1805.] Vindication of Locke’s Effay on the. Human Underflanding. 353 
lieft ideas than the circulation of the 
biood, for of that we are rarely conicious 
in any part of our lives. But whatever 
inftance he bad taken, he would have 
proved nothing by it againft Locke, who 
was fully aware, that at leaft as foon as 
we are born, we have /én/fations, and confe- 
quently zdeas ; and that an infant, almoft 
certainly, has ideas even before its birth. 
But then thefe ideas are not, he remarks, 
innate principles; and he fhews that they 
are not innate fenfations, and that the 
mind receives them from their exciting 
caules, Were they innate, they would be 
neceflarily and always inherent in the 
mind. An infant has an idea of warmth, 
but till it feels cold it has no idea of cold. 
The Inquirer fuppofes Locke to con- 
found principles with ideas, and to fhift 
the queftion ; but, take him in metaphy- 
fics, religion, or politics, and perhaps 
there never was a fairer reafoner than 
Locke, and rarely any fo little defultory, 
fo conipicuous, correét, and confiftent.— 
He requires, it is true, as every great me- 
taphylician muft, great attention in his 
reader; but he rewards it. I truft it 
will'readily be fhewn, that Locke does 
not confound them. He argues, that we 
have no innate fpeculative principles,* 
no innate praétical principles,+ ‘but ac- 
quire both by our power of refe&ing on 
cur fimple ideas. He reprefents, that, 
principles including a  propofition by 
which one idea is affirmed or denied of 
another, it principles were innate, theideas 
on which they are founded mutt be in- 
nate.{ He then proves that we have no 
innate ideas of fimple fenfation, by fhew- 
ing (as I have ftated), that, until a fimple 
idea of fenfation has been excited, we can- 
not create it ourlelves; neither, when we 
have it, can we by any language convey it 
to others who have not received it. Inail 
this there is no confufion; it is regular 
indudtion, proving, by complete ie. 
fion of particulars, that our ideas are not 
innate. But it mult not be fuppofed that 
Locke, in deriving them from /enfation 
and refleétion, refolves them all ultimately 
into fenfible ideas, and confiders reflection 
as the mere revival; and, at moft, combi- 
nation, of the fenfible ideas of the mind. 
He ftates that we have ideas.of reflefion 
which are not received from any of our 
fenfations, but are formed by the opera- 
tion of the mind meditating on its own 
acts, faculties, and powers. || 
+ iii. 
 B. ii, c. vi. 
But in whatever way ideas are formed 
in the mind, whether by combining thofe 
of fenfation, or by the moft intellefual 
abftraégtion which the mind tan exercife in 
reflecting, the remark of Locke is equally 
juft as to cither. “The povvers are innate, 
but the zdeas arife fucceflively,* accord- 
ing to circumftances; and of fome of the 
moft important of our intellectual and 
moral ideas, the obfervation of Locke is 
very jult, that we can trace the time, and 
often the oecafion, of their firit prefenting 
themfelves to the mind. 
If I could avoid it, I would not think 
or fpeak of the Inquirer as he has thought 
and {poken of Locke; but I do think, 
that, in this inflance, the Inquirer ** has | 
made many afleitions which are unfound- 
ed,’ and ‘* uled”’ fome *¢ arguments ne- 
ceffary unintelligible,’’ as they involve a 
contradiction. En a word, by a /imple 
idea { underftand that which cannot be 
divided into more ideas than one 3; fuch is 
white, black ; fuch is whitenefs ; fuch is’ 
individuality ; fuch is fenfation or percep~ 
tion, An abftragi idea may be timple, 
or it may be very complex, as denoting a 
certain afiemblace of complex ideas, fuch 
as gold, tree, horie, man, wifdom, virtue, 
univerfe, imfnenfity, eternity, order, 
plenty, perfection. ‘The ideas of percep- 
tion or will, as inftanced by Locke, ate 
as fimple ideas as any from fenfation.— 
An idea, whether particular or immediate, 
or reflex and abftraét, wall be fmple if it 
include only one fimple perception ; com- 
plex if it include a combination of more 
than one; and, as I fiafed in the com- 
mencement of this Paper, nothing being 
metaphyfically fimple of which a divifion 
can be conceived, no fimple idea, whether 
of fenfation or refleCtion, can be more or 
or Jefs fimple than another. 
And I truft, as the refult of thefe con- 
fiderations, that Locke is fully vindicated. 
I am, indeed, confident, that, notwith- 
fianding the obfervations of the Inquirer, 
Locke, though he did not-carry his views 
of mind fo tar as others have fince done, 
has laid the bafe of an indeftru&ible py~ 
ramid, and has determined the propor- 
tion and principles of a fabric equally 
ftupendous, beautifuj, and admirable fn 
its utility—an obfervatory for the crn- 
templation of yniver{al truth and crder.— 
Agreeably to fuch a ftru€@ture, and fuch 
inftruments as he has fupplied or indicated, 
I apprehend that future difcoveries m the 
intellectual and moral heavens will conti- 
nue to be made. I accordingly admire 
Se i AD, § 21, 
and 
