1805.) Vindication of Locke's Effay 
comparifon of thefe languages, as wellas 
into various other particulars: which I 
have ‘colle&ted refpecting the geography 
and the manners of the inhabitants in the 
interior parts of the country, which it was 
not inmy power to vifit, Its natural hif- 
tory is copious, and highty interefting. 
The coafts of this great ifland are in 
general reckoned very unwholefome.— 
This infalubrity, which is common to all 
maritime diftriéts when allowed to remain 
in a ftate of nature, has, however, been 
much exaggerated, and might be eafily 
remedied by draining the morafles and fa- 
cilitating the difcharge of ftagnant waters. 
Such exhalations have, however, proved 
only deftru€tive to Europeans, for. the in- 
habitants themfelves are not affected by 
them 3 and itis probable, that the difeafes 
which the former experience, arife, in a 
great meafure, from their inattention, and- 
a neglect of a proper regimen in aclimate 
fo extremely different from their own, and 
ftill more efpecially te the great abule of 
ardentipirits. 
a 
For the Monthly Magazine. 
A VINDICATION of LOCKE’s. ESSAY 07 
the HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 3. 772 
ANSWER Zo the INQUIRER. 
‘© By celeftial Wifdom whilom led 
Through the apartments of th’ immortal 
MIND, 
He view’d the fecret ftores.. 
Immortal glory therefore him betide: 
Let every generous mind his praife proclaim, 
Who, wandering through the World’s rude 
. foreft wide, 
hath been y-taught his courfe to 
frame, 
To Virtue’s fweet abodes and heaven-afpir- 
ing Fame.” 
From West’s Chara&er of LocKxe, 
in his Poem on Education. _ 
N the queftion, ‘* Are the Ideas of 
Senfation or the Ideas of Abfiraction 
the moft-fimple ?” 
The Ingnirer afferts, the ideas’ of ab- 
firaction ; and that all ideas ef fenfation are 
compound. ‘This we flall examine. Ino 
the mean time, it may not be improper to 
obferve, that, in the ftri&t fenfe of the 
term, fimplicity has no. degrees ; and one 
fimple idea is not more fimple than an- 
other. 
In comparing fexfations with each 
other, this is plain. An idea of a tafte, 
a~bitter tatte, for inftance, is as fimple 
as that of a -/mell, an idea of found, or 
light, as either. 
eeece 
By him 
When we abfrac, we recollect fume _ 
on thé Haman Underfianding. 533 
particular fenation, and defignedly fepa- 
rate it from the different fubjeéts m which 
it prefented itfelf to our fenfes. Thus, 
reduefs, whitenefs, are feparated. But 
the abftraét. idea of red or white is not 
more fimple than the red or white in 2 
rofe orsin a lily. The one, indeed, is 
called red or white in the abfrad ; the 
other is red or white in the coucrete ; be~ 
caufe it is the idea of either as in the par- 
ticular fubject where it is found in union 
with other fenfible qualities of figure, 
fmell,. foftnefs, &c. 3 both the one and 
the other are the fame fimple idea. But 
whoever wifhes a perfect idea of abfrac- 
tion, the mode, and the effect of it, maw 
confult Locke in this his immortal Effay, 
b. ii, ch. xi. §.9. If I contribute any 
thing toward recovering an attention to 
Ps ts 1 Ay 
this great; and, I fear, neglected Wor ky 
I fhall think the trouble of this paper, or 
much greater troubie, well beflowed; 
Although in a rofe or lily the enfations 
derived from one and. the fame’ fabje& 
be very numerous, and prefent themfelves' 
to the mind together, they are not the lefs 
fimple each in itfelf. The mind does not 
confound one with the other, but ditinét. 
ly recognizes each, with as much, and, in. 
deed, more certain diftinGinels, than’ kr 
would gold, filver, and leaden counters,’ 
and others of {tained ivory, black, red, 
blue, and-green, .all on the fame table; 
fenfations of different kinds being more 
flrongly and perfectly determinate in their 
difference than thofe of different fpecies of. 
tlre fame kind, N®& eye or ear is fo con- 
fiitutediascto: miftake found for colour, 
though it! may one found or one colovr 
for another. Confequently to this fate-” 
ment it wil] appear, that, where the idea 
itfelf is imple in the immediate fenfation 
or perception, the abjfiraciion of that idea 
from the fubject is fimple alfo. The 
ewhitene/s of {now, which is whitenefs in 
the concrete'(or affemblage of this quality 
with others in’ a certain fubjeét), is as 
fimple an idea of fen/ation, as oor abftrac& 
idea of whitenefs, cr a white colour, is of 
refiediion. , The Inquirer would have us 
call this latter, when the mind is not ec- 
cupied in receiving direét fenfations, an 
idea of abffraétion. Locke names it, on 
account of the mind recolleéting its fen- 
fations, anidea of reflection; a more com- 
prehenfive, as will appear, and nota lefs 
correct or daftinét term. 
It feems tome a miflake to fuppofe, 
that Locke ufes refiefion as the reprefen- 
tation of an image tn a mirror, or the re. 
verberatian of a found. He ufes it as the 
act of the mind in recalling its ideas, alm 
ther 
