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424 
cient for giving up sO important a post. as 
Talavera, for exposing the“ combined ‘armies 
to an attack in front and rear,.at the same 
time, and for abandoning my hospital; and 
Twrece the letter of which I inclose‘a ‘copy. 
This unfortunately reached the General alter 
he kad marched, and he’arrived at Oropesa 
shortiv after day-light, on the morning’ of 
the 4th. The question. what was to be done, 
was then to be ¢onsidered. The enémy, sta- 
ted to be 50,000 strong, but at all’ events 
consisting ee the ‘corps at Soult and Ney, 
either united or net -very far distant from 
each other, and supposed by Marshal Jours 
dan ard Joseph Buonaparte to be roa nere aid 
strong to attack the British army,* stated to 
be 25,000 strong; were on one side, in -pos= 
Session of the high road to the passage of the 
‘Tagus at Almaraz, the bridge at-which -place 
we knew had been” removed, although the 
boats still necessarily: remained im the river, 
On the other side, we Had reason to’ expect 
the advance of Victor’s corps’to Talevera, 
zs soon as-General Cuesta’s march should be 
known, and after leaving £2,000-men to 
avatch Vanegas, and allowing him from 10 
to. 11,000 killed and 4vounded inthe date 
action, this corps would have amotnted to 
25,000... We could extricate ourselves from 
this difficult situation, only by great celerity 
of movement, to which the troops were un= 
egual, as they-had not had their allowance 
ot provisions for several days, and by success 
in two battles. If unsuccessful in either, we 
should have been without a retreat; and if 
Souli and Nev; avoiding an action, had retired 
before us, and had waited the ‘arrival of Vie- 
tor, we should have been exposed toa general 
eciiun with 59,000-men, ecually without a 
retrest. We -had reason. to expect, that as 
the Marquis de la Reyna could not remove 
the boats. from:the river Almaraz, Soult 
would have destroyed them, ‘Our’ only re- 
treat. was, therefore, by: the bridge of Arco 
Bispo; and if we had moved on, the enemy, 
by breakirfg’ that. bridge -while-the army 
should be engaged with Soult and Ney, would 
have deprived us of that onty resource. We 
could not takea position at Or ropesa, as we 
thereby left open the-read tothe bridge of 
Arco Sispo from: Falavera by Caleras and; 
after considering the whole subject matarely; 
E was of epinien that. it wes advisable ta re- 
tire to the bridge of.. Arcobispo,. and to:take 
up a-defensive position upon-the Tagas. ¢ 
I was induced to adopt: this last opinion, 
because the French have sow-at least 59,000 
men disposable to oppose. to the combined 
armies, and a: corps of | £2,000 to. watch 
Vanegas; and {was likewise of-opinion; 
that the sooner the defensive line should be 
taken uy, the more likely were the troops to 
be able to defend it. .. Accordingly 1 marched 
on the Sth, and crossed the Tagus by the 
bridge of Artobispo, and ave - “continued 
my route,to this<place, in whieh Tam weil 
Situated to defend the passage vi Almaraz, 
State of Public Affairs m October. fev. %, : 
and the lower parts of the Tagus. General 
Ciiesta crossed the river on the night of the 
Sth, and he is still’ at the bridgé of Arca 
Bispo. About 2600 of the ‘wounded have 
been brought away from Talavera, the res 
‘maining’ 1500 are theré; aad I doubt whe- 
ther, under any circumstances, it woyld have 
Beehh possible or consistent with humanity, 
to attempt to remove any more of them.” 
From the treatment which some of the sol- 
diers wounded on the 27th, and who fei} 
into the ‘hands of the enemy, experienced 
from them, and from the manner in which 
T have always treated the wounded who have 
fallen into my hands, I expect. that these 
men will be well treated ; and I have only to 
lament, that a new concurrence of events, 
over which from circumstances F had and 
could haye no controul, should have placed 
the army ina situation to be obliged to leave 
any of thein behind. 
/ (Signed) “ARTHUR Wetresceny 
PROCLAMATION OF THE KING. “*' 
* Madrid, Aug. 10. 
Soldier: .—It is scarcely fifteen daysfsince. 
120;000° enemies, consisting’ of English, 
Pavtomicees sand Spaniards, who. marched 
from different points, reridezvoused undeg 
‘the walls of ‘my® capital; but united on the 
26th of July,’ at the bridge of Guadarrama, 
the first and fourth corps of the reserve, de~ 
feated on that day the enemy. ‘ Onthe 27th, 
he repassed in great haste the Alberche.» Oa 
the 28thj attacked in a position, judged un- 
attackable, 80,090 men have not been able 
to contend agaiiist 40,000 Erench. From 
that time, senounting ‘their - chimericai 
project of conquest, they have thought but 
of safety, and have abandoned the’ field of 
battle. More than 6,000: English, ‘wounded, 
are in our hospitals. The least of our COrpss 
the first, was judged sufficient to observe and 
keep in check this army, — so numerous 
in spite of its losses. : : 
It remained upon the Nieries vie the 
fourth corps-and the reserve set ont on the 
“29th to succour Toledo, besieged by the army 
of La Mancha; and that of Madrid, menaced 
by the same army, has forced the enemy, 
already within four leagues of the capital, ta 
relinguish its prey. It has repassed the Tae 
= in the greatest haste; and fled to the 
Sierra Morena, after having abandoned somes 
peaasadds of killed; wounded; and prisoners 
‘The 2d, 5th,’and 6th corps are following the 
rear agar of the “enemy’s army. These 
corps formed a junction with thedst at Oro- 
pesa, omthe 7th of August. 
. The English fly every way in disorder, and’ 
by roads’ hitherto j pals ed impracticable to are” 
tilery... The 2d and. 5th corps are pursuing 
them. Soldiers, you bave saved my capital 5 
the King of Spain thanks you ; you. haye done 
more, the brother of your emperor sees- fly 
before your eagles the eternalenemy oi the 
French name... shee eg be 
Tbe emperor shall know all that you have 
, done 3 
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