in engaging the 
invaders. The other, to the propriety of 
fecuring the capital, and other parts, by 
circumivallations and other modes of for- 
tification. 
_ Monruiy Mac. No, 107, 
Reply to Cimmon Senfe on Invafion 
321 
Tt is doubtlefs the beft way, for the 
{paring of blood on beth fides, to reduce 
an enemy to fubmiffion by firaitening his 
quarters and furrounding him. It was 
thus that the American caufe triumphed 
at York-town and Gloucefter. It was 
thus alfo that General Wafhington, with- 
out the effulion of blood, fubdned, by the - 
very appearance of a mighty force, in 
1794, a body of infurgents who had af- 
fembled at Pittfburg, the principal place 
of the difaffeéted countries, tothe number 
of 4000 and upwards. Againf this body 
Gen. Wafhington advanced in perfon, but 
not till the force he collected was feven 
thoufand ftrong, and another feven thou- 
fand was on its march to join them. His 
humane plan fucceeded completely. The 
infurgents, on the approach of the Gene- 
ral, gave up all ideas of refiftance. 
Tn the circumftances inswhich the Ame- 
ricanGeneral was placed, his mode of war- 
fare was equally humane and prudent. 
But it was not equally prudent in our 
Commander in Chief in Ireland, in 1798, 
on whom, probably, the example of Wath. 
ington had made a deep impreflion, to 
delay his march againft 800 French until 
he had aflembled an army of 30,000. In 
war, ag in every thing elfe, regard is to 
be had to fituations and circumitances. If 
the French were to land in England, the 
general who fhould fuffer them, without 
oppofition, to approach the capital, would 
deferye (as was juftly obferved by an il- 
Juftrious general, flatefman, philanthro- 
phift, and patriot * arid whofe retire- 
ment all men, at the prefent crifs, re-= 
gret and deplore) to lofe his head. 7 
Yet I do not fuppofe fo able a com- 
mander would reft the fate of the Britith 
Ifles on the iffue of one general and de- 
cifive engagement ; although what I 
have now quoted has been urged by fome 
who declare for meeting the French on 
their landing, direétly in their teeth, what. 
ever their numbers. If they fhould be 
50,000 firong, the wifett courfe for us to 
follow, is the Fabian mode of warfare. 
This, indeed, J apprehend is the ‘general 
and prevailing opinion. But as it is, per- 
haps, in fome danger of being fhaken by 
the noble ardour of our brave countrymen, 
it may not be improper to confirm its pro- 
priety by the authority and reafoning of 
twO GREAT MEN,of our own country, the 
renowned Sik WaLTerR RaLeicH, and 
the more renowned JOHN DUKE oF 
MarLBoroucu. 
* The Earl of Moira, in a Speech on the 
State of the Nation, in the Houfe of Peers, 
3 ee In 
