196 
Irith government, amounts to £.5,000,000 
Irifh ; they have alfo fhewn tnat there is 
reafon to believe the mode ufed by the 
Trifh treafury of bringing over the loans 
from England has been prejudicial to the 
exchange; and the whole weight of evi- 
dence goes to fhew it could be much more 
advantageoufly managed by the bank of 
Ireland; they therefore recommend that 
immediate meafures fhould be taken with 
the bank of Ireland for the purpofe, and 
for their eftablifhing an effe€tual fund in 
London for diawing on, whereby they 
may gradua'ly reduce the exchange in the 
manner fomewhat refembling that which 
was adopted by the Edinburgh banks. 
If any arguments fhould be thought ne- 
ceflary in aid of the ftrong practical ex- 
ample which Scotland affords, they would 
refer to the evidence of Mr. D’Olier, and 
of others, but particularly Mr. Irving, 
who ftates, ** that if the bank were to in- 
vet part of its capita] m England, there- 
by furnifhing a fund which would at all 
times give it the means of drawing, it 
would in fuch cafe have a contrcul cover 
exchange’ operations, of fuch power as to 
enable it at all times to regulate the ex- 
change ;”” and he fays again ‘“* that he 
would confider a loan of 2, 3, or 
£-4,000,000 in England for the ufe of 
the government of Ireland, paid into the 
bank of England, to be placed there to 
the credit of the bank of Ireland, to ope- 
rate to all intents and purpofes as fuch 
fund.” Mr. Irving adds, ‘* that the crea- 
tion of fuch a fund in London might, and 
moft probably would, be attended with 
confiderabie expence to the bank, but the 
evil of the expence would be temporary, 
the good would be permanent to the bank: 
and to the public.”” This plan he fays, 
«< would neceflarily oblige the bank of 
Treland to be dealers in exchange, which 
would be a new fource of advantage that | 
would more than compenfate the addi- 
tional rifk and trouble.”” And your Com- 
mittee are inclined to think that the Union 
Meafure makes it expedient that they 
fhould deal fo now, whatever might have 
been their intereft or praétice before, and 
that it is the duty of both banks to endea- 
vour, to the utmoft of their power, to 
render the monty dealings between the 
two ccuntries as free from fluctuation, 
and at as fteacy a par at all times as it is 
between Edinburgh or Liverpool and 
London; and they agree entirely with 
that gentleman in his opinion, “* That a 
bank, ‘having an exclufive charter, exadis 
from its directors a two-fold duty, a duty 
‘to the proprietors and a duty to the pub- 
Report of the Committee on the State of Ireland. 
[02. 1, 
lic, which, operating together, would 
make the directors avoid iscrificing their 
duty towards the public to the intereft of 
the proprietors.” In th’s cafe however 
the intereft of the proprietors of the bank 
of Ireland and the public feems to be the 
fame, and there poffibly and probably is 
another fund, ‘which that jo:nt intereft 
might induce the direétors to inveft in the 
bank of England, or ufe for the benefit of 
the exchange, if they were legally em- 
powered, namely, whatever furplus they 
have of {pecie in their coffers, over and 
above what they are allowed by law to 
iffue, or what a due confideration of the 
circumftances of Ireland might fhew it 
prudent or neceffary for them to keep 
there. Of the amount of fuch furplus 
your Committee do not pretend to form 
any judgment; be it what it may, it is as 
ulclefs both to the bank and to the public 
where it lies, as if it were buried by them 
m theearth; but by being applied to free 
exchange from the mifchiets which opprefs 
it, it might be of effential fervice. Ifan 
unfavourable exchange fhould even take 
the whole of fuch {urplus out of the coun- 
try, which is by no means to be fuppoled, 
a favourable exchange, which would be 
the probabie eonfequence, mutt foon bring 
it back again, and mean time it would 
not only operate beneficially, but might 
have the advantage of being at leaft as 
completely fecured for the Irifh bank pro- 
prietors as it is now. 
Another -means of aiding the endea- 
vours of the bank in creating fuch a fund 
of credit in London cecurs—the vefting 
the government with power to iflue trea- 
fury bilis to the bank, not to be made ufe 
of unlefs they fhould be found neceffary 
to fupport that credit; and another and 
effe@iual refource {till remains—their en- 
larging their capital for the purpofe; fo 
that upon the whole of the government 
Joans in England, the rebundant fpecie 
now locked up, the contingent aid of 
treafury bills, and a power to the bank of 
enlarging its capital; your Committee 
cannot entertain a doubt of the praética- 
bility of what they recommend, nor that 
it ought to have the fure effect of reduc 
ing exchange to par. In cafe of fuch 
‘event, they would alfo ftrongly urge the 
doiug away the name of exchange, and 
putting an end to its calculation, hy equal- 
izing tne monies of account and monies of — 
circu ‘ation in both countries, and the fix- 
ing the future interchange by bills, at a 
ftated number of days, adequate to defray 
the expence of remitting at all times, fo as 
fully to adopt thé fame practice which 
prevails 
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