1810.] 
larly from the great difficulty of communica- 
tion between the several parts of our line, I 
determined, in order to relieve the troops, and 
press forward the siege with as much vigour as 
possible, to avail myself for the time of the 
services of these corps; but it is to be re- 
membered, that this was only done because 
Isaw no movement making to push forward 
a single vessel up the West Scheldt, and it 
therefore seemed more advisable to have 
their assistance before Flushing, than that 
they shouid lie inactive in the Veer Gat; 
and they might at any time be re-embarked 
from Rammekins-ina few hours, whenever 
their transports could be brought up from 
Veer, and there was the least chance of our 
proceeding to our ulterior destination. 
I have already stated that Rammekins 
surrendered on the evening of the 3d of 
August. § 
Immediately upon this event, feeling as 
I did great uneasiness at the delay which 
had already taken place, and at the depar- 
ture from the original plan, I wrote a letter 
to the admiral, then at Ter Veere, expressing 
my hope that the ships wauld now be able 
to enter the West Scheldt by the Sloe Pas- 
sage, and that no time should be lost in 
pressing forward as speedily as possible our 
fuither operations; and I requested, at the 
same time, that he would communicate to 
me the extent of naval co-operation he could 
afford, as well for the future blockade of 
Flushing, as with a view to protecting the 
coasts of South Beveland, aud watching the 
ypassaves from the Meuse tothe East Scheldt, 
as this consideration would govern very much 
the extent of force I must leave in South 
Beveland, when the -arniy advanced. To 
this letter he did not reply fully till the 8th 
of August; but I had a note from him on the 
Sth, assuring me the transports should be 
brought forward without delay; and I had 
also a very long conversation with him on 
the morning of the 6th, on the arrangements 
to be taken for our farther operations, when 
I urged, in the stongest manner, the neces- 
sity of not losing a moment in bringing up 
the cavalry and ordnance ships, transports, 
Store-ships, victuallers, &c. in order that 
the armament might proceed without delay 
to its destination; and I added my hopes, 
‘that they would receive the protection of 
the ships of war, none of which had yet 
entered the West Scheldt. 
To all this, and to the several arrange- 
ments explained to him in detail, he fully 
assented, = Ay) 
In his reply to my letter of the 4th, on 
the 6th of August, he acquaints me, that 
several of the smaller vessels of different 
descriptions lad passed through the intricate 
passage of the Sloe, and that he had ordered 
the frigates to pass up the West Scheldt, to 
be followed by the line of battle ships; and 
he gave hopes that he should be able tu go up 
tlie river with the flotilla on the 10th of Au- 
State of Public Affairs in March. 
233 
gust at furthest, and that the frigates and 
line of battle ships should follow as they 
came in succession. 
The frigates, however, did not pass Flush 
ing till the evening of the 14th, and the 
line of battle ships only passed to the ancho- 
rage above Flushing on the 14th, the se- 
cond day of the bombardment. 
These ships began to proceed up the river 
on the 18th, and arrived on the 19th; one 
division as high as the bay below Waerden, 
the other off the Hanswent, where they 
remained ; the Courageux passed above 
Batz ; the cavalry ships only got through 
the Sloe Passage into the West Schelde from 
the 20th to the 23d, and arrived off Batz on 
the 22d and 24th; the ordnance ships and 
Store ships passed thraugh from the 22d to 
the 23d, and arrived at their destination of 
Batz on the 24th and 25th; the transports 
fer lieutenant-general Grosvenor’s division 
only came up to receive them on the 19th, 
on which day they embarked 3 and those for 
major-general Graham's division on the 20th 
and 2ist; and they arrived off Batz on the 
24th. The corps of brigadier-general Rotten= 
burgh, and the light battalions of the Germah 
Legion, preceded to join the earl of Rosslyn’s 
division in South Beveland. Nii 
From this statement, your majesty will 
see that notwithstanding every effort on my 
part with the admiral, the armament. was not 
assembled at the point of its destination til} 
the 25th, and of course that the means of 
commencing operations sooner against Ans 
twerp were never in my power. 
It now became at this advanced period, my 
duty to consider very seriously the expediency 
‘of landing the army on the continent. On 
comparing all the intelligence obtained as to 
the strength of the enemy, it appeared to be 
such as to jeave (as stated in my dispatch- of 
the 29th of August) no reasonable prospect 
of the force under my command, after accom- 
plishing the preliminary operations of reducing 
Fort Lillo as well as Liefkenshoeck, on ‘the 
opposite side of Antwerp, without the pose 
session of whicli the destruction of the ships 
and arsenals of the enemy could not be effect 
ed; andin addition to this, the sickness 
which had begun to attack the army about 
the 20th, and which was hourly increasing 
to an alarming extent, created the most seri- 
ous apprehensions in the minds.of the medical 
men, as to its further progress, at that une 
healthy season, and which fatal experience 
has since shown to have been but to well 
founded. i 
Your majesty. will not be surprised if, 
under these circumstances, I paused in re 
quiring the admiral to put the army on 
shore. Thet a landing might have been 
made, and that any force that had been ops 
posed to us inthe field would have yielded 
to-the superior valour of British troops, I 
have no doubt; but then, any such success 
could have been of no avai] towards the ate. 
tainment 
