1810.] 
doubts, till the communication of a distinct 
Official opinion, given’ on this point by the 
lords of the Admiralty, decided in the affir- 
wmative this important question. 
At the same time it is to be remarked, 
that the occupation of Walcheren, which by 
some persons it had been thought possible to 
leave behind us, and the reduction of Flush- 
ing, which it had once been proposed only 
to mask, were deemed indispensible to the 
security of the fleet, in case of disaster; and 
accordingly a considerable separate force was 
allotted to this service 5 and, in this view, 
jt was besides distinctly agreed upon, that a 
vigorous attack by the navy upon the sea- 
front should be made at the same time that 
the troops, after ¢ftecting their landing, ad- 
vanced to invest Flushing}; it being hoped 
that by a powerful co-operation from the sea, 
at the moment the troops presented them- 
Selves before the place, the labour and delay 
of a regular siege might have been avoided, 
and a considerable portion of the force al- 
lotted to this service set at liberty to follow 
the army up the Scheldt. How far this ex- 
pectation was fulfilled, or whether the as- 
surance given that the whole of the arma- 
ment (the part to pe landed at Walcheren 
excepted) should be at once transported up 
the Scheldt, in prosecution of the ultimate 
objects of the expedition, was carried into 
effect, or was wholly disappointed,. the in- 
formation already before your majesty will 
have in a great measure shewn, and which it 
will be my duty to bring more, particularly 
under your majesty’s view, when I detail 
the subsequent course of our proceedings. 
From what cause this failure ensued—whe- 
ther it arose from insufficient arrangements 
on the part of the admiral, or was the una- 
voidable result of difficul:ies inherent in the 
nature of the expedition itself, it is not for 
me, considering it entirely as a naval ques- 
tion, to presume to offer any opinion upon to 
your majesty. 
It may, however, be here proper to re- 
mark, that in all the projects which have at 
various times been brought forward on the 
subject of an attack upon the Island of Wal- 
cheren and the Scheldt, the necessity of hav- 
ing a wind a good deal to the westward, with 
moderate weather, has always been insisted 
on. Without these advantages, in the one 
case, the passaye would be difficult; in the 
other, the surf would prevent a landing on 
the points deemed most favourable in other 
respects. In the present instance, owing to 
the wind blowing strong from the westward, 
the surf was actually such as to prevent a 
Janding on either-of the points first fixed on 
for that purpose by the admiral; and the si- 
tuation of the gun- boats and transports at an- 
chor in the Stone Deep becoming very criti- 
cal, and the gale encreasing, he, found it 
necessary to carry such part of the fleet as 
was arrived for safety into the Roompot, and 
by which means the division of the army des- 
- Montity Mac, No. 197. 
State of Public Affairs in March. 
231 
tined for the attack of Walcheren was enabled 
to effect its janding from a more sheltered 
anchorage on the Bree Sand to the westward 
of Fort den Haak. At this time, the divie 
sion under Lieutenant-general Jord Rosslyn, 
as well as that under Lieutenant-general 
Grosvenor, also the cavalry, artillery, 8c. 
were not arrived; but they were afterwards, 
on their making the island, ordered by the’ 
admiral into the Veer Gat. It is, however, 
particularly deservine of attention, that this 
measure, though in itself one of great ad- 
Vantage, as far as it applied to the division 
destined for the attack of Walcheren, by 
placing the transports, store-ships, and small 
craft, in security, was, if ‘carried further, 
certainly not a little at variance with the 
leading purpose of the expedition, namely, 
the running with a right wing, and the ad. 
vance of the army at once up the West 
Scheldt, at the same moment that the at- 
tack upon Walcheren was proceeding. But thet 
even this need have delayed it for more than 
three or four days, unless on account of naval. 
difficulties, which it will be for the admiral, 
not for me, to explain, I deny; for as soon 
as Ter Veere and the Fort’ of Rammekins 
fell, which happened on the 3d of August, 
the passage of the Sloe was open to the trans- 
ports and gun-vessels; or they might have 
entered by the Durloo or by the Zoutland 
passages, the batteries of Dyshook, of Vyge-~ 
teer, andthe Nolle, having been all carried’ 
by the army early onthe first of August ; 
and on the same day the battery of Borslen, 
at the south-west end of South Beveland, 
was abandoned on the movement of a detach- 
ment from the corps under sir John Hope; 
and I know of nothing (but this, of course, 
is a point for the admiral to speak to) to have 
prevented the line of battle ships and frigates 
from coming in and passing up above Fiush- 
ing, in the first instance, according to the 
plan originally decided upon. 
Before, however, I pursue further the de- 
tails of the proceedings of the army, govern- 
ed as they necessarily were (until a footing 
should be gained on the continent) by the 
movements of the navy, I must fora mo- 
ment refer to two separate operations; the 
one under Lieutenant-general lord Huntly 
and commodore Owen, and the other under 
Lieutenant-general sir John Hope and rear 
admiral sir Richard Keats; but both directed 
to assist and ensure a rapid progress up the 
Scheldt, had the admiral found it practicable 
in other respects. With respect to the fore 
mer, which was destined to destroy the Cad 
sand batteries, and particularly that of Bres- 
kens, had it been carried at once into effect, 
and that the admiral could have availed hime 
self of it, to take the ships up the Wesr 
Scheldt by the Weeling Passage, it would 
have been of the utmost advantage; but it 
was certainly rather fortunate it did not take 
place ata later period, as after all the trans. 
ports; store-ships, ec. were ordered into the 
2N Veere 
