consists of “a lurking doubt whether the -Incomprehen- 
sible is really incomprehensible.” Evolution is due to 
the “instability of the homogeneous.” In “Principles 
oj Biology" he develops his scheme of evolution; he 
admits the transmission of acquired characters. 
"Principles of Psychology" derives the working of the 
adult mind from that of a child and from our animal 
ancestors. In regard to his “Principles of Sociology” 
Spencer has been classed politically as an individualist 
of extreme laissez faire type. “Principles of Ethics" 
completes the Synthetic Philosophy. 
49. Dr. Schiller sums up Spencer’s position as 
follows:—^His heroic attempt at a synthesis of all 
scientific knowledge could not but fall short of its aim. 
Living at the commencement of an epoch of unparalleled 
scientific activity, Spencer could not possibly sum up 
and estimate its total production. To the specialists 
in sciences which were advancing rapidly and in diver- 
gent directions to results which often reacted on and 
transformed their initial assumptions, Spencer has often 
appeared too much of a philosopher and defective in 
specialist knowledge. To the technical philosophers, 
who strictly confine themselves to the logical collation 
and criticism of scientific methods, he has, contrariwise, 
not seemed philosophic enough. Hence his doctrines 
were open to damaging attacks from both sides. It 
seems unlikely, therefore, that as a system the Synthetic 
Philosophy will prove long-lived; but this hardly de- 
tracts from its fruitfulness as a source of suggestion, or 
from the historic influence of many of its conceptions 
on the culture of the age.” 
50. Spencer is a Biosopher, but his great work is too 
abstract and too cumbersome to approach the character 
of a “Handbook of Biosophy.” It is not written for the 
"man in the street," and, so far as I remember, there is 
not a picture or diagram in all the ten volumes. Spencer 
is not a democrat, he writes for the elect. 
51. No two men could differ more widely than the 
socially persecuted Communist, Marx, and the scientifi- 
cally accepted individualist, Spencer, and if I am blamed 
for admitting either as a forerunner of Biosophy I would 
reply that the two are mutually complementary; 
Biosophy is neither Marxian nor Spencerian any more 
than it is Darwinian or Mendelian, Newtonian or 
Einsteinian; it looks for truth wherever the nearest 
approach is to be found. The Handbook of Biosophy 
I envisage is not a book written once for all by an 
author, but an institution constantly changing with the 
erowth of knowledge and keeping pace with the hoped- 
for rationalisation of human conduct, 
52. Biosophy, if it is destined to have any popular 
influence, will owe that, so far as Natural Science and 
Anti-clericalism are concerned, to the group of brilliant 
scientific men who, in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, devoted most of their work to popularising 
evolution and spreading a scientific philosophy 
variously known as Agnosticism, Rationalism, and Scien- 
tific Materialism. Their activities coincided with the 
spread of public education and the establishment of 
"mechanics! institutes" and the like. Those of us who 
Some Forerunners of Biosophy 
are old enough to remember the later of those days will 
recall the enthusiasm with which the new knowledge 
was received; perhaps it was only by a minority, but, 
nevertheless, a true age of reason appeared to be dawning 
for humanity. But a generation has passed and still the 
age of reason has not arrived; popular education not 
only made science available, it also let loose a flood 
of yellow journalism on the world; much as advance of 
technology has created fresh instruments of destruction 
for human life, 
53. John Tyndall (1820-1893) was no less great for 
his physical discoveries than for his popular scientific 
expositions. His “Belfast address" to the British Asso- 
ciation in 1874 will not be superseded for its concise 
and brilliant description of the early history of science 
and might with advantage be incorporated in the Hand- 
book of Biosophy. 
54. Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895) took, as a 
Biologist, the same place that Tyndall was taking as a 
Physicist. He was a great exponent of Darwinism and 
in his classic work, “Man’s Place in Nature’ (1863) 
brought the origin of man into the forefront of public 
interest, - 
55. On the Continent of Europe the equally distin- 
guished biologist, Ernst Haeckel, popularised the new 
knowledge by a philosophical treatment of the biology 
of man and other animals under the title “The Riddle 
αἱ the Universe.” 
56. Karl Pearson in The Grammar of Science 
(1892) appears as a Biosopher. This is particularly true 
of the introductory chapter, of which the opening para- 
graph runs as follows:—‘Within the past forty years so 
revolutionary a change has taken place in our apprecia- 
tion of the essential facts in the growth of human society 
that it has become necessary not only to rewrite history, 
but to profoundly modify our theory of life and gradu- 
ally, but none the less certainly, to adapt our conduct 
to the novel theory." “The slowness ought not to 
dishearten us, for one of the strongest factors of social 
stability is the inertness, nay, rather active hostility, 
with which human societies receive all new ideas." 
57. “Modern Science," says Professor Pearson, *as 
training the mind to an exact and impartial analysis of 
facts is an education specially fitted to promote sound 
citizenship.” “There is no sphere of inquiry which lies 
outside the legitimate field of science.” “The claims of 
science to our support depend on:—(a) The efficient 
mental training it provides for the citizen; (b) The light 
it brings to bear on many important social problems; 
(c) The increased comfort it adds to practical life; 
(d) The permanent gratification it yields to the aesthetic 
judgment." 
58. Of the remaining nine chapters seven are de- 
voted to mathematical and physical considerations of 
matter, motion, space and time, scientific law, etc., one 
to life and one to classification of the sciences. 
59. Apart therefore from the very interesting intro- 
ductory chapter and a brief treatment in the chapter on 
life, Professor Pearson does not carry on his survey into 
the domain of human sociology and politics, 
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