. accounted for to the uttermost farthing. 
‘tesimal transfer of energy (if any at all). 
Biosophy 
to be complete uncertainty as to when à particular indi- 
viduat atom will disintegrate. 
29. C. Finally, we have to look for an example 
of our third case, viz., Free Will.. The question we have 
to answer is, when you or I consider two alternatives 
as to a proposed action, is our decision an exercise of 
deliberate choice, i.e., of Free Will, or is it in reality 
forced on us by preceding circumstances? i.e., if any- 
one knew precisely the whole of these circumstances 
could he foretell with certainty what our action would 
be? Is Free Will, which most of us think we have, 
really an illusion, and does Necessity really govern us, 
or, as a further alternative, does Chance come in part 
upon the scene? Suppose that a man, on holiday, takes 
a walk along a country road which is quite unknown 
to him; the road ends in a T, with branches leading left 
and right, Which road will he take? Suppose also that 
an observer made it his business, hidden behind the 
hedge, to tabulate the actions of all the solitary holiday- 
makers who come to this cross-road. He might find 
statistically that 50% of his men went one way and 50% 
the other; on observing more closely he might find that 
all the 25% of tall fair men, apparently attracted by a 
distant glimpse of the sea, took the lefthand road; all 
the 2546 of short dark men seemed to be drawn by a 
group of pine trees and took the righthand road; the 
remaining 5090 took either road indiscriminately for 
all the observer could cas Krom the observer’s point 
of view he would conclude that there was a Statistical 
Law by which it could be foretold that 50% would go 
to the left and 50% to the right; that this Statistical 
Law covered 25% compelled by Necessity to go one 
way, and 25% compelled by Necessity to go the other; 
whilst, of the remaining 50%, although the Statistical 
Law held good, no prediction could be made as to the 
action of any one individual; but the observer would 
be at a loss to know whether Chance or Free Will was 
the leading factor in each of the latter 50% of cases. 
If one asked each of the individual holiday-makers why 
he took .the particular road, one would probably find 
him under the impression that he had taken it from 
choice, i.e., with the exercise of his free will; the obser- 
ver, on the other hand, would tend to be rather aenea] 
as to this. : 
30. The above example has left us rather didedided 
as to the existence of Free Will, which is only to be 
expected, as the question has exercised the minds of 
philosophers for generations. Let us, therefore, examine 
one or two points connected with Free Will a little more 
closely. The exercise of Free Will (if such exists) in 
an action, implies directly and primarily only an infini- 
When our 
holiday-maker decides to take the lefthand road, it is 
not his Free Will that does the work of carrying his 
body along that road, the work is all done by chemical 
(or we should now say electro-magnetic) agencies whose 
workings are now accounted for or are rapidly being 
When the cap- 
tain of a battleship “wills” to fire a broadside, enormous 
.power is released hy an ounce or two of pressure on a 
. 
ES 
button, and even this ounce or iwo is accounted for on 
scientific laws by the physiological processes of the 
firers body. All that we need postulate for‘ the exercise 
of an act of free will is the diversion of, it may be, one 
electron in the actor's brain, by an infinitesimal amount 
from its former course. Even that is probably a crude 
overstatement of the case from the energy point of view, 
because the whole tendency of modern physics is to 
show that our mechanical picture based on the behaviour 
of visible and even microscopical particles breaks down 
entirely in the inconceivably minute world of atom and. 
electron. We know these things exist, but we cannot 
represent them by a mechanical model sual as we use 
for the greater world, 
31. It has already been pointed out that some 
“laws” are now known to be “statistical laws"—true 
in the mass, but untrue as to the individual particle, 
whose precise conduct can not be predicted. It may be 
suggested that this uncertainty, appearing in this form 
in the simple atoms of matter, may, in the enormous 
molecular complexes of living organisms, manifest itself 
as Free Will. ^ Uncertainty in the behaviour of the 
constituents of simple atoms only affects the compara- 
tively limited sphere of those simple atoms and is quickly 
masked by “statistical law." But uncertainty in the 
behaviour of a constituent of the living organised com- 
plex may be expected to have much more far-reaching 
effects, because it has a much larger organised field 
to work on. One unit of uncertainty may thus leaven 
the whole mass, as far as the organic linkings of the 
organism extend. A hundredweight of iron may con- 
tain within itself countless myriads of infinitesimal un- 
certainty units of which the effects are smoothed out by 
statistical law; whereas a hundredweight of man may 
at any instant be under the control of one such infini- 
tesimal uncertainty unit, a control which perhaps mani- 
fests itself as Free Will. 
32. In this connection the chapters which follow, 
"on Life and Consciousness as a function of Chemical 
Complexity," may be referred to. 
33."Ehe word usually employed in science for 
. events under the rigid control of Natural Laws is Deter- 
minism, and for the reverse Indeterminism. I have 
rather avoided these words because, as so often happens 
with regard to words, they have a popular usage with a 
'very different meaning. The words Determined, Deter- 
mination are the same in origin as Determinism, but 
when we speak.of Napoleon as being determined, as 
being a man of iron will and determination, we are 
using the terms to suggest Free Will in extreme form, 
and in precisely the opposite sense to the “determinism” 
of the scientist. 
34, Determinism corresponds to Necessity. Indeter- 
minism includes Chance (which may be masked by 
Statistical Determinism) and (?) Free Will. 
35, If Biosophy accepts Free Will, as I think it 
may, at any rate as a working hypothesis, it does so 
on the following considerations, viz., that recent ad- 
vances in Physics are more favourable that otherwise; 
l 
| 
| 
| 
l 
| 
1 
