Chapter II]—Consciousness as a Function of Chemical Complexity 
early years of the 19th century. Democritus affirmed 
the multiplicity of elements, and considered that the 
atoms in themselves have no sensible quality, but that 
qualities are phenomena due to the arrangement of 
atoms. 
110. In these two ancient views of Empedocles and 
Democritus we have a crude, though rational, view of 
the universe, a view free from mysticism or supernatural 
bias; but it seems to me that the same cannot be said 
for the systems of some of the later and more celebrated 
Greek philosophers whom I now proceed to mention. 
lll. Plato, who lived from B.C. 430 to 347, 
believed in two co-existent worlds. His first world is 
the real or ideal world, the world of existence, in which 
abstract ideas are the only realities and the only basis 
of science or philosophy. His second world is the world 
of sense—of matter—or of phenomena, and is the subject 
matter of sensation and opinion. 
112. Aristotle, who was born B.C. 384, is considered 
the greatest intellect of antiquity, and his range of sound 
scientific knowledge was enormous; it is therefore rather 
disappointing that his view of the universe does.not give 
us much help in the present enquiry. ^ Aristotle held 
that matter exists in a three-fold form, He dis- 
tinguished—Firstly :—God, who as an absolute unmoved 
eternal substance is thought. 
substance, which, though perceived by the senses, is 
imperishable; he gives the heavenly bodies as examples 
of the higher substance. Thirdly:—the lower substance, 
perceptible by the senses, which is finite and perishable. 
113. The Stoic Philosophers held the following 
views:—‘There are two elements in nature. ‘The first is 
‘hule prote’ or primordial matter, the passive element 
from which things are formed. The second is the active 
element which forms things out of matter: reason— 
destiny ‘heimarmene’-—God. The divine reason, operat- 
ing upon matter, bestows upon it the laws which govern 
it, laws which the Stoics called ‘logoi spermatikoi’ or 
productive causes. God is the reason of the world.” 
(Lewes, p. 243.) i 
114. The only other ancient philosophy I need here 
mention is that of the Neo-Platonists of Alexandria, 
which is interesting, not so much for scientific soundness, 
but because it introduces three conceptions, viz.:—God 
as Trinity, the mystic Word “logos,” and the idea of 
creation by Emanation, which formed the basis of 
Christian philosophy. Neo-Platonism began with Philo, 
who was born a few years before Christ, and ended with 
Proclus, who was born A.D. 412. The Alexandrian 
Trinity of the Neo-Platonists included the three following 
“hypostases” of God:— . 
A. “To hen haploun," the one in all, the perfect 
principle which generates but is ungenerated. By 
“emanation” (1) generates (2), i.e. (2) is the “logos” 
or word of (1). 
Secondly:—the higher. 
99 
D. “Nous”—intelligence, pure thought abstracted 
from all thinking. By “emanation” (2) generates (3), 
ie, (3) is the “logos” or word of (2). 
C. "Psyche?—the soul of the world. 
God, as unity, is not existence, but he becomes 
existence by emanation of “Nous,” and again of 
[14 33 T [11 9. . . . . 
psyche,” and this: “psyche,” in its manifestations, is the 
world. 
115. Descartes, who lived from 1596 to 1649, and 
was one of the great founders of modern science and 
philosophy, held an interesting opinion on the subject 
of consciousness, which he considered as peculiar to 
man, and as forming a rigid partition between man and 
brute. According to him the human soul is a thinking 
immaterial being completely distinct from the body, 
which is extended and material. Nevertheless, the soul 
is united’ to the body at a particular point, the pineal 
gland of the brain. It is difficult to be sure that Descartes 
was absolutely sincere in his statement regarding the 
soul, because his was an age of much religious persecu- 
tion, and it would have been a dangerous heresy to 
compare the soul of man to that of animals. As Haeckel 
points out there is a good deal of inconsistency in 
Descartes’ views, which may be considered monistic as 
regards animals, dualistic as regards man. 
110. Du Bois Raymond, in his famous “ignorabimus” 
speech delivered at Leipsig in 1872, on the “Limits of 
Natural Science,” treated consciousness as an insoluble 
problem, and as being opposed to the other functions 
of the brain as a supernatural phenomenon. He stated 
that there are two insoluble enigmas; firstly:—the con- 
nection of matter and force and their distinctive charac- 
ter; secondly:—the problem of consciousness—the 
question how. our mental activity is to be explained by 
material conditions, how the substance which underlies 
matter and force comes, under certain conditions, to feel, 
to desire and to think. He suggests, however, tenta- 
tively that these two great world enigmas may be two 
aspects of one and the same problem. 
117. Haeckel in “The Riddle of the Universe,” 
published in 1899, devotes a great deal of attention to 
the subject of consciousness. This book is intended by 
Haeckel to demonstrate his monistic system of philo- 
sophy and is very well worth reading. ^ He appears, 
however, inconsistent with his monistic principles in his 
view of consciousness. He separates the idea of the 
soul from that of consciousness; and whereas he allows 
soul to the protozoa and to all cells, and speaks of 
cell-souls, tissue-souls and nerve-souls in the higher ani- 
mals, he denies consciousness to the lower invertebrates. 
He says, "Personally I take that theory to be most 
probable which holds the centralisation of the nervous 
system to be a condition of consciousness. , . . The 
presence of a central nervous system, highly-developed 
sense-organs, and an elaborate association of groups of 
presentations, seem to me to be required before the unity . 
of consciousness is possible.” 
