1809.] 
GREAT BRITAIN. 
The following letter from Lientenant- 
General Sir John Moore, to Viscount 
Castlereagh, dated Corunna, Jan. 18, 
1809, three days before the death of the 
general will tend to explain better than 
has yet been done, the causes of the un- 
fortunate termination of that campaign. 
‘¢ Situated as this army is at present, it is 
impossible for me to detail te your Lordship 
the events wh‘ch have taken place, since I 
had the honour to address you from Astorga, 
~ onthe 3ist of December: I have therefore de- 
termined to send to England, Brigadier-Gene- 
ral Charles Stewart, as the Officer best quali- 
fied to give you every information you can 
want, both with respect to our actual situa- 
tion, and the events which have led to it- 
«* Your Lordship knows, that had I followed 
my own opinon, asa military man, I should 
have retired with the army from Salamanca. 
The Spanish armies were then beaten, there 
was no Spanish force to which we could unite, 
and I was satisfied that no efforts would be 
maade to aid us, or to favour the cause in 
which they were engaged. 
‘<i was sensible, however, that the apathy 
and indifference of the Spaniards would never 
have been believed; that had the British been 
withdrawn, the loss of the cause would have 
been imputed to their retreat, and it was ne- 
cessary tarisk this army to convince,the peo- 
ple of England, as well as the rest of Europe, 
that the Spaniards had neither the power nor 
the inclination to make any efforts for them- 
selves. /t was for this reason that I madethe 
march to Sahagun., Asa diversion, it suc- 
ceeded; I broughr. the whole disposable force 
of the French against this army, and it had 
been allowed to follow me, without a single 
movement being made to favour my retreat.— 
The people of the Gallicias, though armed, 
made no attempt to stop the passage of the 
French through their mountains. They 
abandoned their dwellings at our approach, 
drove away their carts, oxen, and every thing 
that could be of the smallest aid to the army. 
The consequence has been, that our sick have 
been left ‘behind; and when our horses or 
mules failed, which, on such marches, and 
through such a country, was the case toa 
great extent, baggage, ammunition, stores, 
&c. and even money, were necessarily de- 
stroyed or abandouied. 
‘¢ I am sorry to say, that the army, whose 
conduct [had such reason to extol! onits march 
through Portugal, and on its arrival in Spain, 
has totaily changed its character since it be- 
gan to retreat. I can say nothing in its fa- 
vour, but that when there was a prospect of 
fighting the enemy, the men were then or- 
derly, and seemed pleased and determined to 
do their duty, In front of Villa Franca, the 
French came up with the reserve, with 
MontTuix Mac. Ne. 134. 
General Moore’s last Letter. 
393 
which I was covering the retreat of the army; 
they attacked it at Calcabelos. J retired, co- 
vered by the 95th regiment, and marched that 
night to Herresias, and from thence to Nogales 
and Lugo, where I had ordered the different 
divisions which preceded, to halt aad collect. 
At Lugo, the French again came up with us. 
They attacked our advanced posts on the 6th 
and 7th, and were repulsed in both attempts, 
with tictle loss anour side. [ heard from the 
prisoners taken, that three divisions of the 
French army were come up, commanded by 
Marshal Soult 3 I thereiore expected to be at= 
tacked on the morning of the 8th. It was my 
wish to come to that issue; I had perfect con- 
fidence in the valour of the troops, and it was 
only by crippling the enemy that we could 
hope either to rctreat or to embark unmolest< 
ed. I made every preparation to receive the 
attack, and drew out the army inthe morning 
to offer battle. This was not Marshal Soult’s 
object. Heeither did not think himself suftie 
ciently strong, or he wished to play a sureg 
game, by attacking us on our maxch, or due 
ring our embarkation. The country was ine 
tersected, and his position too stfang for me ta 
attack with an inferior force. The want of 
provisions would not enable me to wait longs 
er, Imarched that night; and in tv «forced 
marches, Divouacing for six or eigot-nours ig 
the rain, I reached Betanazos on the 10th ine 
stant, 
“* At Lugo, I was sensible of the impossibil« 
ity of reaching Vigo, which was at too great a 
distance, and offered no a¢vantages to embarlg 
in the face of an enemy. My intention was. 
then to have retreated to the peninsula of Bea 
tanzos, where I hoped to find a position to co« 
ver the embarkation of the army in Ares or 
Redes Bayes; but having sent an officer to res 
connoitre it, by his report I was determined te. 
prefer this place. I gave notice to the Admie 
ral of my intention, and begged that the transe 
ports mignt be brought to Corunna: had 
i found them here on my arrival on the 11th, 
the embarkation would easily have been effect« 
ed, for 1 had gained several marches on the 
French. They have now come wp with us, 
the transports have not arrived; my position 
in front of this piace is a very bad one} and 
this place, if 1 ara forced co retire into it, is 
commanded within mysket shot, and the har- 
bour will be so commanded by canaon on the 
Coast, that no ship will be able to iay in itm, 
In short, my Lord, General Stewart wili ing, 
form you how critical our situation is, It has, 
been recommended to me ta makea proposal te 
the enemy, to induce him to allow us toem=" 
bark quietly, in which case he gets us out of 
the country soon, and this place,. witha, its 
stores, &c. complete; that otherwise we have, 
the power to make a long defence, which. 
must cause the destruction of the towns, - . 
am averse to make any swch propesal, and am: 
exceedingly.doudtful if it would be atténded, 
3F with 
’ 
