» 488 
actions, by present pleasure or pain; bat 
it must be also admittea, that they 
possess a strong memory ; that they form, 
by repeated experience, general judg- 
ments, founded on analogy; and that 
they afterwards conduct tuemselves ac- 
cording to the pleasure, or pain felt in 
consequence of the decisions, and often 
Ja Opposition to the attraction of present 
pleasure or pain; and, lastly, that this 
principle, welt directed, may be employed 
by: man in their aie allon, and may 
sametimes lead animals to th xe habit of 
performing, with admirable precision, ac- 
tions not only in tvemselves extiemely 
citficult, but to which their conformation 
does not seem adapied. 
None of these pbilosophers doubt, 
that animals have various ways of ex- 
ressing their wants aud their passions, 
and that those of the superior orders, 
whose organization approaches to that 
of the humau species, are capable of 
learning the signification of many of cur 
words, “and obey our orders, without 
cominitting any mistakes. 
But independently of these faculties, 
which in some respects resemble ours, 
and which vary in a considerable degree 
in the different classes of animals, na- 
turalists conceive they have discovered 
in ecrtain species other faculties, which 
appear to be essentia lly different, and to 
which they have givei nthe name of instinct. 
There are certain actions essential to 
the preservation of the species, but which 
are often entirely foreign to the apparent 
wants ot the individual: ; they are often 
also so very complicated, that were we 
to attribute them to intelligence, it would 
prestppose a degree of “fares ight and 
knowledge, which no one has yei ventured 
to ascribe to these species. Such actions 
cannot be attributed to a principle of 
imitation, since it should seem that the 
individuals, who perform them, had no 
opportunk y of acquiring such knowledge, 
and yet that those of the same species 
uniformly practise them nearly in the 
same manner: lastly, what appears not 
less remarkable is, that actions, which 
have no reference whatever to the degree 
of ordimary 1 telligence, and which be- 
come mere singular, more acute, and 
more disinterested, in proportion as the 
animals, which perform them, belong to 
classes less elevated and more stupid. 
Thus it is among the inseets, the mol- 
lusez, and the worms, that we observe 
the most astonishing instincts; hence, it 
should seem, that instinct and intelhgence 
are two Hastinch faculties intended to 
compensate the want of each other, as, 
Proceedings of Learned Societies. 
[ Dec. 1 
in some respects, fecundity supplies the 
place of strength or longevity; it is ever 
by the just propertion of intelligence, — 
instine:, and physical qualities, such as 
the delicacy of the seuses, or the strength 
of the body, that the speciesare preserved. 
_ Naturalists have, therefore supposed, 
that animals endow éd with instinct exert 
these pariicular actions, in consequence , 
of aninterna! impulse, wholly independent 
of experience, foresight, education, and 
external agents, or, 1n eee terms, that 
organization alane determines them to 
act in that peculiar manner, This con- 
clusion has been adopted by most ob- 
servers, who merely differ in explaining 
the mode, in which organization imparts 
this determination. The following ac- 
count is given, by the reporter, of M. 
Dupont’s opinions on this subject. 
The necessity or the desire of per- 
forming a certain action can only pro- 
eced irom sensations, or the recollection 
of sensations; in a word from images, 
but it is not requisite, that sensations 
should derive their ongin from without, 
‘for ali external sensations require internal 
motions of the nerves and brain, without 
which they could not occur. Now as 
these internal motions may origmate in 
the organs themselves, exclusively of any 
action from without, as may be abservedin 
dreams and aifcecas maladies, it seems 
therefore fair to infer, that certain animals 
are organized 1m saci a@ manner, that in=. 
ternal motions’ may. uniformly - arise 
within themselves proper to produce 
sensations and images, and that these 
images irresistibly determine em will 
to certain actions, 
This hypothesis appears not to possess 
any thing in common with that of in- 
nate ideas, which has only for its ob- 
jeets general or abstract notions ; for - 
those who deny, with reason, that the. 
general ideas of man are innate, have 
never athrmed, what daily experience 
would contradict, that he may not expe~ 
rience seusations from the internal moti- 
ons of his own organs, and that with 
out the intervention of external bodies. 
Neither docs it appear to have any 
thing, in common, with the doctrine of 
materialism ; for whatever idea we may 
enftertam respecting the nature of the 
sentient principle, we are nevertheless 
constrained to allow, that if can only 
experience sensations through the tnter- 
medium of the brain and nervous system. 
Lastly, this hypothesis does not ap- 
proximate more nearly than auy other 
to fatalism; for every action being de- 
termined, either by a present sensation, 
Gr 
we 
