412 
vollies fred without even killing four men ; 
and fhall appeal to the experience of ail 
mankind, if any fingle difcharge was ever 
fo vivient as to dijable.an enemy from ad- 
vancing afterwards to take ample revenge, 
by-pouring in his fite, and at the fame in- 
ftant rufhing in with fixed bayonets : it ts 
by this method only thar nombers are to 
be detroyed, and victories obtained. At 
the battle of Belgrade I faw two batta- 
Jions cut to pieces in an -inftant : they 
gave a general fire upon a large body of 
Turkith horfe, at the diflance of about 
thirty paces ; inflantaneouily after which 
the Turks rufhed ‘forward through the 
fmoke, and with their fabres cut the 
whole to pieces om the fpot. I was on 
the ground a few minutes after, and had 
the cariofity to count the rumber of Turks 
deftroyed by the general diicharge of two 
battalions, and found-it amounted only to 
thirty-two, a circumftance which has by 
no means inereafed myregard for fring.” 
—Marfhal Saxe’s Reveries, ato., p. 19. 
If {mall fire-arms are thus \ineficacious, 
the queftion between the pike and the bay- 
onet ought to be decided for clofe fighting ; 
for furely aregimentof pikes oppoled to a 
reciment of bayonets would be decidedly 
victorious, through the. moft multiplied 
experiments. The authority juft quoted 
is as much in favour of the pike as it is 
againft mufket-firing. 
<¢ My opinion in regard to the impor- 
tance of pikes is fupported by the general 
concurrence of men of reflef&ticn and expe- 
rience ; and the only reafons to be affign- 
ed for the difufe of it are fuch as have alfo 
occafioned the abolition of many other ex- 
cellent cuftoms of the ancients, by which 
I mean negle& and indolence.”—~Saxe. 
If firing, which is the only apparent 
motive for preferring the mufket to the 
pike, be thus inefficacious, and if the pike 
be fuperior to the bayoret, as nobody can 
doubt, what poffible reafon can be produ- 
ced for arming all our troops with muf- 
kets, at the expence of two or three gui- 
neas, inftead of with pikes, at that of fix 
fhillings?_ But with two millions of fol- 
diers this would be infanity. 
A meafure very requifite before the 
landing of an invading army, would be, 
to pafs an a&t of parliament, declaring it to 
be high treafon to receive a flag of truce, 
or any prepofition whatever, from any 
perfon amongft the hoflile troops. Who 
can read the details of the late campaign 
without feeing the immentfe mifchief which 
refuited from thefe infidious and mott ruin- 
ous negotiations ? 
But whatever may be the refult of com- 
The Example of Europea Warning to Britain, {June 1, 
paring weapons, the cafe of a general levy 
feems to preclude any mede of arming’ 
except wiih pikes : the expence, and the 
time neceflacy to difcipline troops armed 
with mufkets, muft render pikes effential. 
to the plan, at leaft for the greater part of 
the forces thus levied. And if the vat 
importance of baving fuch numbers in the 
field as may enable our generals not only 
-to outflank, but ab{olutely to furround, the 
foe, be well confidered, it will furely ap- 
pear, that to have army. behind army, fo 
potted as to be called readily into aétion, 
ought {peedily to decide the refult of the 
contelt. 
Tf it be fuppofed that a French army 
landed on our coaft, it is dificult to con. 
ceive that the campaign cavld be of any 
long duvation. Defended by a regular 
army, two battles, perhaps one, would de- 
cide the fate of London ; for the vicinity 
of the coaft, approached either from Bou- 
logne or Holland, is fuch to that capital, 
that the ftruggle mu(t be a very fhort one. 
But with as many armies of pikemen as 
you pleafe to cail our, nothing would pre- 
vent the aétion being unintermitted from 
the there to the Thames, with the great 
advantage of being able abfolutely to fur- 
round the enemy at every point ; and it 
would not be very good policy to let him 
clofe his eyes from the very inftant he 
forced a landing. If three or four of the 
beit generals of France were in the-invad. 
ing army, perhaps any pian of manoeuvre- 
ing would prove a very bad fnare, and 
finifh with our being out-generaled ; but 
if the iffee be put on cloie fighting, he 
muft gain his advantages, whatever they 
were, at a very dear price, fo that his vic- 
tories might prove his ruin. . 
How many men, when they read a pro- 
pofition of this fort, will be fure to cry* 
out, ** ailthis is very wild.’ If wildne(s 
be an entire departure trom that fyftem 
which has hitherto been depended on for 
the defence of Europe, I hope it is ex- 
ceedingly wild: it cavnot be too wild in 
that refpe&t. Troops of the line have lof 
Europe : in the name of common fenfe let 
us nét truf to them alone. 
If it were within the verge of poffibility 
to bring into the field five or ten armies of 
troops of the line, it mightde very weil to 
rely upon them ; but we have not an hua- 
dred thouland fuch, if the debates in par-. - 
jiament are to be relied on; that is, we 
have a fufficient number for-one battle. — 
Lofe it—and the kingdom is gone. : 
But the great principle for which I con- 
tend does not depend. on the arms, or on 
the defeription of the troops to be raifed ; 
det 
